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THE BROKEN WORD: THE THEME OF COMMUNICATION FAILURE
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY LITERATURE
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE PATHOS OF CŒMUNICATION
. . . the Renaissance and our own era are alike in having much 
that is new in them, both have seen the rapid breakdown of 
what belonged to slow evolutionary growth, of a society held 
together by traditional codes of conduct, of power modified by 
common ethical values and judgments. Our revolutions followed 
by dictatorships, our almost omnipotent states and ubiquitous 
politics, return to Machiavelli's world, except that we are 
aware of dangers that would have appalled him.^
Certain moments in history find a people preoccupied with some 
particular psychological, sociological, or philosophical problem. This 
preoccupation often assumes ühe. complexion of a veritable pathos. When 
this happens, vast numbers of problems, vast numbers of cultural phenom­
ena become identified with, and are explained in terms of, the predomi­
nating "suffering" of the age. Some particular problem becomes, as it 
were, a kind of ideological scapegoat, a problem that is burdened with 
all other problems. At such times, a majorityof'aculture's population 
feel that if this one "scapegoat problem" were to be solved, then their 
world and their lives would return to normal, the major difficulties of 
existence would be overcome.
^J. B. Priestley, Literature and Western Man (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1960), pp. 16-17.
Usually this exaggerated concern with a problem, this governing 
preoccupation, occurs in an age that is beset with extreme crisis or con­
fusion. At those times in history when traditional values seem inadequate, 
when established world-views seem more fiction than fact, when the universe 
itself, or the social structure, or the human psyche, is being seen anew 
in the light of new discoveries and realizations, then a people seek, it 
seems, some unifying ideology, some monolithic explanation, some generally 
recognized fault in the nature of things to which society can relate its 
failures and by which society can explain its frustrations.
The pathos of mutability that occurred in England late in the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth century can be cited as an example. In 
those momentous years when men witnessed the decline of the old universe 
of scholastic thought and medieval tradition and the rise of the new uni­
verse of inductive reasoning and disrupted social patterns, an intense 
preoccupation with "order" and "degree" emerged, a preoccupation "common 
to all Elizabethans of even modest intelligence."^ This preoccupation 
in turn engendered the pathos of the age— a fear of negated order. "If 
Elizabethans believed in an ideal order animating earthly order, they were 
terrified lest it should be upset and appalled by the visible tokens of 
disorder that suggested its upsetting."^ The Elizabethan pathos, and the 
Jacobean continuation of that pathos, was an obsession with "the fear of 
chaos and the fact of mutability."^ To maintain order and to conquer time 
was the ideological quest of a people at a time when the crisis of science
^E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture (New York; The 
Macmillan Co., 1944), p. 10.
^Ibid.. p. 13.
^Ibid.
3versus faith was yet to be resolved, when new cosmological and ontological 
explanations had yet adequately to replace the old vision and the old 
understanding.
Such preoccupations, as they appear at various critical moments 
in history, have a general structure or anatomy. À first phase of such 
a pathos is usually a philosophic or scientific preparation, a period of 
intellectual questioning of the universe in which new theories and new 
organizing concepts of the world appear. A second phase is one of edu­
cated recognition of the problem and an educated and even belletristic 
articulation of it. A third phase is that of the popular acceptance of 
the pathos, the period in which the "problem" is discussed by the man on 
the street and every schoolboy becomes an expert on the nature of the 
problem and its solution. Roughly these phases are sequential, though 
a great deal of overlapping occurs. The scientific-philosophic phase 
comes first, but it may continue into the subsequent phases; the scientific- 
philosophic questioning does not necessarily come to an end simply because 
educated articulation begins or because popular acceptance occurs. Erasmus, 
Machiavelli, and Copernicus may in their individual ways have instituted 
the first phase of what was to become the Elizabethan pathos, yet long 
after Shakespeare, Spenser, and Marlowe had effected the second phase, 
the first phase continued in the work of Galileo, Bacon, and Kepler. Like­
wise the second phase of educated recognition and articulation does not 
cease with the advent of the third phase; popular acceptance and concern 
does not quiet authors and artists— the Jacobean dramatists and the meta­
physical poets were still examining and expressing the pathos of chaos 
and mutability even after the common Englishman had begun to relate great
4numbers of his perennial problems to the lack of order and degree and to 
the inevitability of time's ruthless progress.
Nearly every age, of course, has had a pathos. The eighteenth 
century, for instance, had its preoccupation with the ideas of nature, 
reason, and taste— a pathos of "natural decorum." Eut some preoccupations, 
like that in the eighteenth century, are fortunately more unifying than 
problematical, are more an answer than a question. Sometimes the scienc 
tific or intellectual event that sets the tone for an age is more construc­
tive than disturbing. The difference between Newton and Copernicus, for 
instance, is in part that Newton provided an answer and rationale that 
served Western man until modern times, while Copernicus exploded an old 
universe, tore down the old foundation before the culture had time to 
shift position, to readjust and reorient. Both Copernicus and Newton 
dealt with the same "truth" and the same view of the universe, but 
Copernicus' contribution created cultural problems while Newton, resolv­
ing those problems, provided answers.
In many ways, the contribution of Charles Darwin, in the middle 
of the nineteenth century, is comparable to that of Copernicus. If the 
date 1543, when Copernicus published the De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium. 
is the beginning of a disturbing epoch, then the date 1859, when Darwin 
published The Origin of the Species, is similarly epoch-marking, too. For 
the acceptance of Darwin's biology, just as did the acceptance of Copernicus' 
astronomy, necessitated a revision of man's understanding of himself and 
his world, and opened the door to a period of confusion, misunderstanding, 
and intellectual strife as man struggled to make sense out of his universe 
and to achieve some articulate realization of himself and his place in
5reality. And just as Copernicus' description of the heavens helped insti­
tute the chain of intellectual events that promulgated the Elizabethan and 
Jacobean pathos, so Darwin's description of man's genesis helped institute 
the sequence of intellectual considerations that has led to the pathos of 
the twentieth century.
In the hundred years since Darwin brought to a climax the evolu­
tionary theories of the early nineteenth century, the phases leading to 
a major intellectual mid-twentieth-century preoccupation have occurred, 
and in the years following World War II, a pathos has developed in Western 
culture with its roots in the Darwinian revolution and the whole series 
of scientific, philosophic, and cultural mutations that occurred in the 
wake of Darwinian thought. The anatomy of this pathos is marked, roughly, 
by a rather long speculative and theoretical first phase that begins with 
Darwin, 1859, gathers momentum around 1880, and develops fully by the 
beginning of World War I. The second phase, the literary and aesthetic, 
occurs most richly in the period between the wars, 1919-1941. And the 
third phase, the real period of the pathos as a popular phenomenon, has 
dominated large areas of cultural life in the postwar period of the late 
forties, fifties, and sixties.
2.
This twentiety-century pathos has been the pathos of communica­
tions. In the past two decades especially, Western man has become obsessed 
and preoccupied with a breakdown of communications, with man's inability 
to say what he means and to communicate with others, with man's tragic 
isolation, loneliness, and alienation as the result of his inability to 
bridge the gap from his intelligence to that of another. "Failure of
6mental communication is painfully in evidence nearly everywhere we choose 
to look,"^ we are told. And this failure is occuring concurrently, 
strangely enough, with an increased desire to communicate: in our century
" . . .  something has happened to our relation with language which seems 
to require that we make methodical and explicit what was once immediate 
and unformulated.Also paradoxically, in our century we have seen the 
development of the most sophisticated, elaborate, and extensive systems 
of communication ever devised on earth; ours has been a century of high­
speed presses, national distribution of newspapers and magazines; of tele­
phones, telegraphs, and radios; of movies and television. Never before 
in the history of the world have so many people talked with so many people 
at such great distances. We are as close to one another as the flick of 
a telephone dial or the fastening of a postage stamp. Yet never in his­
tory has man been so concerned over his failure to communicate with other 
human beings. Twentieth-century man hurls into space his communication 
satellites, his radar beams, his radio-equipped interplanetary probes, 
yet he is increasingly frightened by the seemingly inevitable silence 
that surrounds his soul, by the lingering darkness that surrounds the 
island of his individual mind through which, he begins to suspect, he 
can never completely or even adequately penetrate.
Man cannot communicate, we are told, because of the very nature 
of the universe and reality and our own limited intellectual capacity. 
Modem science has opened doors that reveal a meaningless and indescribable
^Stuart Chase, The Tyranny of Words (New York; Harcourt, Brace & 
Co., 1938), p. 19.
^Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (Garden City: Doubleday 
& Co., 1959), pp. 178-79.
7universe, and as "the very concept of existence becomes meaningless,"^ 
then " . . .  the only way of reacting to this is to shut up. We are con-
g
fronted with something truly ineffable." We grow mute in the face of the
universe, because our language proves totally inadequate to express what
we see, because " . . .  our neat language has lately become increasingly
inadequate to express recent observations of nature. And if language
is not equal to the recent observations of nature then it is a weak and
deceptive medium that in no other area of experience is trustworthy; all
our faith in it is shattered. It is blasphemous, therefore, to ignore the
limits of language, to "assume that one's words do indeed tell . . . what
is going on. There is an important sense in which nobody knows what he
is talking a b o u t . A n d  we arrive at the pathetic realization that
. . . the glass of language is flawed, and as man looks through 
it back into the past and out into the present, his view is 
distorted and blurred. Individually and collectively he is 
linguistically maladjusted. Not understanding himself, he fails 
to understand others. Such misunderstanding may lead to fears, 
anxieties, conflicts, and disasters which might have been less­
ened or prevented if man were able to communicate properly.
But does the fault all lie in the universe or in the language medium? Does
not the fault lie in man's misuse of language, his failure to manipulate
the language properly, his failure to take care in his communication
^James B. Conant, Modem Science and Modem Man (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1952), p. 51.
^Ibid.
^Walker Gibson (ed.), The Limits of Language (New York: Hill &
Wang, 1962), p. 50.
% b i d .. p. 113.
^^Kelly Thurman (ed.), Semantics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1960), p. viii.
8experience? Is it not "an unconscious misuse of man's most human attri- 
butes— thinking and its tool, language*!?^
Such ponderings are, of course, a part of the pathos itself. And 
regardless whether they are right or wrong, true or false, they have led 
to the widespread and popular lamentations in the twentieth century over 
the breakdown of communications, to the hue and cry for improved communi­
cations, to the explanations of many of our ills in terms of communication 
success or failure. Tragic positions are taken. Hopeful positions are 
taken. Positions of every kind are taken regarding man's articulative 
relationship with fellow man. In nearly every area of modern life, men 
or various responsibilities and commitments have had something to say 
about the subject.
From the pulpit to the comic strip— and at every way station in 
between— the pathos of communications flourishes. Recently the Very Rev. 
James A. Pike, Episcopal Bishop of the Diocese of California, in answer­
ing the question, "What is the world's greatest need?" said: "To my mind,
the world's greatest need now is for communication . . .  we are still mak­
ing only a beginning at real communication." He pointed out the presence 
of communication problems in the home, in national life, and in interna­
tional relations. "Some readers may wonder why as a clergyman I didn't 
say that the world's greatest need is God. Of course it is. But the 
knowledge of God comes through people— people who can communicate. Com­
munication is the very essence of God." Bishop Pike then quoted the first 
verse of the Gospel according to St. John, and went on to say: "As made
in God's image, man's greatest gift is his ability to communicate. When
^^Chase, op. cit.. p. 19.
9he loses it, he is hardly a man. Yet we are losing it— or, worse still, 
having it, refusing to use it.”^^
We realize how extensive the pathos of communication is when so
distinguished a churchman recognizes our need to communicate as the "world's
greatest need," and we realize how extensive the pathos is, also, when an
editor of The New Yorker is able to interpret a phenomenon of social be-
havior--the Twist, a dance that flourished for a brief time in the early
sixties— as evidence of our communication problems:
A dance, we suggest, is a socially performed parable of sexual 
relations. The minuet, with its intrigue-like shifts of posi­
tion and its subtle homage to a Clockwork Universe, offered the 
Age of Reason a contemporary frame for this perennial parable.
Cool fingers touch, eyes glance, lids lower, fans tilt and 
quiver, and all the while the little buckled feet tidily slither 
and patter through the pattern of a secure rationale. Whereas 
in the Twist a man and woman, isolated not only from everybody 
else but from each other, eyes closed, teeth clinched, perform 
one monotonous motion to rigorously monotonous music. It is 
very beautiful. Across the little space between the man and 
the woman a call goes forth, but the space remains, and they 
never touch, poignantly acting out the Breakdown of Communica­
tions for which our century is celebrated. We live in the Age 
of Unconsummation . . . .^^
And everywhere we look, like manifestations of the pathos are 
apparent. In the years since World War II, our university courses in 
Freshman English composition have become courses in Communications, while 
at the same time the most interesting avant-guarde segment of American 
youth— the notorious postwar Beat.Generation— are obviously "determinedly 
antiverbal . . . lying on beaches in Zenlike silence,accepting
^^"What Is the World's Greatest Need?" The New York Times 
Magazine. April 2, 1961, p. 39.
^^"Notes and Comments," The New Yorker. May 19, 1962, p. 31.
^^Gibson, op. cit.. p. 112.
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wholeheartedly the Zen observation that
Words cannot describe everything.
The heart's message cannot be delivered In words.
If one receives words literally, he will be lost.
If he tries to explain with words, he will not attain 
enlightenment In this llfe.^^
And even so popular an art form as the American comic strip— reflecting 
as It often does the Issues of the postwar soclety--ls riddled with satire 
on communication failures, with pointing out the humor of various semantic 
situations. In one Installment of the strip Dennis the Menace, the bal­
loons read as follows:
Dennis: (Rushing Into the kitchen). Mom, do we have any bug
killer?
Mother: What?
Dennis: When Grandpa said "Goodnight," he said, "Don't let the
Bedbugs bite!"
Mother: Oh, he was joking!
Dennis: Was he jokln' about "gettln' up with the chickens," too?
Mother: Uh-huh.
Dennis: Where does Grandpa get all those new jokes?
Mother: I don't know, honey . . . .  Where are you going?
Dennis: Back to Grandpa's room! Maybe he was jokln' about bein'
tired, too!
Mother: Grandpa wasn't joking about that, dear. I could tell.
Dennis: Yea? How? He never winks !
Dennis In this situation Is faced with a semantic problem. How Is he to 
know what the words mean? How Is he to orient himself to the communication
^^Paul Reps (comp), Zen Flesh. Zen Bone: A Collection of Zen and
Pre-Zen Writings (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1957)» p. 150.
^^The Tulsa World. May 27, 1962.
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of his grandparent? How to tell a joke from the serious statement? And 
the fact th't Hank Ketchem can make humor out of a communication problem 
is a reflection upon our age. Likewise another popular strip, called 
simply B.C.. a satire on our age presented in the guise of stone-age life, 
deals frequently and extensively with communication. For one whole season 
the comic strip dealt with man's problem in naming the objects of his 
world, and in one particular strip we see a stone-age man cast into the 
waters a large stone slab bearing the message, "Our winter is very cold. 
What is your winter like?" Two panels go by while he waits for an answer. 
Finally another stone slab floats into shore; the stone-age man picks it 
up and reads it; all it says is, "Winter?"^^ This, of course, is a seman­
tic joke; a seeing something funny in man's difficulty in finding a common 
language, common terms, common definitions. The joke--presented to a mass 
audience— is meaningful to the mass audience because of popular semantic 
awareness, because of popular familiarity with communication problems.
Another Instance of the widespread pathos is seen in the popular
newspaper advice column. Howard Whitman, writing a column entitled "Making
Marriage More Rewarding," opened one column, under the headline "Don't
Stop Communicating with Your Soul Mate," with this observation:
Animals, said an ancient sage, do not talk because they have 
nothing to say. But people do. And in marriage, talk is at 
once the greatest balm for trouble and the surest way for two 
people to become the soul mates they have always wanted to be.
For some reason our generation has produced more than its share 
of clams.
When the "How to be Happy" columns of popular journals deal, naturally and
^^Ibid.. January 8, 1963.
^^Ibid.. October 18, 1962.
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easily, with the problem of communications, then we know the problem has 
become a cultural possession, that we are faced, not with a simple aca­
demic question, but with a problem of truly "pathetic" proportions.
We don't talk. When we do talk, we misuse the language. In 
either case, we don't communicate. But if we could truly communicate, we 
would do away with many of our problems. So the argument seems to go— in 
the sermon, in the comic strip, in the what have you. LGn one side we 
are faced with the imperative: communicate— it is our greatest need; we 
can do it if we try. On the other side, we are faced with the tragic ob­
servation: we can never communicate— it is impossible to do so because
of the nature of man, his universe, and his language. And from both sides 
comes the constantly iterated "truth": Communications have broken down.
Regardless whether the situation is correctible or not, man is not com­
municating at the present time. And he is suffering because of his fail­
ure. And in the face of such statement's, modern man has grown semantically 
self-conscious, deeply concerned with language, deeply concerned with what 
direction he should take.
3.
Nowhere has a consideration of this entire phenomenal concern with 
communications been more effectively presented than in the great master­
pieces of twentieth-century literature. In both American and British 
literature of our age, the pathos of communication has found moving, pro­
found, and perceptive articulation. Especially in that ; reat period of 
modern literature, the period between the two great wars, do we find var­
ious demonstrations of and commentaries upon the pathos of communication. 
Even before the pathos became popular in the forties, fiftie'^, and sixties.
13
many of the great writers of the twenties and thirties had given their 
formulations of the pathos of communication, had assimilated the pathos 
of communication into their various world visions, had incorporated an 
awareness of communications into their understanding of life and their 
depiction of reality.
The semantic awareness, the understanding of communications, that 
occurs in modern literature is important for several reasons: First, the
articulated semantic awareness in our great literature stands as a contri­
bution to the popular acceptance and development of the pathos of communi­
cations. The exceptional body of interbellum literature in both America 
and Britain serves, in general, as the second phase of the anatomy of our 
modem pathos. Second, an author's semantic awareness can throw light on 
our communication problems, may serve to instruct us about man's need to 
communicate, his possibilities of doing so, his use of language, and the 
like. The literature may, indeed, help us find direction, may show us 
what to do. Third, the semantic awareness that appears in any one author's 
writings is an essential key to understanding that author's Weltanschauung, 
his message and meaning in general; and, therefore, a recognition of an 
author's semantic awareness contributes to our over-all literary experience.
For these reasons, the isolating of an author's semantic awareness 
is a significant task, and to isolate various patterns or modes of semantic 
awareness in twentieth-century literature, the awareness growing out of 
and becoming a part of our age's pathos, is the purpose of this study. 
Acknowledging without argument the existence of a pathos of communications, 
we can legitimately explore the significant literature of our times to 
see what various directions various authors have taken in their handling
14
of semantic problems. And after examining twentieth-century literature 
in general, in order to determine the scope of semantic awareness as it 
occurs in drama, fiction, and verse, we can with reward examine in some 
detail the semantic awareness of three representative figures--Eugene 
O'Neill, James Joyce, and T. S. Eliot— who, each in his own special way, 
have articulated the essential modes and approaches apparently available 
to twentieth-century man in-dealing with the problems of communications 
and in incorporating an understanding of communications into the fabric 
of their lives.
Before making this examination, however, we may well-Tin akind 
of prologue— ask ourselves some questions about semantic awareness prior 
to our age and some questions about the scientific-philosophic development 
(the first phase) that brought our pathos of communication into existence.
CHAPTER II
SEMANTIC AWARENESS: THE OLD ORDER
There is an ancient Arabian story about a poet who composed a 
satire about his Sultan. The Sultan was very displeased but 
he pretended that the poet was still in favour and sent him 
on a special mission to the Sultan of Baghdad, carrying cer­
tain papers. The poet . . . could not read but, while cross­
ing the desert, he met a wise old man who could do so. The 
old man took the papers from the poet and read them to him.
One was a request for an armed guard to meet a caravan which 
would shortly be travelling north; another was a suggestion 
that the two Sultans might exchange daughters in marriage to 
one another; the third was a warrant for the execution of the 
poet.
When he read this last, the old man urged the poet to de­
stroy it and continue with only the remaining two articles of 
his embassy. But the poet replied with a little poem which, 
translated roughly, ran: 'Great is the power of the spoken
word, but even greater is that of the written. Let it never 
be said that I who have lived by the spoken word, attempted 
to destroy that which is written.' Having said those words, 
he gathered his papers from the old man and continued on his 
way toward Baghdad and his death.^
Semantic awareness has not been an intellectual development pecul­
iar to the post-Darwinian world. From the eleventh to the fifteenth cen­
turies a semantic awareness prevailed among the Schoolmen, who made ex­
tended efforts to verbalize the sacred mysteries in order that the mys­
teries might serve as a basis for human reason. Theologically oriented, 
scholastic semantic concern was with definition and distinction of meta­
physical terms. In the several centuries from the Renaissance to the
^"The Poet's Voice," The Times Literary Supplement. July 14, 1961,
p. 425.
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second half of the nineteenth century, a semantic awareness^— of greater 
dimension than that of the medieval era--existed that, as it is articu­
lated through British and American literature, acknowledges certain lan­
guage phenomena and draws certain definite conclusions about communication 
and man's use of the language medium. In the post-Renaissance, pre-Darwinian 
era of Western culture, the need and desire for communication was recog­
nized, the power of the word was acknowledged, the reality of various kinds 
of communication (non-lexical as well as verbal) was admitted. The pre'- 
Darwinian culture acknowledged that articulation and verbalization was a 
vital human experience, that inarticulation contributed to cultural dete­
rioration rather than progress, that indeed, "One good deed, dying tongue- 
less/ Slaughters a thousand waiting upon that." The pre-Darwinian culture 
recognized certain psychological aspects of articulation, certain thera­
peutic factors in verbalizations; recognized that it is "the silent griefs 
which cut the heartstrings," and that alleviation of sorrow can come with 
"the opening out of griefs." So certain was the pre-Darwinian culture of 
the need for articulation (and articulation was considered the equivalent 
of communication) that even when men were confronted with meaningless 
words and expressions they were inclined, as they were in the face of 
Ophelia's fanciful and mad talk, to read into the articulation some mean- 
for themselves: " . . .  they aim at it,/ And botch the words up fit to
their own thoughts."
Indeed, in the pre-Darwinian world, the power of the word was un­
disputed. Hamlet, in his advice to the players, clearly extolls the power
9
Rooted to a certain extent in such classical language treatises 
as Plato's Cratylus and Aristotle's De Interprétations and Categoriae.
17
of the word to effect emotional revelations in listeners; throughout the 
age, words could stir men's souls, could soothe men's minds, could enter 
like daggers into the ear. But the word was not the only means of com­
munication. The pre-Darwinian world had faith, it seems, whereas the post- 
Darwinian world has lost nearly all faith, that even "dumb discourse" 
could be "excellent," and that "The silence often of pure innocence/ 
Persuades, when speaking fails." In general, there was a major appreci­
ation of the word and its use and a generally optimistic assumption that 
communication could be achieved with the word or, if the word failed, with 
some other medium of expression.
2 .
Such an optimistic semantic awareness did not preclude, however, 
certain observations about language and observations of language problems. 
The problems of ambiguity and definitions, diverse languages, and discrep­
ancies between words and events were all recognized by pre-Darwinian 
"semanticists." Locke, for instance, recognized that "confusion arises 
from the ambiguity of the words we use as symbols of our ideas, which only 
too often do not fit them exactly and which suggest other ideas besides
O
those of which they are the name." From Shakespeare's puns and quibbles 
to Coleridge's observation that "Controversy is not seldom excited in 
consequence of the disputants attaching each a different meaning to the 
same word, the problem of ambiguity is discussed in the semantically- 
alert literature of the pre-Darwinian world.
A. G. Fuller, A History of Philosophy (Rev. ed.; New York; Henry 
Holt and Company, 1945), p. 132.
^Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographie Literaria (London: J. M. Dent 
and Sons; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1906), p. 164.
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Some of the problems of definition were also acknowledged in this
earlier period. Berkeley had recognized that "there is no such thing as
one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they
all signifying indifferently a great number of particular i d e a s . A n d
as late as the mid-nineteenth century, such Victorian writers as Ruskin
and Arnold were toying with various definitional plagues. Ruskin, in
Modern Painters, worries over the definition of such philosophical terms
as beauty and truth, and over the definition of terms, especially as terms
are applied to art:
Nothing is more common than to hear people who desire to be 
thought philosophical, declare that 'beauty is truth,' and 
'truth is beauty.' . . . The fact is, truth and beauty are
entirely distinct, though often related things. One is a
property of statements, the other of objects. The statement 
that 'two and two make four' is true, but it is neither beau­
tiful nor ugly, for it is invisible; a rose is lovely, but 
it is neither true nor false, for it is silent. That which 
shows nothing cannot be fair, and that vdiich asserts nothing 
cannot be false . . .  in things concerning art, the words true 
and false are only to be rightly used while the picture is 
considered as a statement of facts.^
And Arnold, in his essay "Sweetness and Light," worries about definitions 
of words peculiar to certain limited groups. He regrets that "men have 
got such a habit of giving to the language of religion a special applica­
tion, of making it a mere jargon . . and he considers nothing more 
pathetic "than to see people . . . employ . . . language which properly
C
Fuller, OP. cit.. p. 145.
^John Ruskin, Modern Painters. Ill--Part IV: Of Many Things,
Chapter III, "Of the Real Nature of Greatness of Style," Note 7, in William 
E. Buckler (ed.), Prose of the Victorian Period (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1958), p. 352.
^Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1924), p. 22.
19
Q
applies only to complete perfection." Sir William Temple, earlier. In 
1690, had, simply by his argument for an easy solution, admitted to the 
definitional problem: "The best Is to take words as they are most com­
monly spoken and meant, like coin as It Is most currently passed without 
raising scruples upon the weight of the alloy, unless the cheat or the 
defect be gross and evident
A more Important, and more widely discussed, problem to the pre- 
Darwlnlan world was that of diverse languages. Though certain authors 
and philosophers had recognized the problems In ambiguity and definition, 
they had not developed any great concern over communication as a result, 
had not worried a great deal about any communication failure. With diverse 
languages the matter was someidiat different. Latin, of course, had long 
served as a kind of universal tongue, but as the old medieval unity more 
and more disappeared In the post-Renalssance centuries, and as nationalism 
and Its attendant Engllsh-for-the-Engllsh and French-for-the-French psy­
chology made progress, the problem of talking on an International level 
began to appear. When one man spoke French and one man spoke English, 
with neither one a Milton and with Latin scarcely practical outside school 
and church, a communication barrier existed that could not be Ignored.
One simply had to say, "You speak a language that I understand not." But 
even In the face of this unavoidable obstacle, no great "suffering" about 
communication took place, at least not until late In the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and even at those moments of greatest concern, an
^Ibld.. p. 21.
^Slr William Temple, "Of Poetry," Eighteenth Century Poetry and 
Prose, ed. Louis I. Bredvold, Alan D. McKlllop, and Lois Whitney (New 
York: The Ronald Press, 1939), p. 128.
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attitude of acceptance rather than frustration seemed to prevail. Early 
in the pre-Darwinian era, late in the Renaissance, the "foreign language" 
problem seemed more amusing than frustrating, as is the case in Henry V . 
Kate's French and Henry's English meet head-on, but the result is more 
comic than tragic. And even as the decades passed, and the "foreign lan­
guage" problem was seen as more and more a barrier, especially to world­
wide communications, very hopeful systems for universal languages were 
proposed, a prime example being that set forth by John Wilkins in his 
Essay Toward a Real Character (1668). Wilkins, in the glow of Restoration 
optimism, assumed that the spirit of rationalism would make a universal 
language practicable. Yet no such language was forthcoming, in spite of 
Wilkins' elaborate plans for one, and by the eighteenth century a general 
feeling was, as Thomas Paine said, that "human language, more especially 
as there is not an universal language, is incapable of being used as an 
universal means of unchangeable and uniform information."^^ Human lan­
guage, as Paine realized, was local and changeable, and this regionalism 
and mutability presented a serious obstacle to communication--but only, 
so it seemed at the time, to communication on a universal scale. The 
"foreign language" problem seemed to have no effect upon communication 
among individuals. Only a few men, such as Coleridge, saw that the "for­
eign language" problem was but a variation of a deeper problem that might 
spoil communications among individuals: Coleridge, for instance, saw that
two men, both speaking English, might in reality be speaking diverse 
tongues. "Every man's language varies," said Coleridge, "according to
l^ihomas Paine, "The Age of Reason," American Poetry and Prose.
2 vols.; ed. Norman Foerster (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), I, p. 204.
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the extent of his knowledge, the activity of his faculties, and the depth 
or quickness of his feelings. Every man's language has, first, its indi­
vidualities; secondly, the common properties of the class to which he be­
longs; and thirdly, words and phrases of universal use."^^ Just as 
Coleridge suggested that difficulty in finding common language "has proved 
the weightiest obstacle to the progress of our most zealous and adroit 
m i s s i o n a r i e s ,"12 in their work with uncivilized tribes, so the difficulty 
in finding common language, Coleridge implies, proves a weighty obstacle 
in the communion among men who would seem otherwise to be in a position 
to understand one another.
More serious even than the "foreign language" problem, however, 
was the problem of discrepancy between words and events of words and real­
ities. Well aware that men "will speak daggers . . . but use none," the 
pre-Darwinian semanticists realized that words spoken do not always relate 
accurately to behavior, to thought, to event. Words can fly up to heaven 
indeed, while thoughts remain below. In general, the trouble seems to be 
that men wilfully misuse words, failing to match words honestly and accu­
rately; that is, the problem seems to be a social or moral one rather than 
strictly linguistic, and the statements involving this semantic awareness 
are frequently statements of social criticism. The Fool in Lear speaks 
of those men who are priests "more in words than matter"; Bentham, the 
philosopher, chides Socrates and Plato with talking nonsense, with a mo-
1 O
rality that consists only of words; and Coleridge damns
^^Coleridge, op. cit.. p. 189.
l^ibid.. p. 188.
■'quoted In Matthew Arnold, op. cit.. p. 35.
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. . . all our dainty terms for fratricide;
Terms which we trundle smoothly o'er our tongues 
Like mere abstractions, empty sounds to which 
We join no feeling and attach no form!
There was some awareness, of course, that words were inadequate for the 
expression of reality, as when Cordelia says that her love is "More pon­
derous than my tongue," and therefore comes to the conclusion, "Love, and 
be silent." But in general the feeling is that, linguistically, words can 
be equal to things, as Dr. Johnson observes in the Preface to Shakespeare, 
but that frequently, in communication, words do not truly represent the 
real state of affairs because men misuse language, the misuse being a moral 
or social crime rather than a strictly linguistic one.
3.
Obviously, the more perceptive pre-Darwinian semanticists recog­
nized in the problems of ambiguity and definition, foreign language bar­
riers, and word-reality discrepancies certain essential inadequacies of 
language and the resulting inadequacy and imperfectness of communication. 
Certainly Francis Bacon recognized such a thing as poor communication and 
blamed it upon language: " . . .  whenever an understanding of greater
acuteness or a more diligent observation would alter those lines to suit 
the true division of nature, words stand in the way and resist change.
And Locke, perhaps the first of the true semanticists, recognized, in his 
questioning of the thought process itself, a certain censorship operating
l^Coleridge, "Fears in Solitude" (11. 113-116), The Complete 
Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. E. H. Coleridge (Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1912), p. 260.
15j. M. Robertson (ed.). The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon 
(London: G. Routledge, 1905), p. 269.
23
within the mind itself to inhibit articulation and communication. Indeed, 
"Locke has no illusions about the accuracy of verbal communication,"^^ 
and though he tried to work out in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
an explanation of the mind's function and the symbolic processes the mind 
uses, he could not ignore the limitations on human intellect. Likewise 
Coleridge, who has been called by some the first semasiologist, "was deeply 
interested in the philosophical implications of language and sensitive to 
the problems of communication. He conceived a word as a focal point of 
thought, whose sources are forever h i d d e n , a n d  returns from his study 
of the unconscious with a "new approach to the study of language and 
signs''^® and with "subtle modern ideas on semantics.
The interesting thing, however, about these semantic observations 
is that they do not arrive at anything approaching the twentieth-century 
pathos of communications. Even these most alert semantic observers seem 
to assume that reform and improvement are possible and that whatever se­
mantic problems do exist can be overcome, that communication itself need 
not be seriously or permanently impaired, that only certain readjustments 
need to be made. Especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
a belief in science promoted an essentially optimistic attitude toward 
communication. Certainly it was believed that "science was one field in
^^Ralph Renwick, Jr., "Seventeenth-Century Semanticists," ETC.,
XIX (May, 1962), p. 90.
^^Kathleen Raine, Coleridge (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1953),
p. 32.
l*Ibid.
IQ
Donald A. Stauffer, "Introduction," The Selected Poetry and Prose 
of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (New York: Modem Library, 1951), p. xxiii.
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which xleàr communication would be p o s s i b l e , e v e n  if faulty communica­
tion remained in the popular area. Locke, as one of the leaders of the 
scientific-philosophic movement of the late seventeenth century, proposed 
a number of semantic reforms, applicable especially to scientific commu­
nications, but with implications for communications in general. Inters 
estingly enough, the "first step" he proposed had to do not with the nature 
of language but with the nature of man:
. . . methin^ those who pretend seriously to search after 
or maintain truth, should think themselves obliged to study 
how they might deliver themselves without obscurity, doubtful­
ness, or equivocation, to which men's words are naturally 
liable, if care be not taken. . . . How many are there, that, 
when they would think on things, fix their thoughts only on 
words, especially when they would apply their minds to moral 
matters? And who they can wonder if the result of such con­
templations and reasonings, about little more than sounds, 
whilst the ideas they annex to them are very confused and 
very unsteady, or perhaps none at all; who can wonder, 1 say, 
that such thoughts and reasonings end in nothing but obscurity 
and mistake, without any clear judgment or knowledge? . . .
For language being the great conduit, whereby men convey their 
discoveries, reasonings, and knowledge, from one to another, 
he that makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the 
fountains of knowledge, which are in things themselves, yet 
he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop the pipes whereby 
it is distributed to the public use and advantage of mankind.
He that uses words without any clear and steady meaning, what 
does he but lead himself and others into error.
This plea for sincerity and carefulness is typical of nearly all pre-
Darwinian semantic considerations. Locke, however, supported this plea
for better use of language with some observations about definitions:
A man shall take care to use no word without a signification, 
no name without an idea for which he makes it stand. . .
20
Renwick, loc. cit.. p. 87.
21John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed., 
Alexander Campbell Fraser (2 vols.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1894),
II, pp. 149-50.
^^Ibid.. p. 152.
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Men . . . must also take care to apply their words as near as 
may be to such ideas as common use has annexed them to.23
. . .  it is sometimes necessary, for the ascertaining the 
signification of words, to declare their meanings; whether 
either common use has left it uncertain and loose . . .  or 
where the term . . .  is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake.
. . .  in all discourses wherein one man pretends to instruct 
or convince another, he should use the same word constantly 
in the same sense.25
Locke also "urges that abstractions be clearly defined and that names of
substances be 'conformable to things as they exist.' Where common usage
lacks an adequate name, a new term, or old word with a new meaning can be
used, if immediately clarified by synonyms or by 'showing'— producing the
referent.
Similar attempts at reform were carried on by others, the chief
attack on language problems being made by proposing rigid controls on the
use of language. Dryden said.
If written words from time are not secur'd.
How can we think have oral sounds endur'd?
Which thus transmitted, if one mouth has fail'd.
Immortal lies on ages are entail'd.2?
The prescriptive attitude implicit in those lines was developed fully in
the century that followed when the regimentation of language occurred, the
Latinate imprisonment of language took place, and rule books and grammars
Z^Ibid.. p. 154.
^^Ibid.. p. 154.
2^Ibid.. p. 164.
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Renwick, loc. cit.. p. 91.
.27John Dryden, "Religio Laici" (11. 270-73), Eighteenth Century 
Prose and Poetry, ed. Louis I. Bredvold, Alan D. McKillop, Lois Whitney 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1939), p. 71.
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were composed to hold the language "steady and true." Another reform pro­
posed late in the seventeenth century, and advocated from time to time 
ever since, was that of "plain style." The assumption was that most lan­
guage and communication problems would disappear if language were simply 
purified and relieved of some of its complexities. In 1664, for instance, 
the Royal Society set up a committee— including Dryden, John Evelyn, and 
Bishop Sprat--to reform the language, and Bishop Sprat, in particular, in 
his History of the Royal Society (1667) argues for a return, in language, 
to a primitiveness and brevity, and to an equality in number between words 
and things. This is the same attitude toward language that Wordsworth was 
to reveal in his faith in rustic language and that Emerson was to reveal
in his faith in natural language.
The "plain language" reform became, in the hands of some, some­
thing like a "wordless language" reform, with a preference for things to
words, and certainly a limitation of words to real things. William Petty
even proposed a Dictionary of Sensible Words, "to show what perceptible ' 
reference belongs to each word."^® Petty described his plan in a letter 
to Southwell: "The Dictionary I have often mentioned was intended to
translate all words used in argument and important matters into words that 
are signa rerum et motuum."^^ But both the "plain language" reform and 
the "things, not names" reform were to come to naught, mainly because they 
are both inherently fallacious. The fallacy was pointed out most effec­
tively in literature by Jonathan Swift, who in Gulliver's Travels "gibes
^®Renwick, loc. cit., p. 88.
^^Marquis of Lansdowne (ed.). The Petty Papers (2 vols.; London: 
Constable & Company, Ltd., 1927), I, p. 150.
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at the many suggestions from scientists and others, for the formation of
a philosophical or universal l a n g u a g e , a n d  who, in the third book, when
Gulliver visits Laputa, laughs in particular at the notion that things
could become words in themselves.
We next went to the School of Languages, where three professors 
sat in Consultation upon improving that of their own country.
The first Project was to shorten Discourse by cutting 
Polysyllables into one, and leaving out Verbs and Participles; 
because in Reality all things imaginable are but Nouns.
The other was a Scheme for entirely abolishing all Words 
whatsoever . . . that since Words are only Names for Things, 
it would be more convenient for all Men to carry about them, 
such Things as were necessary to express the particular Business 
they are to discourse on . . .  .
Another great Advantage proposed by this Invention, was, that 
it would serve as an Universal Language to be understood in all 
civilized Nations, whose Goods and Utensils are generally of 
the same kind . . .
Swift's laughter and criticism of the proposed language reforms suggests, 
of course, the futility of the reforms, the kind of wrong-road approach 
taken by semanticists in the pre-Darwinian culture; but the laughter also 
suggests that the whole problem of language and communications was not 
yet deadly serious. The reforms proposed were serious, of course, but 
even the proposers did not suggest that without the reforms no communi­
cation should take place or that any serious consequences would result. 
Things would just be better if communication could be improved. Indeed, 
a half century later, Laurence Sterne was to write one of the most seman­
tically-oriented novels ever written, Tristram Shandy, in which he vigor­
ously explores all the semantic difficulties imaginable in human expe­
rience and gives some of the most telling instances of communication
^^Louis A. Landa (ed.), Gulliver's Travels and Other Writings by 
Jonathan Swift (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Riverside Edition, 1960), p. 512.
^h b i d .. pp. 150-51.
28
failures. But Tristram Shandy is humorous, not tragic. And even in the 
face of all the communication failures and semantic idiocies, men survive, 
even joyously. Apparently, semantic awareness in the pre-Darwinian era 
inevitably leads to an optimistic view of communication situations at the 
very time semantic problems are acknowledged. Even when men recognized 
the rickety nature of the language machine, even when they were attempting 
to repair and fix the language instrument, even when they admitted that 
the language vehicle was not getting them where they wanted to go as speedily 
and smoothly as they might wish, they nevertheless took their communication 
journey in high spirits, trusting that the ultimate outcome would be satis­
factory if not perfect.
4.
Of far greater concern, actually, to the pre-Darwinian world than 
the semantic problem in language was the problem of social usage. If 
there were difficulties in communication, the pre-Darwinian world saw them 
as the result, not of inadequate language or even an inadequate semantic 
use of language, but of the corruption of man. Language was merely an 
instrument, and any failure with the instrument was primarily the result, 
not of unskilled men, but of insincere and even immoral men. Words had 
social and moral values as well as communicative values; the communicative 
values were rarely questioned, but the social and moral values were given 
great attention.
As late as 1837, Emerson had said that "The corruption of man is 
followed by the corruption of language," and the order of those events 
reflects the pre-Darwinian attitude. Dickens was saying the same thing 
when he said he was tired of hearing about "the tyranny of words," since
29
he was "less concerned with the way words abuse us than with the way we 
32abuse words." The question was one of taste and morality, and semantic 
awareness in the pre-Darwinian era must always be considered in the light 
of such matters as society and decorum and manners. Even Locke, in all 
his concern with language, felt that popular usage, just as it was, served 
the market place and exchange satisfactorily.^^ And Bacon, even earlier, 
had seen the problem of communication in social terms, and aristocratic 
terms at that: "Essentially, the difficulty is mass communication, or
rather participation by the masses in the communication p r o c e s s . T h e  
real trouble with language, with communication, was the misuse of it, the 
social abuse of it, the indecorous use of it. What the pre-Darwinian era 
really feared and hated and questioned was not inadequate communication, 
but distorted or perverted communication, the distortion and perversion 
being measured in social rather than scientific terms. Caliban says in 
The Tempest. "You taught me language, and my profit on't/ Is, I know how 
to curse." And this was what the pre-Darwinian world was essentially coa- 
cemed about; not communication failure, but the curse within communica­
tion. And the "curse" of language is extended in meaning to include all 
sorts of distortions and misuses, even to include language that is insig­
nificant and meaningless and empty.
Ben Jonson, in particular, attacked and satirized this sort of 
language curse. Jonson deals with the misuse of language and with mean­
ingless communication as a symbol of moral disorder, and nearly all his
32quoted in Lionel Trilling, op. cit.. p. 187.
33john Locke, op. cit.. pp. 148-49.
^^Renwitk, loc. cit.. p. 86.
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major comedies are plays not of noncommunication but of insignificant com­
munication and perverted communication, wherein characters like Jack Daw 
or Subtle become prototypes of language abusers. In The Staple of News, 
for instance, the great attack, carried on primarily by Pennyboy Canter, 
is against cant or the meaningless language of the jeerers. Jonson saw 
throughout his plays communication reduced, by way of cant, to blatant 
noise. Even in such an early masque as Cynthia's Revels he satirizes a 
courtly society who amuse themselves by playing the game of "Substantives 
and Adjectives," in which the players ingeniously fit adjectives to un­
likely nouns. His attack, as usual, is against the trivial and light­
hearted use of language.
Almost as reprehensible, in the pre-Darwinian view, as distorted 
or insignificant language, is language that violates one's sense of aes­
thetics and decorum. The Mistress Quicklys and the Mrs. Malaprops not 
only twisted language but robbed it of its loveliness. Sweet words are 
spoiled, not communicatively but aesthetically, when they "Are muttered 
o'er by men, whose tones proclaim/ How flat and wearisome they felt their 
trade." This socio-aesthetic concept of language is expressed clearly 
by Samuel Johnson:
Language is the dress of thought; and as the noblest mien, 
or most graceful action, would be degraded and obscured by 
a garb appropriated to the gross employments of rusticks 
or mechanics so the most heroic sentiments will lose their 
efficacy, and the most splendid ideas drop their magnificence, 
if they are conveyed by words used commonly upon low and 
trivial occasions, debased by vulgar mouths, and contaminated 
by inelegant applications.35
Pre-Darwinian men charged one another not so much with the lack
O C
Samuel Johnson, "Cowley," Lives of the English Poets, ed. George 
B. Hill (3 vols.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1905), I, pp. 58-59.
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of clarity as with the lack of taste or significance in communication.
To question with a wicked tongue brought forth answers with an idle tongue. 
To speak rudely was to be censured; to speak lowly was to lower one's 
social status. It is true that not only in America, as Lionel Trilling 
points out, but in England as well, "Our most fervent interest in manners 
has been linguistic," and an accent or dialect was long, and in some cases 
still is, regarded as a social stigma rather than a communication barrier.
This social criticism of and attitude toward language was corol­
lary, of course, to the assumption that both communication and noncommuni­
cation were controlled by social considerations and were not the result 
of incapacities, inherent or acquired, in either man or the language medium. 
Men failed to communicate only because it was not politic to communicate 
or was not socially proper to do so. One was advised to "Give thy thoughts 
no tongue . . .," and to "Give every man thine ear, but few thy voice," 
and Hamlet, when he cries, "But break my heart, for I must hold my tongue," 
is refusing to communicate, not because he himself is incapacitated, but 
because the situation does not tolerate communication; it is neither pol­
itic nor gracious to communicate at the present time. And when Hamlet 
addresses his father's ghost with "Speak. I am bound to hear," we notice 
the importance of the word "bound." One speaks and listens, just as one 
fails to speak or listen, as the result of status, occasion, propriety.
If one fails to abide by the propriety, one is criticized. "The truth 
you speak doth lack some gentleness./ And time to speak it in." So Gonzalo 
expresses the general criticsm and attitude of the age, an attitude that
^®Trilling, op. cit.. p. 253.
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lasts throughout the pre-Darwinian era.^^
Since language was conceived as an adequate communication instru­
ment but as a flawed social instrument, the most grievous communication 
problem, the most grievous case of communication failure, was that of 
false or insincere communication. "Good God," Katherine exclaims, in 
Henry V . "the tongues of men are full of trickeries." And the old order 
feared the "candied tongue" and the "painted word" as the primary ingred­
ients in inadequate communication. Inadequate communication was simply 
false communication, the communication that, like poison in the king's 
ear, kills and destroys. To be deceived is as bad as to fail to under­
stand. The lie, in other words, joins the curse as one of the two great 
language crimes in the pre-Darwinian world, crimes that far transcend any 
problem in semantics. For as the Houyhnhms explained to Gulliver,
. . . the use of Speech was to make us understand one another, 
and to receive Information of Facts; now if any one said the 
Thing which was not, these Ends were defeated; because I can­
not properly be said to understand him; and I am so far from 
receiving Information, that he leaves me worse than in Ignorance; 
for I am led to believe a Thing Black when it is White, and 
Short when it is Lon g .38
Thus "our human speech is nought," when we find "Our human testimony
false,"— as Browning says--and the plea of the pre-Darwinian centuries
becomes, essentially, a plea less for semantically accurate and adequate
communication, more for the better moral use of communication. Not so
much accuracy, but candor, as Whitman, again late in the older order,
3?George Bernard Shaw, whose semantic awareness reflects the old 
order more than the new, depicts frequently a society that values lan­
guage more as a social instrument than as a communication instrument (see 
Pygmalion).
^®Louis A. Landa, op. cit., pp. 193-94.
33
still expressing the sentiments of semantic optimism, says in the 1882 
Preface to Leaves of Grass; "All faults may be forgiven him who has per­
fect candor. Henceforth, let no man of us lie, for we have seen that 
openness wins the inner and outer world . . ,
5.
The significant features of this earlier order of semantic aware­
ness are its general optimism and melioristic position. Communication 
failures appear partial rather than complete; language appears as an ade­
quate medium; man's use of language appears as behavior subject to social 
and moral improvement. The faults and flaws in language behavior are 
actually rooted in extra-linguistic areas of experience, and the gravest 
crimes to emerge from these faults and flaws are those of false, not bro­
ken, communication.
Such an attitude toward language and communication contributes to 
and reflects the general cultural attitude of the post-Renaissance world. 
Indeed, "our present age of pessimism, despair, and uncertainty succeeds 
a quite different earlier period of optimism, hope, and certainty— a 
period when man believed in himself and the work of his hands, had faith 
in the powers of reason and science, trusted his gods, and conceived his 
own capacity for growth as endless and his widening horizons limitless. 
What caused the change from this happier world to the present, what caused 
the change from faith in communication to the loss of faith in communica­
tion, is actually a complex series of events and attitudes, a revolution 
in both the world of ideas and the world of experience that wrought a
^^Eric and Mary Josephson (eds.), Man Alone; Alienation in Modern 
Society (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), p. 10.
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cultural metamorphosis, the dimensions of which even yet are difficult to 
measure.
CHAPTER III
A TIME OF CHANGE
There is the general feeling, to be sure, that we have reached 
a significant turning point in the ages, but people imagine 
that the great change has to do with nuclear fission and fusion 
or with space rockets. What is concurrently taking place in 
the human psyche is usually overlooked.^
Late in the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century a new 
world emerged that could no longer support the old order of semantic 
awareness. It was a new world of experience and idea that completed a 
réévaluation of language and communications, a revaluation that marks 
a transition from a generally optimistic view to a generally pessimistic 
view of man's use of words and other communication devices. Understanding 
this new world provides a basis for understanding the semantic develop­
ments of our time, for not only did this new world cause a change in the 
understanding of language functions, but also caused the pathos of com­
munications to develop.
Darwin's Origin of the Species marks the beginning of this new 
world's appearance, but all the phenomena of the new world are not neces­
sarily an immediate outgrowth of Darwinian thought. For the new world is 
not only an intellectual-scientific creation; it is also an outgrowth of
^C. J. Jung, "Jung's View of Christianity" ^from Memories, Dreams. 
Reflections, recorded and edited by Amiela Jaffe, trans. by Richard and 
Clara WinstonT, The Atlantic Monthly. CCXI (January, 1963), p. 64.
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events in the economic-technological area and in the social-cultural area. 
Although Darwin's great work conveniently marks a point of no return in 
the development of the modern world, not all the experiences and ideas in 
the modern world are necessarily indebted to Darwin or explicable in 
Darwinian terms.
Actually the new world is a vast complex of forces and phenomena 
of diverse order, all seeming to contribute, one way or the other, to three 
basic problems that mark man's condition in the twentieth century and pro­
vide the basis for the new semantic awareness that is symptomatic of our 
time. The three basic problems are the loss of adequate identification 
within some recognizable social group; the loss of personal freedom in 
the face of increasingly inflexible and totalitarian social and political 
structures; and the loss of acknowledged absolutes and certainties, not 
only in ideological fields, but in scientific fields as well.
In reaction to these losses that developed in the new world of 
idea and experience, man's attitude toward so basic a social behavior as 
language began to change. Seeing himself both alienated and imprisoned 
within a shifting, uncertain world he began to put emphasis upon the con­
tact and communion with the world that his use of language and other com­
munication devices would seem to provide; yet at the same time, his over­
whelming sense of loss seemed an indictment of communication itself, a 
constant reminder of communication failure, and he more and more discounted 
the efficacy of communication, noting that in spite of all his communica­
tion efforts his sense of loss remained.
What are the forces and phenomena that brought modern man to pes­
simism, that robbed him of his earlier optimism regarding himself, his
37
language, his communications? What are the characteristics of the new 
world— the characteristics that are themselves the causes of the new 
world— that have alienated, imprisoned, and robbed man and forced him to 
a new order of semantic awareness, almost antithetical to the old? The 
forces are numerous, of course, but a few of the more significant ones can 
be cited in order to indicate the powerful transition that occurred from 
an old semantic view to a new one.
2 .
Perhaps the most striking features of the new world are its in­
creased industrialization, urbanization, and over-population. Techno­
logical and political revolutions that had begun late in the eighteenth 
century and that had been continued throughout the nineteenth came to 
their maturity at the end of the nineteenth century and gave birth in 
turn to a complex of sociological and economic problems. Eric and Mary 
Josephson, in an admiral commentary on an alienated society, describe 
the development of the isolated individual that took place as the result 
of economic, political, and technological changes in our society. They 
point out that the great revolutions had a "shattering impact on a rigid 
social o r d e r , w i t h  the result that "one of the most disturbing phenomena 
of Western culture has been man's sense of e^strangement from the world 
he himself has made or inherited— in a word, man's alienation from himself 
and from others.
2
Eric and Mary Josephson (eds.), op. cit.
^Ibid.. p. 10.
*Ibld.
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This alienation is to a certain extent rooted in the machine. The 
machine, developed late in the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth 
century, increasingly impersonalized the economic world, reducing the hu­
man being to something of a machine, relieving the human being more and 
more of many of his significant activities. Thorstein Veblen suggested 
that modern life "is guided by the machine process, the course of things 
is given mechanically, impersonally, and the resultant discipline is a 
discipline in the handling of impersonal facts for mechanical effect.
And Henry Adams, of course, defined the machine as the culprit of the age, 
seeing in the dynamo the inhuman divinity that ruled the modern world.
As Adams looked at the dynamos exhibited at the 1900 Paris Exposition, he
began to feel the forty-foot dynamos as a moral force much as 
the early Christians felt the Cross . . . .  Before the end 
one began to pray to it; inherited instinct taught the natural 
expression of man before silent and infinite force. Among the 
thousand symbols of ultimate energy, the dynamo was not so 
human as some, but it was the most expressive.&
Confronted with the machine, men were actually relieved of a great deal
of communication experience, for suddenly their colleague in economic and
business matters was a noncommunicative instrument, the inarticulate robot,
who could not answer or converse, who— if he ever were to speak, as the
modern computers of our day seem to do--would speak only what he had been
told to say, echo back to us our own words.
In yet another way, the machine contributed to a change in commu­
nication habits. In those cases where the machine provided increased lei­
sure and less labor, men failed to employ their new free time in any
^quoted in Josephson, op. cit.. p. 20.
^Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1946), p. 380.
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maturing way; failed to grow up--in a certain sense of the word. A fail­
ure to grow up may well contribute to a modification of previous adult 
communication habits, and communication may well change when left in the 
hands of children and adolescents, even when those children and adoles­
cents are fifty and sixty year old people in charge of society and culture.
Significantly, too, the machine gave rise to the industrial rev­
olution with its industrial society and class consciousness, and with an 
increased antagonism of social classes. Class distinctions became social 
abysses over which communications seemingly could not leap; with the 
"breakdown of traditional community b o n d s , e v e n  the will to communicate 
was lessened. Also within the industrial city, dominated by the machine, 
there arose on all class levels a new sense of "norm" and "standard"--the 
great criteria of a mass-production society— that was to alienate more 
and more individuals and groups within the industrial society. Not only 
had the industrial cities of England and America attracted peoples of all 
races and nationalities, but the industrial cities harbored the inevitable 
and natural minorities within any society. All different people— peoples 
of different race, nationality, and religion; even the "young, the aged, 
the physically handicapped, the sex deviant"^--were made to feel outside 
the machine-controlled, one-standard society that flourished with indus­
trialization, and people outside were faced with communication problems
^Josephson, op. cit.. p. 33.
^Ibid.. p. 35.
40
in trying to deal with those inside.^
In general, the machine and the industrial revolution that it 
prompted wrought great changes on the human personality; in fact, the 
industrial revolution may be considered a "characterological" revolution. 
And with changes in character came changes in language habits and in com­
munication processes. With the loss of social identity, with a loss of 
a sense of humanity, with the burden of alienation from the human spirit 
and from fellow man, the modern man grew increasingly suspicious of the 
generally optimistic world-view that had prevailed; modern man was pre­
pared to alter his semantic awareness. (Interestingly enough, this new 
semantic awareness was accompanied by what may be called a neo-infantilism 
in language habits of the masses. The machine produced not only aliena­
tion; it also produced--at least after the initial stage of mechanization 
was played out— an increased amount of leisure for many people. Many 
people began to "play" more, and in their "return to the playground," 
reverted to language habits of abbreviation, sing-song, syntactical re­
duction, and the like.)
Not only has the new world been marked by industrialization, and 
accompanying problems, but it has also been marked by international mili­
tarism on a scale never before known in history. Perhaps such militarism
^Cultures have always, at all times, managed to shove some people 
"outside." One culture may protect the aged while practicing infanticide. 
Another culture may do the opposite. The pernicious quality of modern 
ostracism is that it is more frequently subtle, tacit, and unadmitted. 
Denying a caste system on the one hand, while practicing a caste system 
on the other surely creates more frustrations than an out-in-the-open 
admission that some people are "in" and others "out."
Josephson, op. cit.. p. 18.
^^Above, p. 38.
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is an outgrowth of the machine, too; certainly the new economic problems 
introduced by the machine, the greatly larger populations supportable by 
the machine— these were factors in bringing about the great wars of the 
world that have raged since late in the nineteenth century. Also the 
technological know-how growing out of mechanized economy made possible 
the development of an increasingly complex weaponry that, in turn, made 
possible the extension of the horrors of war over wider and wider areas. 
Beginning with the Franco-Frussian War, tortuously maturing with World 
War 1, climaxing in World War 11, the military spirit of the modern world 
has contributed greatly to a new semantic awareness, for war not only 
alienates one culture from another but war is a direct contradiction of 
any philosophy of optimism, and with the demolishing of optimism, the se­
mantic awareness based upon an idealistic view of the world is demolished 
also.
Following the defeat of France in the Franco-Frussian War, "a 
wave of pessimism and materialism, spreading across the Channel from de­
feated France, swept many men of letters into an aesthetic isolation from 
practical life . . . Following World War 1, there was a repudiation
of a chaotic world and a rejection of values^^ that once had supported 
communication experience. Following the horrors of Nazism and World War 
11, men at last stared inexpressible tragedy in the face, and as Lionel 
Trilling says,
The facade is down; society's resistance to the discovery of 
depravity has ceased; now everyone knows that Thackeray was
^^Samuel C. Chew, "The Nineteenth Century and After," A Literary 
History of England, ed., Albert C. Baugh (New York: Appleton-Century- 
Crofts, 1948), p. 1449.
^^ Ibid.. p. 1582.
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wrong. Swift right . . . the great psychological fact of our time 
which we all observe with baffled wonder and shame is that there 
is no possible way of responding to Belsen and Buchenwald. The 
activity of mind fails before the incommunicability of man's
suffering.14
Modern militarism and the machine that preceded it have together 
contributed to a world of alienation and isolation and to a world of in­
expressible experience. Obvious repercussions have taken place in the 
world of language, for, as Van Wyck Brooks comments in discussing American 
culture after World War I, "It was no use to talk to the young about 
'sacred' and 'glorious' things especially when the war had traduced-them 
further; and the more sacred one felt they were, the more one felt it was 
obscene to use the words or even think about them."!^ Militarism and the 
machine contributed mightily to a changed semantic awareness, to a rejec­
tion of certain vocabularies, to a réévaluation of communication, to a 
revised faith in communication possibilities. And even while this alter­
ation of semantic awareness was taking shape, other economic, political, 
and cultural forces emerged that threatened to inhibit communications even 
further.
Primarily these new forces were the outgrowth of the mass society 
produced by the machine and industrialization. Depersonalized and urban­
ized, the new industrial society was also large. Neither our wars nor 
our diseases have seemed adequate to keep population in control. And with 
a mass society have come various forms of regimentation, socialism, and 
totalitarianisms that, in spite of whatever virtues of order and control
^^Trilling, op. cit.. p. 256.
^^Van Wyck Brooks, New England; Indian Summer (New York: E. P. 
Dutton, 1940), p. 498.
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they may bring, bring various forms of conformity, imprisonment, and 
restrictiveness that militate against free and open communication. "Per­
haps the basic difference between the semantic investigations of the seven­
teenth and twentieth centuries," Renwick says, "lies in their divergent 
social climates, the seventeenth century being dominated by the few, and 
our times by the many
The "many" joins the machine and militarism as a shaping force in 
the modem world, and modem man is faced with the overwhelming power of 
large numbers of people, machine-oriented, who create, for the sake of 
self-preservation, various forms of socialistic, dictatorial, and pater­
nalistic political systems that— instead of providing the stabilizing social 
structures that once supported communication— prove themselves to be de­
ceptive social structures that in actuality destroy communication expe­
rience by rigorously controlling all such experience.
John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer both argued in the nineteenth 
century against paternalism, regimentation, and socialism, on the grounds 
that such ideologies tend to destroy human freedom and consequently indi­
vidual communication.And in our new world, the mass society, increas­
ingly controlled by regimenting institutions, becomes the victim of con­
trolled communications and "managed news." The "many," in necessarily 
surrendering their freedom to small powerful elites, let the elite monop­
olize the means of communication,"^^ and the individual, within the many, 
finds himself the victim of a one-way communication process.
Renwick, loc. cit., p. 93.
Fuller, op. cit.. pp. 403-408.
18 Josephson, op.cit.. pp. 42-43.
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Mass society weakens or destroys traditional human groupings, 
thus leaving the individual at the mercy of impersonal 'commu­
nication,' such as newspaper and radio. In addition, the 
process of communication itself, presumably a two-way system, 
tends to become a one-way street, with individuals more on the 
receiving or taking end than on the giving end. How does one 
talk back to a TV screen? As a result, the information of 
opinion is facilitated for those who control the channels of 
communication— whether they be propagandists in a military 
dictatorship or the advertising industry in our society; the 
stage is set for manipulation of tastes and opinions as ob­
stacles to mass persuasion are removed.19
3.
Victim of the machine, militarism, and the "many," modem man 
finds himself, not only less and less in control of comnunic at ion on a 
social scale, not only more and more restricted and inhibited in communi­
cation experience, but he finds himself deprived of two of the prerequi­
sites for successful creation of communication, no matter how limited that 
communication may be. These prerequisites are social conventions and com­
mon experiences.
In a new industrial society, seemingly without forms and conven­
tions, and in a detached, isolated state, removed from institutions and
events that once provided common communication ground, man faces a world
20
of normlessness— what Emile Durkheim calls anomie. Language being itself 
a conventional system of symbols, communication is always dependent upon 
certain agreements within any given group of people, agreements about the 
meanings of words and phrases, meanings of syntactical arrangements, and 
the like. Such agreements come about, however, only through common expe­
rience and through reference to common beliefs, traditions, faiths.
l*Ibid.. p. 42.
20
Ibid.. p. 13.
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Communication is more than simply a manipulation of language; it depends 
upon common events and feelings. Â word defined by other words is only 
partially defined; until a word is defined by common experience within a 
common framework of values, it will not work effectively within communica­
tions .
In the new world, however, conventions and experiences and values
once held in common have disappeared. Mass standardization and norm-
establishment are not the same as organically active values and forms.
The former are negative, the latter are positive. And "it was the atrophy
21of positive convention during the nineteenth century," and "a pervasive
22sense of social disintegration," in the twentieth that led, finally, to
a "cynical repudiation of all s t a n d a r d s , a n d  "a disgust with history
and society and the s t a t e . M o r e  and more men gave up a faith in such
common ground as family, state, nation, church, or what have you. And in
the face of growing materialistic and mechanistic philosophies, such as
that of Ernst Haeckel, men were inclined even to give up such common
reference-ideas as God, freedom, immortality; man began to "suffer from
25
lack of faith in a transcendent truth." And modern man began, there­
fore, a deep and profound search wherein he "is constantly and anxiously 
looking around for external rules and regulations which can guide him in
21J. W. Lever, The Elizabethan Love Sonnet (London: Metheun & Co., 
Ltd., 1956), p. 57.
^^Chew, loc. cit.. p. 1454.
Z^Ibid.. p. 1584.
^^Trilling, op. cit., pp. 256-57.
25Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Co., 1953), p. 18.
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his perplexity . . . Paradoxically, however, man's quest has led
him, not to new forms of stabilization to replace the old, not to new per­
manent foundations to replace the shaken foundations of the old world. 
Rather, man's quest has led him to the great, profound observations of 
modern psychology and physics, wherein truth itself has taken on new com­
plexion, truth itself has become a matter of relativity rather than abso­
lutism.
Without attempting to rehearse a history of modern psychology, we 
can nevertheless note a major result of this ideological revolution, es­
pecially as Sigmund Freud affected it. As psychology relates to language 
and communication, perhaps Freud's chief contribution was his showing that
"no image or symbol has one meaning alone, for it carries with it at least
27its opposite in the unconscious or in dreams." It is this "perception
of the hidden element of human nature and of the opposition between the
28hidden and the visible," that not only militated against any discovery 
of absolutes but also militated against the old faith in anything like 
absolutely perfect communication. Indeed, "the idea of the hidden thing 
went forward to become one of the dominant notions of the age."^^ This 
dominant notion that apparent truth is not real truth did little to as­
suage man's quest for a common field of reference or commonly recognized 
truth, and furthermore,.this dominant notion contributed mightily toward
26Jung, loc. cit.. p. 62.
^^Frederick Karl and Marvin Megalaner, A Reader's Guide to Great 
Twentieth Century English Novels (New York: The Noonday Press, 1959), p. 34.
^®Trilling, op. cit.. p. 34.
2*Ibid.
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a new semantic awareness, a new attitude toward communications. Man began 
to think Freudian-like, always sensitive to the hidden beneath the obvious, 
always assuming that the "truth" or the "real" was somewhere beyond the 
surface of things, always hidden within. The old joke about the psychi­
atrist, being greeted by a friend, "Good morning, how are you?" and paus­
ing to ask the question, "What did he mean by that?" is an example of the 
kind of Freudian doubt that began to affect semantic attitudes and sub­
sequently communications. To a certain extent, one may argue that Freudian 
and related psychologies have actually provided the modern world with a 
common field of reference, but the trouble in that observation lies in the 
fact that a unique field of reference is not what man needs. He needs 
fields of reference— plural. He needs more ways than one to talk. And 
more than that, the Freudian field of reference has in many cases become 
dictatorial; it has, in the hands of some, become more than a field of 
reference--it has become the one language into which all other languages 
must be translated. An extreme Freudian position actually subverts com­
munication, because it makes Freudianism a kind of magnet that pulls all 
symbols to it and, regardless of meanings attached to the symbols of others, 
makes of those symbols a part of the Freudian discourse.
This misuse, if we call it that, of Freudianism is most-clearly 
seen in what has always been a communications curse--the innuendo— but 
which in the Freudian age has taken on definite anti-communication pro­
portions. To say one thing and mean another has always presented communi­
cation problems, but to say one thing and to be accused of saying another, 
or burdened with saying another, is a grievous problem. In Freudian se­
mantics there is no such thing as a non-Freudian statement; all statements
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have Freudian meanings. The college boy--or the office worker or the
artist or who have you— who gives sexual meaning to every word he hears
is merely carrying on, in a work-a-day manner, a Freudian attitude toward
language; he is translating all meaning back into a single meaning. And
as Lionel Trilling well puts another side of this problem:
A specter haunts our culture--it is that people will eventually 
be unable to say, 'They fell in love and married,' . . . but 
will as a matter of course say, 'Their libidinal impulses be­
ing reciprocal, they activated their individual erotic drives 
and integrated them within the same frame of reference.' Now 
this is not the language of abstract thought or of any thought.
It is the language of non-thought.30
Freudianism, it would seem for all the light it has thrown on human be­
havior, has, as the result of the misuse made of it, served to inhibit 
comnunication and has contributed to a new semantic attitude.
Likewise the new science, particularly the new physics, though 
contributing to great and wonderful achievements, has contributed to a 
semantic awareness that is essentially doubtful and pessimistic. The new 
science has not only contributed to the destruction of old value systems, 
but has also pointed to a relativistic universe in which no permanent or 
absolute value system or ^ stern of references could be established. Just 
as in the past the developments in astronomy "had already made man and 
his earth of infinitesimal significance,"31 so Darwinism had placed man 
in the animal kingdom, psychology had seemed to make man "a creature of 
blind impulses and automatic responses to s t i m u l i , a n d  a new physics,
3°Ibid.. p. 276.
^^Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought (2nd ed.; New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1943), p. 706.
^^ Ibid.
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at least by the early decades of the twentieth century, had "made it clear 
that many of the long-accepted vlewSiof the universe were in reality not 
universal and final law . . . the scientists were less convinced of abso­
lutes and certainties within the realm of s c i e n c e . A s  a result, real­
ity "can no longer be thought of as the orderly stable uniform causally 
determined and mathematically calculable affair it was of yore. It rather 
suggests a core of caprice and chance and spontaneity and indeterminism, 
in whose sheer madness there is no method.
Scientists and philosopher-scientists have both contributed to 
this new view of the universe. Spencer, in the second half of the nine­
teenth century, had anticipated "the relativity of all human knowledge to 
perceived phenomena," and suggested that any sort of "absolute and the 
unconditioned must be, in the nature of things, forever unknowable."^^ 
Later Henri Poincare argued that ". . . it is impossible to assert an 
absolute fact;" many of our simplest scientific statements— i.e. the earth 
moves around the sun— "depends entirely upon where we take our stand. 
Santayana, in the twentieth century, has said.
Possession of the absolute truth is not merely by accident 
beyond the range of particular minds; it is incompatible 
with being alive, because it excludes any particular station, 
organ, interest, or date of survey: the absolute truth is
undiscoverable just because it is not a perspective. Perspec­
tives are essential to animal apprehension; an observer, him­
self a part of the world he observes, must have a particular 
station in it; he cannot be equally near to everything, nor
33%bid.
^^Fuller, op. cit.. p. 511. 
S^ibid.. 406.
3*Ibid.. p. 417.
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internal to anything but himself; of the rest he can only take 
views, abstracted according to his sensibility and foreshortened 
according to his interests.3?
Hans Vaihinger, the German philosopher, established the philosophy of the 
"as -if," wherein he argued that our scientific, theological, moral, and 
social assumptions are not at all true to experience: "On the contrary
they are falsifications of experience in the interest of great conven­
ience and edification. They are fictions— stories that it is pleasanter 
or more profitable to tell ourselves about the facts than to accept and 
transcribe the facts as they are . . . Such philosophers as Heisenberg
and Schrodinger, observing the new discoveries in physics, postulated a 
"principle of uncertainty," according to which
it proves impossible in the first place to determine with mathe­
matical precision either position or the orbit of an electron, 
and in the second, even to approximate an exact formulation 
without at the same time proportionately decreasing the cer­
tainty of our computation of the electron's movement. The 
physicist thus finds himself between the devil and the deep 
blue sea,
for he finds the physical universe, in its elemental phase, operating in 
a totally random and erratic fashion.
Perhaps all the new science and the new scientific philosophy is 
summarized in the work and theories of Albert Einstein--a theory of rela­
tivity itself.
In physics, Einstein’s theory of time as a 'fourth dimension,' 
of the relativity of motion, of the non-Euclidean nature of 
space, and of the equivalence of the mass of a body with its 
momentum, have brought into question many of the fundamental
^^George Santayana, The Realm of Essence: Book First of Realm of 
Being (London: Constable and Company, 1928), p. xiii.
^®Fuller, op. cit.. p. 478.
3^ Ibid.. p. 510.
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principles of the old physics. To this has been added the 
development of the quantum theory based upon the discovery 
that energy, far from delivering itself in a continuous flow, 
comes in irregular beats and puffs for whose separated and 
capricious occurrence no reason can be found or even conceived.^0
The new universe, in other words, is not dependable. Without the 
sense of the absolute, man has grown uncertain and insecure, and that un­
certainty and insecurity have colored his semantic attitudes, his under­
standing of communications. The symbols of his discourse suddenly have 
become less reliable, for the symbols themselves seem to have only rela­
tive meaning now, relative meanings operative within a relative universe. 
How is man to catch understanding on the wing? How is he to hold the mo­
ment still and make contact with another being?
But not only is the universe relative; it is m y s t e r i o u s W h a t  
man had thought was expressible within the realm of symbols and language 
now seems to slip away from the realm of expression. The symbols of lan­
guage seem now only to point to emptiness and darkness. As early as such
philosophers as Spencer, Lange, and Emile Dubois Reymond, in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, there were growing suspicions about the 
uhknowability— and hence the inexpressibility— of reality. "Spencer agrees 
with Hamilton, Hansel, and Mill in regarding the nature of Reality as a 
mystery which it is beyond the power of the human mind to g r a s p , a n d  
Reymond proclaimed that ". . .we must resign ourselves to the fact that
4°Ibid.
^^Sir James Jeans
Always says what he means:
He really is quite serious
About the universe being mysterious.— E. C. Bentley
^^Fuller, op. cit.. p. 406.
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we can never know the answer and must remain forever i g n o r a n t . B y  the 
twentieth century, it was generally agreed among philosophers, scientists, 
and ordinary citizens that we live "with the knowledge that a good deal 
of life is i n e x p r e s s i b l e , "44 for the "final intelligibility of the world
is no longer accepted. •i45
4.
Alienated from fellow man, imprisoned within the restrictions of 
dictatorial and mass societies, staring into a constantly changing and 
inexpressibly awesome universe, man began, as early as the 1890s, that 
gruelling experience of readjustment that marks his twentieth-century 
experience. Not willing simply to surrender to utter nihilism— though 
this possibility was presented to him— he began to change his philosophies 
and his intellectual attitudes in order both to describe accurately his 
situation and to survive as best he possibly could. His reaction was not 
one of utter denial of the past, although the cleavage with the past was 
extreme. His reaction was rather a kind of metamorphosis out of the past 
into the new world, out of certainty into question. His new position was 
not so much a brand new position as it was a reshaping of the old, a re­
adjustment, and accepting into his position questions and doubts that he 
would rather have ignored, indeed perhaps had ignored for centuries.
Modern man's philosophies and intellectual attitudes were now 
imbued "with the sense that everything is questionable, problematic. Our
4^Ibid.. p. 416.
Zl/l
Gibson, op. cit.. p. x.
AC
•^William Barrett, Irrational Man; A Study in Existential Philosophy 
(London: Heinemann, 1961), p. 49.
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time, said Max Scheler, is the first in which man has become thoroughly 
and completely problematic to h i m s e l f . "^6 included within the changing 
and problematical philosophies and intellectual attitudes were, of course, 
man's aesthetics and his semantic awareness. Man was having to change 
his attitude about language in order to deal with the diverse, uncertain, 
and sometimes hidden nature of reality at the same time he was having to 
explore the possibilities of achieving a workable system of communications 
in a world that threatened, or at least discouraged, communications.
The old semantic awareness gave way to its modern replacement: 
the pathos of communications. Within this pathos, there was less convic­
tion that the senses were the road to t r u t h , l e s s certainty about the 
sensory relationship of language symbols and reality, more sensitivity to 
language's being a subjective creative act much of the time. A new under­
standing of communication arose that, though at times enlightened with ' 
scientific hope, though at times highly organized and analytical, was 
generally shot through with pessimism. The broken word served as founda­
tion for a pathos that, though embracing many of the observations and 
truths of the old semantic awareness, had come to far different conclu­
sions and faced far different challenges.
4*Ibid.. p. 56.
^^Renwick, loc. cit.. p. 92.
CHAPTER IV
LITERATURE AND THE NEW AWARENESS
The master-songs are ended, and the man 
That sang them is the name. And so is God
A name; and so is love, and life, and death.
And everything. But we, who are too blind 
To read what we have written, or what faith 
Has written for us, do not understand:
We only blink, and wonder.^
Even while the anti-communication forces of the late nineteenth 
century were yet beginning their revision of the world and their emascu­
lation of the old semantic awareness, the new pathos of communications 
was being articulated by poets, dramatists, and novelists. This artic­
ulation has served, all the way from the 1890s to the present, as the
second phase of the pathos' anatomy, as the articulative bridge between
the historical, sociological, scientific, and ideological events that were 
creating the broken word and the cultural recognition and acceptance of 
the broken word as a prime issue in modern life. Though the pathos of 
communication, i.e. the new semantic awareness, has been discussed in 
reams of scientific and technical literature written by linguists and 
semanticists, it has been the articulation, expression, and discussion 
of the broken word in major British and American literature that has made 
the pathos of communications a part of contemporary Anglo-American daily
^Edwin Arlington Robinson, "Walt Whitman," The Torrent and the 
Night Before (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1896), pp. 31-32.
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life. Without the literary consideration of the broken word, the pathos 
of communications would not have developed; without the literary consid­
eration, the new semantic awareness would have remained simply an academic 
issue and contemporary man would, in general, have been removed from any 
discussion of his communication problems.
As it is, however, British and American writers have maintained 
a constant survey and analysis of a variety of communication problems and 
have helped formulate a variety of semantic positions. Immensely alert 
to language itself and immensely sensitive to human behavior, serious 
writers of the twentieth century have presented the modern semantic aware­
ness more effectively than the professional semanticists and linguists 
themselves and have related semantics to human behavior better than the 
professional psychologists or "general semanticists." Writers, at their 
best, have the sense of language that non-literary professionals frequently 
do not have. Writers, at their best, have that keen insight into life 
that many non-literary professionals either have but fail to express very 
well or have had but lost during careers of statistics, theories, and pro­
fessional commitments. Writers, in many ways, have been freer than any 
other group in the twentieth century to survey the new semantic awareness 
and to articulate that awareness for both the professionals and the public.
Certainly the literature of the twentieth century remges widely 
over the problem of communications and the nature of language. Nearly 
every significant writer has touched upon at least one major aspect of 
the communication situation and some writers have erected vast and elab-- 
orate structures of semantic awareness in the course of their work. Though 
certainly there is no common agreement in modern literature as to the exact
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nature and cause of communication difficulties or to the exact capacity 
and function of language, agreement does seem to exist that a problem is 
upon us, a problem the significance of which in the lives of human beings 
is worth discussion and comment. And even a quick and cursory promenade 
through modern literature reveals the richness of that discussion and com­
ment, the diversity and the depth. At heart, the discussion, admittedly, 
is more pessimistic than hopeful. The feeling seems to be that modern man 
has grown increasingly inarticulate— our threads of thought "are freezing 
on the doorsteps of the house of my mind," as Sherwood Anderson says; has 
grown increasingly nonreceptive to the communication of others— we are too 
blind "to read what we have written, or what faith/ Has written for us," 
and therefore "do not understand," as Edwin Arlington Robinson says; and 
has encountered, even if he can articulate, an increasingly unresponsive 
world— "Is there anybody there?' said the Traveller,/ Knocking on the moon­
lit door." But even pessimism has its range of possibilities; there is, 
as it were, a light pessimism and a dark pessimism, and the semantic dis­
cussion in modern literature approaches the problem of communications from 
various points on the compass.
2 .
In 1905, E. M. Forster published his first novel. Where Angels 
Fear to Tread, and makes in that novel a plea, as it were, for the im­
portance of communication in human affairs. Forster recognized all the 
growing problems of the modern world and recognized, no doubt, the emer­
gence of a new semantic awareness, but saw problems and difficulties only 
as emphasizing the role that communications should play in human life. 
Indeed, in his first novel, Forster presents a kind of tragedy of
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communication. Yet even in the tragedy communication is important, for 
the tragedy grows out of the way people talk to one another. So convinced 
was Forster of the role of communications that "the crucial years from 
1905 to the late Twenties— which included the trauma of the First World 
War--had if anything reinforced his convictions with respect to the im­
portance of communication and communion among people of varying lands, 
religions, and social back g r o u n d s . A l l  his novels are full of obvious 
and overt communication efforts, full of letters and postcards and conver­
sations, communications of all sorts— "spoken, written, psychically trans­
m i t t e d . F o r  Forster, the attempt at communication, at least, is a good 
thing, and though it may not work all the time, when it does work, it is 
as Septimus, in Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway. says: "Communication is
health; communication is happiness." And even in failure, a certain virtue 
inheres in the very attempt; Winston Smith notes in Orwell's 1984, "To 
mark the paper was the decisive act."
Communication is important, for within our humanity is the need 
and desire to communicate— a need and desire the old semantic awareness 
had also observed. Man's need, desire, and commitment to communicate is 
explored by Maxwell Anderson in Winterset (1935), especially in his crea­
tion of a character passionately in search of communication. Mio Romagna 
cries out, "1 shall not keep quiet," as he searches for the truth about 
his executed father and as he seeks to reveal the truth once he knows it. 
Mio promises to communicate the truth "No further than the moon takes the 
tides" and he becomes almost messianic in his Whitmanesque promises to
^arl and Magalaner, op. cit.. p. 120.
^Ibid.. p. 106.
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give "ears to the deaf and voice to the dumb." And Mio's simple plea to 
Miriamne, "Stay and talk with me^ " is matched by her own need to hear ver­
balized his love for her: "Say once you love— say it once; I'll never/
ask to hear it twice . . . Why communicate, why verbalize? Esdras, 
Miriamne's elderly father, makes the point when he says there is no earth 
till men "have a word/ to say this is the earth." We speak, Anderson says, 
in order to make our earth; we speak, Winston Smith says, even when nobody 
can hear, in order to remain sane; we speak, Helmholtz, in Huxley's Brave 
New World, says, because we have the inexplicable desire to do so.
To a certain extent the recognition of the importance of communi­
cation and the recognition of the inevitable need to show forth in the 
word is a vestige of optimism in a semantic awareness that is otherwise 
essentially dark. And likewise vestigially optimistic is the recognition, 
similar to that in the old semantic awareness, of the great power of words. 
Just as Esdras points out that the word makes the earth, so Edwin Muir 
celebrates the word in his poem, "The Animals":
For by words the world was called 
Out of the empty air.
With words was shaped and walled—
Though language is to be criticized almost mercilessly in the twentieth
century, Yeats could say, "Words alone are certain good," and Forster
could approve of the barrier of language in that, even in its weakness,
it lets pass what is only good. It is the power of words that Aldous
Huxley discusses at some length in Brave New World (1932). "Words can be
like X-rays, if you use them properly— they'll go through anything. You
read and you're pierced." There is the "terrible beautiful magic" of
words as they go rumbling in our heads, words that make possible even
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our emotions as well as our ideas. So powerful are words that the totali­
tarian society satirized in Brave New World has to use them, but must make 
sure the words are without reason. And in Mrs. Dalloway. the single word 
"time" can set off a fountain of fantasy in one character's mind, while 
another character avoids the word "madness," substituting "not having a 
sense of proportion," knowing the power that a single, highly connotative 
word can have. Mrs. Dalloway herself comments on "the enormous resources 
of the English language, the power it bestows after all, of communicating 
feelings . . . ."
Even within this positive-thinking area of the new semantic aware­
ness, there was, however, a criticism to be made of communication behavior—  
the criticism of inadequate communications. Huxley records in Crome Yellow 
the observation that "when a human response is needed, it is voided by 
vacuous talk," and Mrs. Dalloway is aware of her own tendency to talk 
nonsense, "saying things she didn't mean . . . ." Words are powerful, 
our desire to use them is powerful, our use of them is important, but even 
Forster recognizes that communication tends to evaporate in "small talk" 
and "nonsense" and "inane prattling." The motifs of "true communication 
versus mere suburban small talk"^ run through all of Forster's novels, 
and in all of them he "hints at the sacrilege involved in allowing this 
gift of tongues to be debased by frivolous, insincere or superficial use."^ 
This criticism of what Orwell calls "duckspeak," is, of course, the chief 
criticism made in the old semantic awareness, wherein communication fail­
ure is mainly the result of some moral or social failure. And certainly
^Ibid.. p. 103. 
^Ibid., p. 104.
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the semantic awareness so far described is simply that of the pre-Darwinian 
world carried over--with a greater tone of concern perhaps--into the twen­
tieth century. If, however, there is agreement with some portions of the 
old semantic awareness, there is a far greater rejection, or at least ig­
noring, of pre-Darwinian language thinking. Even when modern authors make 
the same observations t±st the old authors did, the modern authors are not 
supporting tradition or the past; they are articulating what they think 
is true here and now. They are not defending the old semantic awareness; 
they are restating universal truths for the sake of a new awareness to 
serve and reflect their times.
3.
Of great concern to twentieth-century authors has been, of course,
the medium in which communication i'S: to take place. The thought has
prevailed in many quarters that perhaps a great deal of the difficulty 
in modern communications results from a devitalized, worn-out language 
that needs to be remodeled and reshaped for the modern world. Yeats, 
for instance, once lamented "the writer of some language exhausted by 
modern civilization," the writer who must "reject word after word." And 
Joseph Conrad deplored "the commonplace surface of words," the inadequacy 
"of the old, old words, worn thin, defaced by ages of careless usage."
One of Virginia Woolf's characters in The Waves cries out at one place,
"How tired 1 am of phrases that come down beautifully with all their feet 
on the ground I" And Hemingway explains in Death in the Afternoon that 
"all our words from loose using have lost their edge,"justbsin A Farewell 
to Arms he denounces the grand language that symbolized an old and inade­
quate world:
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I was always embarrassed by the.words sacred, glorious, and 
sacrifice and the expression in vain. We had heard them, 
sometimes standing in the rain almost out of earshot, so that 
only the shouted words came through, and had read them, on 
proclamations that were slapped up by billposters over other 
proclamations . . . and I had seen nothing sacred, and the 
things that were glorious had no glory . . . .  There were 
many words that you could not stand to hear and finally only 
the names of places had dignity . . . .  Abstract words such 
as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene . . . .
Essentially this is all a rejection of the old language, the language
handed down— not just by the Victorian world— but by the whole pre-
Darwinian civilization. It is a rejection that climaxes in such calls
as that of Walter Lippmann who says "our business is to tear down this
mighty structure of words, these imperial will-o’-the-wisps . . . ."
The old language was not only rejected, however. In the eyes of 
some, the old language was lost. Edna St. Vincent Millay did not call 
for a rejection of the old language, but was simply decrying the castra­
tion of that old language in the hands of the "advertisers." "It is ad­
vertising that has been the death of words," she says in Conversation at 
Midnight.
The word "personal" now on an envelope means "impersonal"
. . . .  We are a nation of word-killers: hero, veteran, tragedy—  
Watch the great words go down.
John Dos Fassos also agreed that the old language was inadequate, but the 
reason is that "strangers"--or so he says in USA--"have turned our lan­
guage inside out who have taken the clean words our fathers spoke and made 
them slimy and foul." And Mio Romagno complains that the old words have 
lost their meaning and power because of the inroads of the new knowledge:
. . . This men called love 
in happier times, before the 
Freudians taught us 
to blame it on the glands.
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All seem to agree the old language has lost its power.^ Some 
blame time and the ages for the debilitation. Others blame the forces 
of the modern world. Some cast the old language aside in scorn. Some 
lament its failure after its long history of grandeur. But in all cases 
the feeling was that the old language could no longer do the job. Regard­
less the cause, the old language could not serve modern man's communica­
tion needs. But dispensing with the old language did not always mean the 
authors had an adequate replacement on hand. Some authors of course— in 
fact most authors— kept right on using the old language, modernizing it 
as best possible, trying merely to record the language as it actually de­
veloped in the twentieth century, letting their characters communicate 
in the idioms of the day. There was a move on the part of a few authors,
Gihe rejection of the old language received support from the prag­
matic philosophers. Charles Saunders Peirce, one of the early formulators 
of American pragmatism, had developed a kind of semantic agnosticism, seek­
ing to strip philosophy of words that have no meaning but seem to have 
meaning because of syntax and grammar. Peirce developed his famous axiom, 
first published in 1878, that declares a proposition means the sum total 
of its results if the proposition were true; but since some propositions 
have no results— they obviously are only syntax, grammar, and linguistics ; 
they are meaningless. William Graham Sumner, the pragmatic Social 
Darwinist, stormed the bastions of economic theory and social science by 
attacking such expressions as "natural rights" and "brotherhood of man" 
because of their lack of meaning. Sumner declared that many of man's . 
verbalizations tend to confuse thinking and deter man from reaching work­
ing arrangements in the fields of economics and social behavior. William 
James, the most famous of the pragmatists, said that a pragmatist "turns 
away from abstractions . . . from verbal solutions . . . .  He turns to­
ward concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards actions and towards 
power." /william James, Pragmatism; A New Name for Some Old Ways of 
Thinking (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1959), p. 5JL/. Thomas Beer,
The Mauve Decade (Garden City: Garden City Publishing Co., 1926), pp.
28-29, tells the interesting anecdote about William James and his concern 
with word meanings: "Miss Grace Ralston caught the words from air about
her and made use of 'the nobility of womanhood' to a courtly, charming 
gentleman in a Bostonian drawing room. 'Just what' he asked the girl,
'is the nobility of womanhood?' . . . Mrs Ralston had to lecture him 
stringently. The nobility of womanhood meant the nobility of womanhood! 
Anybody knew that! 'Yes,' said William James, 'but just what is it, my 
dear?'"
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however, to call for and develop various special languages to replace the 
old.
Primarily the Symbolists and their heirs were the perpetrators of 
special language movements. Symbolism is "a reaction against a type of 
language that says rather than suggests,for the Symbolists thought--at 
least to the extent their movement involved semantics— that the old lan­
guage was eqmattable with "language that says," and the only direction a 
new language could take would be away from "saying." Also the Symbolists 
and all their heirs seemed to think of language, in its communicative 
capacity, as unable to serve private experience or inner feeling. Even 
if they could accept, or so their thinking seems to go, the old language 
as a medium for communicating experiences and events already known and 
recognized, already a part of social understanding, they would have to 
seek a new or special language in order to communicate what had not been 
communicated before, what was so personal and so private that it was unique. 
The Symbolist sought, as Edmund Wilson points out in Axel's Castle, "To 
invent the special language which alone would be capable of expressing 
his personality and feeling."^ The Symbolists were trying to find a new 
level of language, just as was Virginia Woolf, who--though not a Symbolist—  
felt a sympathy with their need and the need of the Georgians when she 
asks for "a new system of communication, a new series of conventions, to 
transmit their v i s i o n . Y e a t s  was indicating the same need when he said,
^Karl and Magaliner, op. cit.. p. 18.
^Edmund Wilson, Axel's Castle (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1931),
p. 21.
0
Karl end Magalaner, op. cit.. p. 9.
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"I have no speech but symbol, the pagan speech I made/ Amid the dreams of 
youth— "
The trouble with the seeking of special language or new language 
is that it has nowhere to go if it intends to remain also within the area 
of communications. All the efforts toward new, special, or unique lan­
guages in the twentieth century have led, one way or another, to a less 
than communicative system of symbols. The new languages have all been 
forms of the old language pushed into areas of delayed communication, in­
direct communication, or noncommunication. The promotors of special lan­
guage have asked the world to accept delayed or confused communication as 
a new medium of communication, but finally, of course, the paradox shows 
itself; though the modern world has accepted the special languages as a 
form of aesthetic experience, the world has not been able to accept the 
antithesis that noncommunication is communication. To turn out the light 
and stand in the dark may be an interesting, even stimulating, even pro­
vocative, even dynamic experience, but only a fool would claim that in 
the darkness he can see or behold the world as we normally think of see­
ing and beholding. When Arthur Symons wrote, "To name is to destroy, to 
suggest is to create," he contributed perhaps to aesthetic experience but 
he gave a blow to communications, a blow that three generations have con­
tinued to duplicate in various cults of unintelligibility. The whole 
movement of literature rooted in Poe, Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Rimbaud, 
Verlaine, and Gautier has carried on a tradition of high aesthetics at 
the expense of communications, and by employing language deliberately to 
create ambiguity, indirection, and suggestion, has not only reflected 
but contributed to the pathos of modern communications. Gertrude Stein's
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"antagonism to commas— almost any commas— is really a defense of ambiguity, 
a protection against being taken too s i m p l y , b u t  it is also a denial 
of communications for the sake of aesthetic effect, just as also is 
Bernard's plea, in The Waves, for "some little language . . . broken 
words, inarticulate words, like the shuffling of feet on the pavement."
Another reaction to the failure of old language has been a kind 
of rejection of verbalization altogether in favor of nonverbal forms of 
communication. In a way, nonverbalization is another case of special lan­
guage, save that it is a special language that has always been admitted 
to the province of communications; the only problem with nonverbalization 
is in an evaluation of its importance. In the twentieth-century, some 
authors— failing to see the regressiveness in over emphasizing nonverbal 
communication--have expressed their dismay with the old language by throw­
ing out language altogether or by drastically subordinating it and by 
building up nonverbalization to an importance far beyond its capacity to 
be important as a form of communication.
D. H. Lawrence, perhaps more than any other author of our time,
celebrated and insisted upon nonverbalization as a prime communication
medium. "Men live only by touch, and all of Lawrence's villains deny this 
fact,"^^ and his characters, even when they cannot understand each other 
in language, manage to communicate with one another on a different level. 
Tom Brangwen does not understand Lydia Lensky's half-Polish, half-German 
foreign speech, "But he knew her, he knew her meaning, without understand­
ing. What she said, what she spoke, this was a blind gesture on her part.
^^Gibson, op. cit.. p. 80.
^^arl and Magalaner, op. cit.. p. 199.
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he saluted her, was with her."^^ Lawrence carries his faith in :«onyerbal 
communication to its ultimate in tactile communication and tactile communi­
cation to its ultimate in sex. Lawrence once told Bertrand Russell:
"There is the blood-consciousness with the sexual connection holding the 
same relation as the eye, in seeing, holds to the mental consciousness.
One lives, knows, and has one's being in the blood without any reference 
to nerves and brain." And in Lady Chatterly's Lover, he makes the point, 
"Sex is only touch, the closest of all touch."
Others, besides Lawrence, recognized nonverbal communication, of 
course, though few put such an emphasis on sex. For Virginia Woolf, non­
verbal communication was a matter of subtle understandings. Peter Walsh 
and Clarissa Dalloway "had always this queer power of communication with­
out words," and though Richard Dalloway could never bring himself to say 
"I love you" to Clarissa, he could hold her hand, and "She understood; 
she understood without his speaking." And in To the Lighthouse, there 
is a recognition on the part of Lyly that intimacy of spirits is better 
than anything written in any language known to men. In Forster, too, 
there is nonverbal communication in the form of non-sexual love. The 
marriage of Lilia and Gino in Where Angels Fear to Tread gives "symbolic 
significance" to "the theme of communication"^^ and when Gino and Philip 
sup together, "both men . . . come to understanding through love. Their 
communication is now, though wordless, c o m p l e t e . I n d e e d ,  most of 
Forster's more sensitive characters "come to know that there is a deeper
IZlbid.. p. 176. 
^^Ibid.. p. 104. 
l^ Tbid.. p. 108.
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more satisfying bond than the spoken or written word . . . based upon
15a common sympathy or understanding.
Communication based upon sympathy and understanding rather than 
upon verbalization was carried to Its extreme by William Butler Yeats, 
who finally saw human communications, regardless what form they may take 
on the surface of our lives, as taking place primarily on some mysterious 
or even supernatural level. Yeats developed the Idea of an Anima mundl, 
a communal psyche beneath our conscious selves, which serves as a kind of 
common communication ground and which supports a kind of telepathic com­
munication not only between living men but also between the living and 
the d e a d . Yeats asks. In Hodos Chamellontos. "Is there nationwide multi­
form reverie, every mind passing through a stream of suggestion, and all 
streams acting and reacting upon one another no matter how distant the 
minds, how dumb the lips?"
The trouble with so abstract a conception of communication Is, 
however, that It can lead to a great deception. Nonverbalization Is an 
admitted part of communication, but when It becomes a way of communication 
In Itself It can lead man to such a communication madness that he will 
accept self-communication as communication with others and will equate 
noncommunication with communication. He will begin to suppose, being 
deprived of the proving out that verbalization Is, that communication has 
taken place when actually nothing has taken place except some Interior 
feeling or Illusion. Many people who rely heavily upon nonverbalization
l^ibld.. p. 105.
^^Austln Warren, "William Butler Yeats: The Religion of a Poet," 
The Permanence of Yeats. ed. James Hall and Martin Stelnmann (New York: 
Collier Books, 1961), p. 208.
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live in a state of illusion, assuming that they are in communication with 
the world when actually they are merely creating within themselves some 
sort of make-believe dialogue between parts of their own psyche.
Virginia Woolf explores the danger of illusory communication in 
Septimus in Mrs. Dalloway (1925). Septimus, in his madness, perceives 
meaning and communication where they do not actually exist. Words are 
not as important to him in their regular communicative symbolism; what 
is important is the "message hidden" in words, the "secret signal," the 
secret message that he alone encounters in language. His response to the 
word "time" is to let it flourish into a vast number of other words and 
meanings that interrupt or break any communication: his response to the
word "war" leads him to attach meanings of his own to the word at the ex­
pense of any established or communicative meaning for the word. But not 
only does Septimus destroy the real communication coming into him from 
reality outside, but he projects a communication that is not actually tak­
ing place. The leaves rustling in the wind speak to him, the skywriting 
of an airplane overhead is a message direct to him. And God speaks to 
him in some mysterious way, revealing to him truths that are to be written 
down on backs of envelopes. Septimus believes, too, that "people were 
talking behind the bedroom walls," and he carries on conversations with 
these unseen peoples, "answering people, arguing, laughing, crying, getting 
very excited . . . ." And most painfully, of course, he carries on his 
conversation with the dead, with his friend Evans. Lucrezia, Septimus' 
wife, is forced to write down many of Septimus' conversations:
That man, his friend who was killed, Evans, had come, he said.
He was singing behind the screen. She wrote it down just as 
he spoke it. Some things were very beautiful; others sheer 
nonsense. And he was always stopping in the middle, changing
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his mind; wanting to add something; hearing something new; 
listening with his hand up.
But she heard nothing.
Lucrezia hears nothing for, as she knows, Septimus is talking to himself. 
He is making a mistake about communications. He is projecting his own 
conversation out of himself, creating a communication mirage. And it is 
this very mirage that awaits the dedicated traveller down the road of 
nonverbalization— or down the road of special language for that matter.
4.
Septimus, in his madness, becomes a noncommunicative personality, 
and the noncommunicative personality has emerged in twentieth-century 
literature as an almost ubiquitous character. Modern writers have been 
especially concerned with the human being who will not or cannot communi­
cate. As early as 1896, Oscar Wilde portrayed the prisoners who silently 
go their rounds, "And no man spoke a word;" each man in his separate hell 
is isolated from the human voice; and in their "hell," . . . made no sign, 
. . . said no word,— / . . . had not a word to say." The "prisoner," 
separated from communication, becomes the subject of a vast number of 
works in our time, for though the highly communicative personality may 
still exist in the twentieth century, he seems, so authors appear to think 
at least, less representative of the problems of his age.
Clifford Odets' characters, for instance, "reveal themselves by 
their very inability to communicate with their fellows; . . . they cannot 
coimnunicate because each is too absorbed in his own misery even to recog­
nize the similar state of all around him."^^ And in Sherwood Andersons's
Joseph Wood Krutch, "An American Drama," Literary History of 
the United States, ed. Robert E. Spiller, et al. (3 vols.; New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1948), II, p. 1328.
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characters there are "the measureless distances" that lay between them; 
"They spoke out of the depths, but in a sense they did not speak at ail; 
they addressed themselves . . . Some characters, like Clarissa
Dalloway, simply do not make the effort to communicate: " . . .  she never
wrote a letter . . . ," and "She knew nothing; no language, no history; 
she scarcely read a book . . . ." Some characters, like those in Joseph 
Conrad's Under Western Eyes, have been deprived of the communication op­
portunity: Tekla says, "No one talks to me, no one writes to me . . . 1  
have no use for a name . . . ," and Razumov is "cut off from all human 
intercourse, his only companion is a bronze statue . . . Some char­
acters want desperately to communicate but do not know how; consider for 
instance Denis' attempt to speak to Anne in Huxley's Crome Yellow:
"What I need is you." That was what he ought to have retorted, 
that was what he wanted passionately to say. He could not say 
it. His desire fought against his shyness. "What I need is 
you." Mentally he shouted the words, but not a sound issued 
from his lips. He looked at her despairingly. Couldn't she
see what was going on inside him? Couldn't she understand?
"What I need is you." He would say it, he would— he would.
"I think I shall go and bathe," said Anne. "It's so hot."
The opportunity had passed.
And conversely there are characters who do not want to communicate, seek
to avoid it. In Brave New World. Lenina is such a character; when Bernard
asks her to go walking with him alone, in order that they may talk, she
replies, "'Talking? But what about?' Walking and talking— that seemed a
very odd way of spending an afternoon." And on another occasion, "Lenina
did her best to stop the ears of her mind; but every now and then a phrase
^®Alfred Kazin, On Native Grounds (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 
1956), p. 168.
19^Karl and Magalaner, op. cit.. p. 74.
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would insist on becoming audible.”
Given the noncommunlcatlve personality— whatever the nature of 
his noncommunication— modern literature has explored In some detail the 
causes of his communication failures, hesitancies, and the like. Modern 
literature has explored the causes In general, some of the particular and 
Isolatable causes, and has once again explored the language medium Itself—  
not In rejection of the old or In pursuit of the new, but In analysis of 
the language being used. In analysis of Its function and workings.
First of all, noncommunication may simply be In the nature of 
things. Perhaps noncommunication Is not so much a matter of human fail­
ure as It Is of a flawed universe. Perhaps we are. In a communication 
sense, a God-forgotten people as Thomas Hardy suggests when he has God
blame Earth for having cut Itself off from communication with Him: ” .....
sudden silence on that side ensued,/ And has till now prevailed." Perhaps 
we do live under "silent powers" as Maxwell Anderson suggests, or live 
under the Christian God who, though he can fashion everything from noth­
ing every day, as Yeats tells us In "A Prayer for My Son," seems to lack 
"articulate speech." But even without referring to the divine or meta­
physical, we may well have to face up to the question that Denis asks In 
Crome Yellow: "Did one ever establish contact with anyone? We are all
parallel straight lines," and of course, "Parallel straight lines . . . 
meet only at Infinity." Perhaps we are all eternally separated, all soli­
tary travellers In life, and, as Peter Walsh asks, ". . . to whom does 
the solitary traveller make reply?" But why are we solitary travellers? 
Life Is like that, Clarissa Dalloway observes, and she recognizes, non­
communlcatlve as she herself generally Is, that the supreme mystery of
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our human existence is simply . here was one room; there another.
Did religion solve that, or love?” We dwell, indeed, as Walter Pater 
much earlier said, behind "that thick wall of personality through which 
no real voice has ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which 
we can only conjecture to be without.”
There are, of course, less universal and inherent causes of non­
communication. Certainly modern authors have identified and discussed a 
host of causes rooted in particular personality attitudes and problems.
We do not communicate, we are told, in Mrs. Dalloway. because "the recol­
lection of cold human contacts forbids us . . . ,” because "a solitude” 
exists between husband and wife, a "gulf . . . that one must respect”; we 
do not communicate because we are afraid in the presence of others, or 
because "one's too shy to say it . . .  to say straight out in so many 
words . . . .  Partly one's lazy; partly one's shy.” Sometimes we try to 
communicate but our emotions get in our way and the messages strangle in 
our throat (Mio in Winterset); sometimes we try to communicate but we do 
not know how: "If I were a little older— if I knew the things to say".
(Miriamne in Winterset). Sometimes we do not have enough, experience in 
coomon, sometimes the communication is dependent upon a dlfficult-to- 
achieve common feeling or understanding.^^ And sometimes, most frequently
Scogan in Huxley's Crome Yellow says: "I read the works of 
the mystics. They seemed to me nothing but the most deplorable claptrap—  
as indeed they always must to anyone who does not feel the same emotion 
as the authors felt when they were writing. For it is the emotion that 
matters. The written work is simply an attempt to express emotion, which 
is in itself inexpressible, in terms of intellect and logic. The mystic 
objectifies a rich feeling in the pit of the stomach into cosmology. For 
other mystics that cosmology is a symbol of the rich feeling. For the 
unreliglous it is a symbol of nothing, and so appears merely grotesque.
A melancholy fact.”
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perhaps, we simply do not have the words; John, the Savage, in Brave New
World, "would have liked to speak; but there were no words," or we do not
have the same words as those around us: Mio Romagne tells Miriamne: "We
don't speak the same language . . .
But is there any common language? If we had the words, would they
do us any good? Some of the severest criticism in the area of communica­
tions has been of the nature of language. The criticism at times has 
reached extremely negative positions, the kind of negative positions that 
support, not special languages— since they fall under the same criticism— , 
but nonverbalization, and lead, it would seem, to the same consequences.
Words have seemed to many in the twentieth.century to be ineffec­
tual. "What you say or do doesn't matter; only feelings matter," we are 
told, and any delight in language--or belief in it in fact— is more or 
less a symptom of ignorant youth. And when people use words against us, 
they do us no harm. "They can take away so little with all their words," 
Miriamne says. Words are but decorations we use to cover up our actions; 
John Beavis in Eyeless in Gaza uses "the sacred names of religion and phil- 
osophy" to cover up what are simply his intellectual masturbations. And 
Addie, in William Faulkner's As I Lay Dying, says of names in general, "It 
doesn't matter. It doesn't matter what they call them."
Addie is no doubt one of the most semantically-oriented characters
in modern fiction, and her criticisms of language are among the severest 
made in modern literature. Her two great complaints seem to be that words
have no meaning in general, and words are quite separate and distinguish­
able from reality. She speaks of "high dead words" that have lost "even
^^arl and Magalaner, op. cit.. pp. 283-84.
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the significance of their dead sound,” in much the same way that Esdras 
in Winterset speaks of "names of names . . . and words that shift their 
meaning.” Words have no savor, no reality behind them. At least they 
do not point to anything real in our lives. "Words are no good,” Addie 
says. "Words don't ever fit even vrtiat they are trying to say at.” She 
cites in particular the word "love." "I knew that word was like the 
others: just a shape to fill a lack." Words are simply devices to trick
us. The only real words are deeds themselves; words that are not deeds 
are "just the gaps in people's lacks, coming down like the cries of the 
geese out of the wild darkness . . . ." She deplores the people "to whom 
sin is just a matter of words" and to whom "salvation is just words, too." 
Some people never know reality, all they know are words, but "words go 
straight up in a thin line, quick and harmless" and they are opposed to 
the terrible "doing" that "goes along the earth." "Sin and fear," Addie 
says, "are just sounds that people who never sinned nor loved nor feared 
have for what they never had and cannot have until they forget the words."
Words are separate from reality. Forget the words and live only 
among deeds and real experience. An extreme position. But even in less 
extreme positions, the feeling prevailed that words were a poor reflection 
or indication of reality. "No word is adequate," Conrad said. And when 
Mrs. Ramsy listens to a conversation between her husband and Charles 
Tansley in To the Lighthouse she notes that their words "are merely a 
species of baby talk when measured against the sum total of meaningful 
experience." Birkin, in Women in Love, is "unable to express in suit­
able words what his blood-consciousness tells him is true . . . And
^^Ibid.. p. 139.
Z^Ibid.. p. 186.
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Mio Romagna sums up the position well when he says:
. . . You see the words
in books. Honor, it says there, chivalry, freedom, 
heroism, enduring love— and these
are words on paper. It's something to have them there.
You'll get them nowhere else.
Edna St. Vincent Millay said "the great words are dead," but here the
feeling is that perhaps the great words never were, never really pointed
to anything in human experience.
The human inability to communicate and the inadequacy of language 
for communication are both surveyed in the twentieth century, but the twen­
tieth century has also recognized another cause of noncommunication--the 
active, aggressive anti-communication spirit or force within human society. 
Though many writers have discussed this problem, no doubt the most effec­
tive and startling discussion occurs in George Orwell's 1984, that fright­
ening anti-utopian satire upon our age, with the horrors of the world-to- 
come rooted in the activities and experiences of contemporary man. Look­
ing at today, Orwell foresees a time when man will live in a noncommuni- 
cative world, a world in which the serious communicator, like Syme, "will 
be vaporized," because "he is too intelligent. He sees too clearly and 
speaks too plainly." Orwell foresees a world in which it will be incon­
ceivable that people ever "exchange any kind of written communication."
It will be a world in which the only communications will be prepared com­
munications— "For the message that it was occasionally necessary to send, 
there were printed postcards with long lists of phrases, and you struck 
out the ones that were inapplicable." It will be a world in which an 
official, prescribed language prevails, a language carefully constructed 
to discourage communication. And behind this intolerable world will be
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the evil anti-communication totalitarian forces that cannot tolerate a 
free and open communicative society.
Newspeak is the official language of the anti-utopian Oceania, 
and Orwell gives a full description of the language, not only in the novel 
itself, but in an Appendix. In Newspeak "the expression of unorthodox 
opinions, above a very low level, was well-nigh impossible" for "the in­
tention was to make speech and especially speech on any subject not ideo­
logically neutral, as nearly as possible independent of consciousness."
To do this— to make speech meaningless— the Oceania powers are preparing 
the Eleventh Edition of the language's dictionary, and in that edition 
"We're cutting the language down to the bone," for the chief task of the 
language-controllers is to destroy as many words as possible: "You think,
I dare say, that our chief job is inventing new words. But not a bit of 
it! We're destroying words— scores of them, hundreds of them, every day." 
Newspeak will gradually destroy Oldspeak "with all its vagueness and its 
useless shades of meaning," and a new language of "one word— one meaning" 
will take its place and a new language of telescoped and contradictory 
words will prevail. Telescoped words— such as Minitrue, Minplenty, and 
the like— will be used because they get rid of old connotations while still 
retaining some necessary denotations.
Even in the early decades of the twentieth century, telescoped 
words and phrases had been one of the characteristic features 
of political language; and it had been noticed that the tendency 
to use abbreviations of this kind was most marked in totalitarian 
countries and totalitarian organizations . . . .  It was perceived 
that in thus abbreviating a name one narrowed and subtly altered 
its meaning, by cutting out most of the associations that would 
otherwise cling to it.
Newspeak also liked contradictory words--such as "blackwhite" or "duck-
speak." "It is one of those interesting words that have two contradictory
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meanings. Applied to an opponent, it is abuse; applied to someone you 
agree with, it is praise."
Obviously, Orwell, in his description of Newspeak, is criticizing 
a great many of our contemporary fashions in language, but his chief 
criticism is of those forces that would take advantage of those fashions—  
and weaknesses— in language for totalitarian ends. There are those, there 
is that spirit, that would, if given the opportunity, deny communication.
Others saw the same thing, of course. Mr. Scogan claims, in Crome 
Yellow, while discussing the anticipated Rational State, that Denis, the 
poet or articulative figure, will be destroyed. "No, I can see no place 
for you; only the lethal chamber." And Huxley says himself, in his Foreword 
to Brave New World, while discussing modern political propaganda, "Great 
is truth, but still greater, from a practical point of view is silence 
about truth." Society, in all its manifestations, has a tendency to 
thwart or destroy communications, and anti-communication figures appear, 
such as Sir William in Mrs. Dalloway. who would deprive Septimus of friends, 
books, or messages; or Trock and Shadow, the criminals in Winterset. who 
destroy and kill anyone who threatens to spread the words they fear.
Hariet Herriton, in Where Angels Fear to Tread, is also an anti-communica­
tion figure, condemning those who can't talk properly, criticizing commu­
nication between people of different social levels. And when Sherwood 
Anderson speaks of the fear in America, the fear of sex, the fear of tell­
ing the truth, he is talking about an anti-communication force within 
society that provides the fear. Oscar Wilde, too, when he speaks of "the 
love that dare not speak its name" is pointing to the force within society 
that uses taboos, social and moral, to prohibit discussion or articulation.
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The anti-communication forces, the human inability to communicate,
the inadequacy of language— all these have had a tendency to force some
authors to an articulation of a compensating rejection of communication
altogether. Throwing up their hands in despair, some authors— or at least
the characters they create— accept Schopenhauer's Nirvana where we find
a positive bliss beyond all thought and speech. "What is the use of
speech?" Ernest Dowson asks. "Silence were fitter,/ Lest we should still
be wishing things unsaid . . . ," and in his poem "Beata Solitudo," he
describes that land of Silence "Where all the voices/ Of humankind/ Are
left behind." No verbalization, no nonverbalization. Just silence. It
is the same kind of nihilism that Mr. Wimbush expresses in Crome Yellow;
How gay and delightful life would be if one could get rid of 
all the human contacts! Perhaps in the future . . .  it will 
be possible for those who, like myself desire it, to live in 
a dignified seclusion, surrounded by the delicate attentions 
of silent and graceful machines, and entirely secure from any 
human intrusion. It is a beautiful thought.
5.
Between qualified optimism and this utter nihilism, twentieth** 
century authors have explored the problem of communications, at times say­
ing much the same things said in the old semantic awareness, but at other 
times— and more frequently--raising new questions and new problems pecul­
iar to the contemporary pathos of communications. Shifting from pre-Dar­
winian criticism of motives and manners in communications, twentieth- 
century authors (as well as professional philogists, linguists, and se- 
manticists) have focused their criticism primarily upon the nature of lan­
guage and upon the technique of using that language for communication pur­
poses. They have told a story primarily of failure, yet within that failure
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are moments of light and hope.
The best way to read the story, however, is in the articulation 
made by individual authors in the course of their total work. Especially 
in those authors whose work is substantial and of major significance in 
our age do we find presentations of rather comprehensive understandings 
of communications. Nearly every major writer of the twentieth century 
reveals, if not a consciously organized semantic awareness, at least a 
sensitivity to communication problems that, by the time his canon is com­
plete, takes on the dimensions of a complete and intricate semantic struc­
ture. It seems that in the twentieth century especially, what with the 
pathos of communications in the background, a major author— who in the 
course of his work presents a comprehensive "view of the world"— must in­
clude in that view a portrait of communications, an enactment of and a 
statement upon what he thinks are the problems and possibilities in man's 
use of language.
Though the modern pathos of communications was being articulated 
as early as the 1890s, the articulation reached its peak in that richest 
of modern literary periods, the twenty some odd years between World War I 
and World War II. It was during these interbellum years that so much of 
the "change" that had taken place between 1860 and 1914 "was beginning to 
reach into the popular consciousness,"^^ and it was during those years 
that some of our greatest twentieth-century authors reached their flower­
ing and did their greatest work, work that no doubt helped bring the mes­
sage of change to the popular mind. In fact, it was the gigantic articu­
lation of the pathos of communications prior to World War II that effected
^^Curti, op. cit.. p. 579.
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the popular occupation with the pathos after 1945.
Three of the great Interbellum writers are James Joyce, Eugene 
O'Neill, and T. S. Eliot. Though their work is by no means dedicated 
exclusively to the pathos of communications, each deals extensively with 
the problems of communication and each comes to a discernible semantic 
position, a position growing out of his total philosophy and reflecting 
back upon that philosophy. Each of the three presents his own individual 
mode of semantic awareness, and together the three summarize, if not all 
possible semantic positions, at least the most popular and significant 
semantic attitudes available to modern man.
CHAPTER V
EUGENE O'NEILL AND THE TRAGIC WORD^
. . .  we come into the unspeakable and incommunicable prison 
of this earth.2
Eugene O'Neill, James Joyce, and T. S. Eliot have in common that 
act of exile and alienation that marks them as representative modern men. 
O'Neill exiled himself from the Catholic Church in an uncommuted apostasy; 
Joyce exiled himself from the Catholic Church and from Ireland; and T. S. 
Eliot exiled himself from America, his native land. For each of them the 
act of exile was an act of criticism^ and, to a certain extent, an act of 
quest. Critical of the way things were, circa World War I, each of these 
three major writers set out on uncharted seas to find, if he could, some 
"new world" to replace the old. And though their quests must finally be 
seen in terms larger than that of communication, a concern with language,
^An earlier version of this chapter appeared as the article 
"Communications and Tragedy in Eugene O'Neill," ETC.; A Review of General 
Semantics, XIX (July, 1962), pp. 148-60.
^Thomas Wolfe, Look Homeward Angel (New York; Charles Scribners' 
Sons, 1947), n.p.
^Communication difficulties are related, of course, to modern anti­
social hostilities, and exile is a manifestation of a general antisocial 
attitude. jO'Neill once said, in an interview with Mary B. Mullett, American 
Magazine /quoted in Arthur and Barbara Gelb, O'Neill (New York; Harper and 
Row, 1962), pp. 146-4/7 that he "hated a life ruled by the conventions and 
traditions of society," and on another occasion he made clear, to William 
Griffith of Current Opinion (quoted in Gelb, op. cit.. p. 483), that 
"Silence is the only answer possible to the yapping of morons . . . ."
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semantics, and articulation does permeate their depiction of the world 
and its reality. For each of them, their semantic awareness becomes an 
analogue of their total vision.
Especially in O'Neill's case, semantic awareness supports a tragic 
vision, and O'Neill's implied theory of communications delineates a funda­
mentally tragic world. Implicit in all of O'Neill's work is the struggle 
man makes to escape what Melville called the insular grief of noncommuni­
cation, and O'Neill seems thoroughly aware of the part noncommunication 
plays in creating and maintaining the tragic moment. O'Neill "stated over 
and over in his plays the theme of man's tragic inability to reach his 
fellow man. And in the play that first made O'Neill famous. Emperor 
Jones, the general outline of his attitude toward communications can be 
seen, as Brutus Jones— representatively acting out the plight of the mod­
ern age wherein every man is the Negro, a member of the oppressed minority-- 
descends from articulateness to silence. Brutus Jones represents simul­
taneously both the individual and the age, both the individual and the 
culture who have gone over the hill and who travel the "backward" and 'Üown- 
ward" path away from the high point of individual glory and cultural tri­
umph. Almost symbolically writing the play in "minuscule penciled script, 
cramming the entire play onto both sides of three sheets of typewriting 
paper,O'Neill tells the story of a man who believed (as obviously 
O'Neill thought modem man believed) that articulation without meaning, 
communication become noncommunication, would suffice to preserve him in
*Gelb, op. cit.. p. 10.
^Ibid., p. 440. The Gelbs also point out, p. 377, that as O'Neill's 
career developed his handwriting grew smaller and more difficult to read.
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power (or would suffice to preserve a culture): "Ain't a man's talkin'
big what makes him big— long as he makes folks believe it?"^ Sensitive 
to the power of language, possessing a certain minimum semantic awareness—  
"And ain't I got to leam deir lingo and teach some of dem English befo*
I kin talk to 'em?’ . . . .  You ain't never learned any word er it, 
Smithers, in de ten years you been heah, dough you' knows it's money in 
yo' pocket tradin' wid 'em if you does"^— Jones is nevertheless forced to 
flee into the jungle. An advocate of false and corrupt communication— "If 
I finds out dem niggers believes dat black is white, den I yells it out
Q
louder 'n deir loudest" — he is nevertheless forced to enter that Great 
Forest with its symbolic "brooding, implacable, silence.
The retreat of Brutus Jones into the silence of the forest is the 
retreat of modern man into the silence of noncommunication. In the forest, 
Jones finds he must be both communicator and receptor; though figures ap­
pear throughout the deteriorating experience, Jones has only self-communi­
cation, and the extended monologue, for which Emperor Jones is famous, 
becomes representative of modem discourse, the prevalent form of commu­
nication in modern life. Finally, in the seventh scene, wherein Jones 
has become anthropos, dwelling in the primitive, savage era of human ori­
gin, he is confronted by the Witch-Doctor, who makes a noise, but does 
not speak. "The Witch-Doctor sways, stamping with his foot, his bone
^The Plays of Eugene O'Neill (3 vols.; New York: Random House, 
1946), III, p. 179. This edition hereafter referred to as The Plays.
?Ibid.
*Ibid.. p. 185.
*Ibid.. p. 187.
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rattle clicking the time. His voice rises and falls in a weird, monoto­
nous croon, without articulate word d i v i s i o n s . M a n  has returned to the 
savage utterance that is meaningless, that is not communication. Man is 
reduced to the articulation that is incantation, but is not message. And 
when Brutus Jones is reduced to the animal level of the alligator, when 
the silver bullet has been shot, he lies on the primeval river bank "whim­
pering,"^^ no longer even maintaining a monologue with himself. He is re­
duced to the communication level that O'Neill seems to imply awaits our 
age: communication become whimpering, infantile, primitive, inadequate,
meaningless.
Looking through all of O'Neill's drama, we can reconstruct his
theory of communications and relate his semantic awareness to his creation
of the tragic character, who--in all his quests— keeps "trying to find the
12Word in the Beginning" and who engages, it would seem, in an everlasting 
conflict with the inarticulate forces of the world. O'Neill's frequent 
pitting of poet against materialist is not only a demonstration of the 
conflict of philosophical values; it is also a demonstration of the com- 
munications-minded man as opposed to the reticent. The appearance of the 
playwright and the stockbroker in Servitude "hints at future shadings of 
the male figure into related types"^^ whom we see as protagonist and an­
tagonist in such plays as Beyond the Horizon, Marco Millions. The Great
^°Ibid.. p. 201.
l^Ibid.. p. 202.
^^ h e  Great God Brown in The Plays. Ill, p. 284.
^^Doris V. Falk, Eugene O'Neill and the Tragic Vision (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 19.
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God Brown. Dynamo, and Days Without End. In these plays there is obvious, 
overt conflict between him who wishes and him who may not want or need to 
articulate, with the tragic burden carried most frequently by the poet- 
artist who falls to achieve his communications with the world. Not only 
in the poet-artist, however, is the tragedy of noncommunication revealed; 
all of O'Neill's characters face the problem of communications, and how 
they deal with the problem becomes O'Neill's comment on man's use of lan­
guage .
O'Neill's theory of communication begins with an awareness of man's 
innate desire and need for communicative contact with the world. Even man 
in his primordial state has this natural need to articulate--"Say, lemme 
talkI" Yank says in The Hairy Ape. " . . .  Say, listen to me— wait a 
moment— I gotter talk, see"^^--for communications provides us not only 
with our identity, but allows us to maintain our psychological health.
Man needs to communicate for therapeutic reasons if for no other. O'Neill 
once said that Yank's struggle was "to 'belong,' to find the thread that 
will make him a part of the fabric of Life— we are all struggling to do 
just that. One idea I had in writing the play was to show that the miss­
ing thread, literally 'the tie that binds,' is our understanding of one 
a n o t h e r . R u t h ,  in Beyond the Horizon, says, "I'd got to the end of
bearing things--without t a l k i n g , a n d  Eben in Desire Under the Elms ex­
presses the same therapeutic drive toward articulation: "An sooner'r
l^ The Plays. Ill, p. 215.
^^Croswell Bowen, Curse of the Misbegotten (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 1959), p. 152.
l*The Plays. Ill, p. 164.
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later, I'll meddle. I'll say the thin's I didn't say them t'hlm. I'll 
yell'm at the top o' my lungs. I'll see t' it my Maw gits some rest an' 
sleep in her grave.
Such a desire for therapeutic communication rises even to the level
of penitential communication with such a guilt-ridden character as Orin
Hannon. His writing the history of the Hannon family is certainly a guilt-
ridden communicative act, and his plea to Lavinia that they confess their
crime is his desire to use communication as an act of penitence. "That's
18the only way to wash the guilt of our mother's blood from our souls!"
There are other reasons for communication among O'Neill's charac­
ters, of course. In addition to the therapeutic need and the penitential 
need, there is the aesthetic need that Charlie Harsden expresses--"Oh, I 
can do it, Nina! I can write the truth! . . .  I'll write the book of 
us! . . . ny duty as an a r t i s t . W h a t e v e r  the particular need, all 
these drives toward communication are a part of basic human nature, and 
even in those characters where articulation does not take on a specific 
utilitarian tone the need for communication is present. "In a sense, this 
was the theme of so many of O'Neill's plays--man's agonizing loneliness, 
his feeling of not belonging, wanting and not wanting to belong, of being 
cursed to remain forever alone, above, and apart." The Dancer's cry, 
in O’Neill’s early play. Thirst, is representative: "Hy God! Hy God!
^^The Plays. I, p. 209.
^^Houming Becomes Electra in The Plays. II, p. 152.
l^Strange Interlude in The Plays. I, p. 177.
^®Bowen, op. cit., p. xviii.
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This silence is driving me mad. Why do you not speak to me?”^^
Out of need and desire, O'Neill's tragic characters attempt com­
munication in a variety of ways. Though most communication takes place 
informally, one character with another, O'Neill shows the place that more 
formal means of communication have in our lives. Nina Evans, in Strange 
Interlude, attempts to communicate by writing a biography of Gordon Shaw, 
Charlie Marsden by writing his novels; John Loving, in Days Without End, 
plans a novel that will permit him to make his statement to the world; 
even Simon Hartford is writing a book "about how the world can be changed
so people . . . will be content with little and live in peace and freedom
22together, and it will be like heaven on earth." Books, letters— espe­
cially in Anna Christie and Beyond the Horizon— and prayers (in Days 
Without End) are presented as possible communication forms in O'Neill's 
dramas, as his tragic characters search for the most satisfactory means 
of communication. Some characters--James Tyrone for instance— even turn 
to the art of others to do their communication for them. "Why can't you 
remember your Shakespeare . . . .  You'll find what you're trying to say 
in him— as you'll find everything else worth saying."^^ Communication by 
direct discourse; communication by recognized forms such as book, letter, 
and prayer; communication by the proiy of art— but even beyond these ver­
bal communications. O'Neill's characters reach out for less obvious, more 
subtle forms of conmmnication in their urgency to escape from the human
21
Thirst and Other One-Act Plays (Boston: The Gorham Press, 1914),
p. 1.
^^A Touch of the Poet (New Hayen: Yale University Press, 1957),
p. 29.
Long Day's Journey Into Night (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1956), p. 131.
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silence and the island of themselves.
"There is . . .  a vast amount of communication aside from language
. . . among men,"^^ and O'Neill's characters rely on non-linguistic means
a great deal of the time. O'Neill points out the importance of intuitive
or psychic communication on several occasions. In Mourning Becomes Electra,
Ezra Hannon feels something uneasy in his mind, ". . . as if something in
me was listening, watching, waiting for something to h a p p e n , a n d
Christine Hannon says, "Even if he never spoke, I would feel what was in
his mind . . . Especially in Desire Under the Elms is this sort of
nonverbal communication pointed out. At various times, Eben says, "I kin
feel him comin' on,"^^ "And I tell ye I kin feel 'em a-comin,'"^® while
a stage direction points out that Eben senses Abbie's presence behind 
29him, and at one time, Eben and Abbie respond to one another although a 
30wall intervenes. Even old Cabot has this sort of intuitive communica­
tion experience: "I felt they was somethin' onnateral— somewhars . . .
Verbal and intuitive communication in O'Neill are also accompanied 
by various forms of tactile communication, wherein some physical act or
Z^Edgar Sturtevant, An Introduction to Linguistic Science (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), p. 40.
Z^The Plays. II, p. 60.
Z*The Plays. II, p. 40.
2?The Plays. I, p. 216.
28
The Plays. I, p. 219.
2*The Plays. I, p. 228.
30
The Plays. I, p. 236.
®^The Plays. I, p. 264.
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sign serves as articulation. O'Neill gives special attention to the lan­
guage of the eye, of the mind, and of sex. In Desire Under the Elms,
Simon says, "What've ye got held agin us, Eben? Year arter year it's 
skulked in yer eye--something!";^^ in The Iceman Cometh. Hickey says,
"She'd kiss me and look in ay eyes, and she'd know. I'd see in her eyes 
how she was trying not to know . . and most vividly in Mourning
Becomes Electra. Ezra Mannon says, "Your eyes were always so— so full of 
silence! That is, since we've been married. Not before, when I was court­
ing you. They used to speak then. They made me talk--because they an­
swered.
The language of the hand is seen in such a play as Beyond the 
Horizon, wherein the two brothers, Andrew and Robert, express their other­
wise inexpressible emotions by using their hands. In the stage directions 
we read that Andrew "grins and slaps Robert on the back affectionately," 
Robert puts "one hand on top of Andrew's with a gesture almost of shyness," 
and Andrew "pulls Robert's hand from his side and grips it tensely; the 
two brothers stand looking into each other's eyes for a m i n u t e . T h e  
most elaborate form of tactile communication, the language of sex, is
clearly seen in Mourning Becomes Electra. Christine's confession that
36her marriage to Ezra "soon turned his romance into disgust," testifies 
to the power of this language, and Grin's incestuous proposal to Lavinia
^^ h e  Plays. I, p. 208.
^^The Iceman Cometh (New York: Random House, 1946), p. 236.
^^ h e  Plays. II, p. 53.
S^The Plays. Ill, pp. 82-86.
3*The Plays. II, p. 31.
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is actually an attempt to find a kind of "final talking" between them.
When he says, "You would feel as guilty then as I do!"^^ he shows that he 
thinks of sex as a means of communicating his feelings to her.
In spite, however, of the great need to communicate and the range
of communicative means available, O'Neill's characters find the communi­
cative act itself difficult to achieve. O'Neill is aware of the many ob­
stacles that face man as he tries to reach out beyond himself, and an iden­
tification of these obstacles becomes a major part of O'Neill's communica­
tions theory.
The primary obstacle to successful communications among O'Neill's
characters is their own individual incapacity to articulate. Something
in their imperfect human nature is a communications flaw that must finally
be seen as a piece of their larger tragic flaw, whatever it may be. Edmund
in Long Day's Journey Into Night puts the situation succinctly: "I couldn't
touch what I tried to tell you just now. I just stammered. That's the
best I'll ever do . . .  . Well, it will be faithful realism. Stammering
38
is the native eloquence of us fog people." And so all of O'Neill's fog
39
people stammer. Chris cries, "Ay can't say it;" Andrew in Beyond the 
Horizon says, "I'd rather go through a typhoon again than write a letter;"^® 
and Charlie Harsden explains his particular incapacity as inevitable where 
father and son are concerned: " . . .  father . . . wanted to speak to me
just before he died . . . .  I couldn't understand him . . . what son can
^^The Plays. II, p. 165.
Long Day's Journey Into Night, p. 154.
^^Anna Christie in The Plays. Ill, p. 67.
^°The Plays. Ill, p. 131.
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ever understand?"^^
Such natural incapacity to articulate is magnified in O'Neill when 
his characters grow additionally inhibited or misinformed about communi­
cations. The Mannons seem to have a special inhibition: "Something queer
in me keeps me mum about the things I'd like to show," Ezra s a y s A n d  
sometimes in O'Neill such inhibition is encouraged by a sense of social 
propriety or decorum. Orin says, "I--I let off steam when I shouldn't, 
and Ned Darrell puts it forthrightly, " . . .  there are things one may not 
say."^^ Likewise, such a rigid notion about communications as Andrew 
takes in Beyond the Horizon— "What's said is said and can't be unsaid 
. . only contributes to the general, prevailing sense of incapacity
that O'Neill's characters possess.
Even when O'Neill's characters overcome their incapacities and 
seek to fulfill their communicative desire, however, there is the frequent, 
tragic failure of the communications receptor to be prepared for the artic­
ulation or to be equipped to receive the message. The communicator must 
find a response, of course, or the communication does not take place.
Mere self-expression is not the problem in O'Neill's theory of communica­
tions; his characters must not only perform the communicative act them­
selves but the act must be completed by reaching another intelligence.
Time and again his characters cry out, as the Mannons do, for some response
^^Strange Interlude in The Plays. I, p. 4.
^^Mourning Becomes Electra in The Plays, II, p. 82.
43lbid.
44gtrange Interlude in The Plays. I, p. 133.
^^The Plays. Ill, p. 109.
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to their articulation. "Don't be so still!" Mannon exclaims. "God, 1 
want to talk to you, Christine! I've got to explain some things--'inside 
me— to my wife— try to anyway ! And Christine cries to Lavinia, "Answer 
me when I speak to you!"^^ So desperate do some of O'Neill's communica­
tors grow that they turn to other than humans. Yank turns to the gorilla 
— "Yuh got what I was sayin ' even if yuh muffed de words''^®— and Cabot 
says, "I kin talk t' the cows. They know. They know the farm an' me. 
They'll give me peace.
Receptor failure is the result of both deliberate refusal and sim­
ple incapacity. Larry, in The Iceman Cometh, on occasion disqualifies 
himself as a receptor with such statements as "No one takes him seriously.
That's his epitaph,"^® and "I'd never let myself believe a word you told
51me." Larry is shutting out any possibility of receiving a communication 
simply by setting up a wall of advance judgment. More frequently, though, 
receptor failure in O'Neill is simply the result of receptor weakness and 
incapacity. Dion, in The Great God Brown, speaks for many of O'Neill's 
characters when he says, "This domestic diplomacy! We communicate in 
code--when neither has the other's key!"^^ We simply aren't capable, Dion
says; we don't possess the equipment to be good communicators or receptors.
^®Mouming Becomes Electra in The Plays. II, p. 53.
^^The Plays. II, p. 78.
AO
The Hairy Ape in The Plays. Ill, p. 252.
^^Desire Under the Elms in The Plays. I, p. 238.
^^The Iceman Cometh, p. 12.
S^Ibid.. p. 129.
S^The Plays. Ill, p. 270.
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And as a result, we do not hear others when they talk to us. Professor 
Leeds realizes that Nina simply can't hear him. "I must talk her out of 
it'. . . . find the right words! . . . oh, I know she won't hear me!"^^ 
and "No use! . . . she doesn't hear . . . thinking of Gordon . . .
The example, par excellence, in O'Neill of receptor failure is, of course, 
the wireless operator in Warnings,who returns to his job on a transatlantic 
liner knowing that he may go totally deaf at any moment; when the liner 
he is on begins to sink, the operator sends a distress signal but cannot 
hear the answer. He has grown deaf to the messages of the world and he 
commits suicide at the play's end.
Another obstacle to successful communication lies in the failure 
of language itself. On those occasions when O'Neill's characters, without 
inhibition or restraint, try to communicate with one another, try to be 
good communicator and good receptor, there is still the difficulty of the 
language m e d i u m . P e r h a p s  Nina Leeds, more than any other O'Neill char­
acter, is aware of the failure of word symbols. On numerous occasions she 
curses the language that man so unsuccessfully uses. She accuses her fa­
ther of using "spiritless messages from the dead . . . dead w o r d s , a n d  
later extends her accusation to all of us. She is particularly aware of
53
Strange Interlude in The Plays. I, p. 15.
^^Ibid.. p. 17.
^^Edwin A. Engle, The Haunted Heroes of Eugene O'Neill (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 224, suggests that O'Neill was espe­
cially aware of the language difficulty because of_his own writing strug­
gles. ^O'Neill the playwright, had been acutely /aware of the failure of 
symbol^/ almost from the start of his playwrighting career--a fact to which 
the inarticulateness of his early protagonists and a continued suggestion 
of ineffableness bear witness."
56
strange Interlude in The Plays, I, p. 15.
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the emptiness of our words, of the failure of our words to denote actual 
referents. "How we poor monkeys hide from ourselves behind the sounds 
called w o r d s s h e  exclaims, and then attacks especially those abstract 
words which all semanticists recognize as especially dangerous symbols.
"Do I seem queer? It's because I've suddenly seen the lies in the sounds 
called words. You know— grief, sorrow, love, father— those sounds our lips 
make and our hands w r i t e . T h i s  semantic problem becomes, for Nina, an 
obstacle even to religious experience. She cannot accept the Gospel, she 
tells us, because she cannot believe the words.^9
The great discrepancy between symbol and meaning is at the heart 
of O'Neill's implied criticism of language. Just as Charlie Marsden had 
never "married the word to life,"^® so few of us, O'Neill seems to say, 
can ever achieve the proper language for our t h o u g h t s . A l l  our words, 
finally, are to be evaluated in the way Dion Anthony evaluates 'love'": 
"Love is a word--a shameless ragged ghost of a word— begging at all doors 
for life at any price!"^^ The ghost word, the spook word is the great 
failure of language, and in spite of our desires and our willingness we 
can never achieve a truly adequate language.
^^Ibid.. p. 40.
SGibid.
S^Ibid.. p. 41.
^^Ibid., p . 148.
^^In O'Neill's own family, his father, mother, and brother always 
"explained away" their talk to each other by saying it was the "booze 
talking” or it was the "poison talking," as though somehow they and their 
talking.were separate phenomena. See Gelb, op. cit.. p. 101.
^^ h e  Great God Brown in The Plays. Ill, p. 266.
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Another area of language failure is examined by O'Neill when he
shows us our human predilection to use meaningless labels to identify one
another and when he shows how we respond, emotionally and irrationally,
to the connotative associations that go along with certain labels. We
certainly notice in The Iceman Cometh the communication confusion that
arises with the use of such labels as "nigger," "Wop," and "whore." The
subterranean characters in this play give much importance to the correct
labels; they respond violently to the "wrong" labels. Joe dislikes the
label "nigger," Rocky dislikes "Wop." And the label "whore" receives
particular attention. In speaking to Larry, Parritt says, "I remember
that you got mad and you told her, 'I don't like living with a whore if
that's what you mean!"' to which Larry vehemently replies, "You lie! I
63
never called her that." Rocky and the girls frequently have it out over 
the matter of names. Rocky in speaking to Margie on one occasion says,
"And imagine a whore hustlin' de cows home! For Christ sake! Ain't dat 
a sweet picture!" Margie answers, "You oughtn't to call Cora dat. Rocky. 
She's a good kid. She may be a tart, but--" to which Rocky agrees: "Sure,
dat's all I mean, a tart."^^ Somehow "tart" is a much nicer word to the 
girls than "whore" is.
This particular semantic phenomenon is easily related, of course, 
to tragic character itself in that O'Neill's characters make language do 
the duty of mask in their attempt to conceal their true identities from 
both themselves and others. Look how important names and labels become 
in the tragic statement of a play like Long Day's Journey Into Night.
63
The Iceman Cometh, p. 125.
**Ibid.. p. 69.
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In the tragedy of the Tyrones, it becomes very important how one talks
about people and events. The choice of words is supposed mysteriously
to alter reality. "Another shot in the arm!" says Jamie of his mother's
dope addiction, but he is immediately attacked by Edmund and Tyrone. "Cut
out that kind of talk!" Edmund says, and Tyrone adds, "Yes! Hold your
65
foul tongue and your rotten Broadway loafer's lingo . . . ," and the
real fight in the play, when Edmund strikes Jamie, is when Jamie asks,
"Where's the hophead? Gone to s l e e p A s  Bess Sondel says.
We protect the self, even if we must delude the self to do it.
We talk ourselves but of our uneasiness, out of our ineptness, 
out of our blunders; out of our fears, out of our frustrations; 
out of our tensions, our unhappiness, our failures. We do this 
with coercive signs. It is the rare one who can resist the se­
duction of his own flattering, soothing, felicitous signs. For 
this is the formula, it seems, for living with the inadequate 
self.67
Such misuse of language, coupled with the semantic failure of lan­
guage itself, leads us many times to false communication, a "lie" in fact, 
that is the greatest obstacle to the achievement of any genuine communi­
cation. O'Neill's use of masks and interior monologues is related to his 
semantic awareness of the false communication into which we frequently 
slide.68 For O'Neill, our acceptance of this false coosnunication is
65
'ibid., pp. 161-62.
Long Day's Journey Into Night, pp. 75-76. 
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6^Bess Sondel, The Humanity of Words (Cleveland: World Publishing 
Co., 1958), p. 161.
68one senses in O'Neill's use of the monologue an implicit attempt 
to reach what, in his tragic world, was the typical if not the ideal com­
munication situation. The extended monologue of Emperor Jones. Before 
Breakfast. Hughie. and other plays, plus all of his experimental attempts 
to reveal inner thought (Strange Interlude) and carry on dialogues with 
self (Days Without End). are a gesture on O'Neill's part to reach that 
noncommunication between characters that he thought was the reality
97
dangerous, not simply because it is a lie, but because it delays genuine 
communication and, over a prolonged period of time, sickens us with com­
munication, deceives us and embitters us to the point that we put no trust 
in communications at all. This great failure of language and our human 
misuse of it, added to our incapacities as communicators and receptors,
beneath the surface of our specious conversations. One feels that O'Neill 
would have liked to have moved toward the one-character play, the play in 
which a single character converses only with himself. This solo perform­
ance would not have been the coming to a level of pure and uninterrupted 
communication; it would have been symbolic of the way things really are 
in O'Neill's world: we are all "solo characters" alone upon the stage of
life. The pure monologue, with which O'Neill toyed, is also an expression 
of pure ego— the uninterrupted communicator who talks without regard for 
receptor--for the receptor has been removed; if one talks only to oneself, 
vast quantities of communication problems are removed. And this ego-aspect 
of the dramatic monologue is a clue, perhaps, to a great deal of the 
"tragic flaw" in O'Neill's tragic world: perhaps communication fails,
not only because of all the semantic reasons, all the language inadequa­
cies, but because of a kind of hybris that denies communication, a kind 
of hybris that is willing to pay the price of tragedy for the contentment 
and satisfaction of self conversations. O'Neill, himself a terribly in­
hibited man most of the time as far as the give and take of conversation 
was concerned, perhaps saw in his monologue experiments a depiction of what 
can only be considered a paradox: the free-flowing articulation within
and to and for oneself that at the same time is a rejection and collapse 
of genuine communication with others.
O'Neill's predilection for masks also has a significance in the area of 
communications. Though his most startling use of masks is in The Great God 
Brown. O'Neill would have liked to use masks in all the plays he wrote; he 
frequently expressed the desire that the characters in his plays wear masks, 
his argument being that masked actors more readily adapted themselves to 
the roles they were playing. More significant, however, than this drama­
turgical excuse for O'Neill's love of masks is the implication that masks 
are the symbolic representation of our confused identities, on the one 
hand, and are the symbolic representation of two major communication dif­
ficulties, on the other hand. As far as communication is concerned, the 
mask obviously is a muffling of our voices; perhaps a magnification indeed 
(O'Neill related his love of masks to the Greek mégaphonie masks) but dis­
tortion nevertheless. And the mask also deceives us in our communication 
orientations; are we talking to the mask or to the man, is it the man tdio 
hears us or the mask he wears? O'Neill made it clear that our masks have 
identities of their own (see The Great God Brown), and the single human 
being, the individual, may actually be a complex of communicators and re­
ceptors. In O'Neill's tragic world, when one man speaks to another, what 
may be happening on a psychological level is that twins are talking to twins, 
or a trio to a trio, or even a crowd to a crowd. Even in those plays where 
O'Neill does not actually call for the physical mask, the idea of mask is 
often apparent. Consider, for instance, the early play Servitude.
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bodes ill of course for any successful and meaningful communication in 
O'Neill's world. Too easy is the road that leads to the world of non­
communication where the final tragedies of man take place.
In O'Neill, part of the blame for the tragedy of noncommunication 
must be given to the tragic character's fear of articulation. At the very 
time the tragic character has the desire and need to articulate, he fights 
off that communication which he feels would shatter his illusion and carry 
him into a reality for which he is not prepared. The Mannons have this 
fear: "We'd better light the light and talk awhile," Ezra says, but
Christine answers, "X don't want to talk! I prefer the dark."^^ 
Christine's very equation of talk and light, noncommunication and darkness 
underlines the part that communications play in O'Neill's tragic vision, 
and Christine becomes especially culpable, it seems, in her failure to 
communicate not because of fate (incapacity, language failure, etc.) but 
because of will. Time and again she says to Ezra, "Don't talk . . .
"For God's sake stop talking. I don't know what you're s a y i n g . A n d  
even Hannon himself, at one point, becomes fearful of communication and 
cries out, "Be quiet, Christine!"^^
In The Iceman Cometh, this same culpable fear of communication is 
seen. The fact that the boarders, in Act III, have had to lock out Hickey, 
and lock out each other even, reveals their fearful refusal to communicate. 
Even if they have the capacity and means of communication they do not want
^^Mourning Becomes Electra in The Plays. II, p. 59.
7°Ibld.. p. 53.
^^Ibid., p. 56.
^^Ibld.. p. 61.
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it. "But if you don't keep still," Larry says to Parritt, "you'll be 
saying something soon that will make you vomit your own soul like a drink 
of nickel rotgut that won't stay down."^^ And the same fear threads its 
way through Lone Day's Journey Into Night. We hear Edmund cry, "Mama!
For God's sake, stop t a l k i n g , " S t o p  talking, Mama."^^ And Tyrone, 
too; "Be quiet! Don't say that to me!" While Mary, more than the 
others, fears and rejects communication: "Now, now. Don't talk . . .
7 0
"Please don't--talk about things you don't understand!" and "I don't 
know what you're talking about, James. You say such mean, bitter things 
when you've drunk too much."^^
O'Neill's characters plunge themselves into the tragedy of non­
communication not only out of this fear of what communication will bring, 
but more frequently out of a hostile recognition of the uselessness of 
communication, the hopelessness of every achieving it, and the deception 
that inadequate communication can be. Most of O'Neill's characters ex­
press the futility of communications at some time or other— Paddy: "Yerra,
what's the use of talking? 'Tis a dead man's whisper;"®^ Christine: "I
81meant— what is the good of words?"; Anna: "Oh, what's the use? What's
7a
The Iceman Cometh, p . 227.
^^ Long Day's Journey Into Night, p. 74.
75ibid.. p. 109.
7*Ibid., p. 145.
77lbid.. p. 92.
^^Ibid.. p. 92.
^^Ibid;. p. 123.
on
The Hairy Ape in The Plays. Ill, p. 214.
®Mourning Becomes Electra in The Plays. II, p. 56.
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the use of me talking?”;®^ Elsa; "Oh, John, stop talking! What's the
83
good of talk?"; Hark: "I know it's useless to talk. But sometimes I
feel so lonely";®^ Tyrone: "But what's the good of talk?";®^ Edmund:
"But let's not talk about it. It's no use now."®^ And out of this phil­
osophy of futility, O'Neill's characters go on to a complete renunciation 
of communication, not because they fear it, do not desire it, think it 
impossible, but because they find it ultimately false. With all its pit­
falls and difficulties, communications become too much to worry about, 
and there is the final denial of it, on the very border of the ultimate 
tragedy.
Even in his early plays, O'Neill foresaw a world of silences, de­
void of communications--silences that he depicts, for instance, in Emperor
87Jones and in The Moon of the Caribees. Mrs. Evans, in Strange Interlude.
denounces communication by saying, "Being happy, that's good! The rest 
88
is just talk!" Lavinia Mannon, also, comes to a denunciation of commu­
nication because it is a meaningless gesture. Her refusal to speak after 
her father's death is a symptom of her final tragic rejection of communi­
cation with the world. Larry Slade feels that he, too, has moved beyond
87
Anna Christie in The Plays. Ill, p. 74.
83
Days Without End in The Plays. Ill, p. 550.
^^Long Day's Journey Into Night, p. 45.
®^Ibid., p. 78.
G*Ibid.. p. 132.
87"Brooks Atkinson once described The Moon of the Caribees as a 
'drama of silence.'" See Gelb, op. cit.. p. 327.
^^The Plays. I, p. 64.
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the futility of communication when he says, "I've gotten beyond the de­
sire to communicate with the world . . .
This is the point to which O'Neill's characters finally come as 
they move toward their tragic climaxes. Beyond the desire to communicate, 
they are beyond the sane human situation wherein man does desire to com­
municate, does make the attempt, fearful or futile as it may be. The cli­
max of Days Without End shows the struggle upon the brink, when the artic­
ulate nature of man struggles with the rejection of communication. John's 
prayer in the last scene of the play represents the eternal tension between 
communication and noncommunication; as John cries out in his prayer, "X 
have come back to Thee!" so Loving cries out, "Words! There is nothing!"^®
If man does not win in this struggle, if his will to communicate 
does not triumph over the noncommunicative forces around and within him, 
he is doomed, of course, to the tragedy of silence. The shuttered, dark­
ened Hannon house is the symbol of this final hell into which man can fall 
when he at last accepts, for whatever reason, his insular grief and works 
no more against it. In this hell, we sit with one another, but "we sit 
together in silence, thinking . . . thoughts that never know the other's 
thoughts . . . and the only cry we make, an interior cry, is "Oh,
God, so deaf and dumb and blind!"^^ ascribing to the universe the same 
noncommunicative characteristics which we have assumed. In a hell where
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The Iceman Cometh, pp. 28-29.
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The Plays. Ill, p. 565.
^Hlouming Becomes Electra in The Plays. II, p. 139.
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Strange Interlude in The Plays. I, p. 199.
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"the damned don't cry"^^ or express themselves, we must finally look even 
at those whom we love and realize that "You can't talk to her now. She'll 
listen, but she won't l i s t e n , a n d  become one with Tyrone and Mary who, 
having known the very closeness of wedded love, must finally act their 
separate parts— "Tyrone: (In hopeless appeal.) 'Mary!' (But it cannot
penetrate her preoccupation. She doesn't seem to hear him . . .
O'Neill's tragedies are, of course, more than communication trag­
edies, but certainly his semantic awareness leads to an intensification 
of his tragic vision, and certainly the tragic moment in O'Neill is seen 
more completely and wholly because it includes a knowledge of man's com­
municative nature. And O'Neill's theory of communications must be in­
cluded in any organizing concept of O'Neill's tragic world, in any state­
ment about O'Neill's philosophy of life and his tragic concept.
O'Neill's theory of communication as revealed in his plays can be 
summarized, I believe, in this way: Normal man has an innate desire to
communicate, but the best he can do is simply strive toward communication 
and accept the imperfection of it. Because of his own incapacities and 
those of his receptors, and because of the inadequacy of the language 
medium, man can never achieve the perfect understanding via the perfect 
communication that he desires. The worst that can happen to man is that 
he may reject communication altogether— out of fear of what it will reveal, 
out of a realization of its imperfections and failures— and fall into the 
tragedy of silence that is our final separation from fellow man.
QO
Mourning Becomes Electra in The Plays. II, p. 156.
9^Long Day's Journey Into Night, p. 78.
*5lbid.. p. 172.
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Fittingly or ironically, as one may wish to view it, O'Neill's 
own private life was itself something of a communication tragedy. Son of 
a highly articulate father, the actor James O'Neill, and a frequently in­
coherent mother, Ella O'Neill, addicted to dope, O'Neill suffered all his 
life not only from a psychological reticance to communicate--he usually 
avoided communication even with family and friends save when he was drunk-- 
but from a disease one of the symptoms of which, in its acute stage, was 
speech impairment.Numerous people found O'Neill sphinxlike, and he was
notorious for his soft almost inaudible voice. He had a tendency to stut- 
97ter. And perhaps one of the most prevalent criticisms of his art has 
been that he did not have an ear for "actual spoken language,"^® and that 
his plays seem "often strangely inarticulate," as though O'Neill were 
"unable to put his ideas into words with even ordinary fluency . . . ."^9 
O'Neill was, of course, aware of his own comnunication failures, his lan­
guage inadequacies. And out of this recognition he developed his philos­
ophy of communication failure.
One of his favorite passages from Hindu philosophy was, "Before 
the ear can hear it must have lost its sensitiveness . . . .  Before the 
voice can speak it must have lost its power to w o u n d . O n e  of his 
favorite passages from his Master Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra was
^^Gelb, op. cit.. p. 941.
97Bowen, op. cit.. p. 79.
98Ibid.. p. 75.
99Joseph Wood Krutch, The American Drama Since 1918 (New York; 
Random House, 1939), p. 291.
lOOgee Gelb, op. cit.. p. 332; also Bowen, pp. cit.. p. 95.
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"Almost in the cradle we are given heavy words . . . O'Neill re­
peated many times throughout his life a remark he heard from his friend, 
Terry Carlin, "Words only conceal thought and do not express . . . ,"^^2 
and he once commented on his favorite people, sailors of the high seas, 
in this manner: "In many ways they are inarticulate. They cannot write
of their own problems. So they must often suffer in silence.
O'Neill saw man suffering in silence, and he saw the tragedy of 
that suffering. His own communication difficulties, the difficulties of 
those around him, led him to an almost fatalistic recognition of communi­
cation failure, a failure that man cannot overcome, but agpinst which man 
can only make that hopeless effort of stuttering. O'Neill himself strove 
to be eloquent by dramatic inarticulation. A paradox. And a sense of 
tragedy.
James Joyce was to explore the paradox at length and was to em­
phasize the comedy, along with the sorrow, of communication failure.
^^^Gelb. op. cit.. p. 209. 
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CHAPTER VI
JAMES JOYCE AND THE WORD THAT FAILED
. . . Mara, in old runic, was a goblin that seized upon men 
asleep in their beds and took from them all speech . . .
James Joyce, teacher of languages, has given the twentieth century 
its most magnificent demonstration of communication failure, a demonstra­
tion manifest not only in the depiction of a linguistically-thwarted world, 
but also in an enactment of communication deterioration in a literature 
that finally transcends "the extreme limits of intelligibility.An 
Irish apostate like O'Neill, Joyce managed a life-long rebellion against 
the Roman Catholic "tyranny over mind and speech,especially against the 
Jesuit order, which he called the "silent service."* Rebelling against 
the Church's restrictive nature, he exiled himself from its communion, not 
only in the sacramental sense, but also in the sense of excommunicating 
himself from the Church's tradition of language. In so cutting himself 
adrift from restriction within an established order of communication,
Joyce found himself forever after "at sea" as far as communications were
^Sir William Temple, op. cit.. p. 139.
2
Samuel C. Chew, op. cit.. p. 1562.
q
W. Y. Tindall, James Joyce (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1950), p. 85.
*Jame
The Modern Library, 1928), p. 217.
s Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist As a Young Man (New York:
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concerned; for "having left the church, he could never bring himself to 
participate in any other communion— 'religious, literary . . . social"^ or 
verbal. Out of this plight, Joyce created a great comic critique of com­
munications in general, its traditional foibles and failures; and in tell­
ing his own story of exile and apostasy, he created a harlequinesque nar­
rative of modern man's falling away from the old order of communication 
into seemingly new frontiers of language and speech.
Joyce's critique and narrative deal with a world called "Dublin,"
a world that emerges out of the totality of his work and transcends any
particular geographical identification. It is a world in which, as Leopold
Bloom observes, the language question takes precedence over nearly any
other civic question. And it is a world in which an "unconscionable amount
of talking . . . goes on,"^ though, as we discover in the course of Joyce's
critique, most of the talking amounts to scarcely more than articulation
(as opposed to true communication) and the most significant utterances are
those animal-like cries such as Stephen Dedalus emits from time to time:
. . . the cry that he had strangled for so long in his throat 
issued from his lips. It broke from him like a wail of despair 
from a hell of sufferers and died in a wail of furious entreaty, 
a cry for an iniquitous abandonment, a cry which was but the 
echo of an obscene scrawl which he had read on the oozing wall 
of a urinal.
It is a world in which, as in "The Sisters," the chalice of the living 
word is broken, in which the communication-that-is-communion is symboli­
cally shattered.
^Harry Levin, James Joyce: A Critical Introduction (Rev. and 
Augmented Ed.; New York: New Directions, 1960), p. 24.
^Ibid.. p. 33.
^A Portrait, pp. 112-13.
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Joyce depicts this world--from Dubliners to Finnegans Wake--as a 
complex enterprise of interlocking and intricately involved relationships, 
a veritable jungle of contacts and communication efforts crisscrossing 
back and forth. People meet, depart, meet again; people gather, disband, 
gather again. A labyrinth of communication possibilities is presented as 
Joyce brings his hungering Irish souls together in every possible combi­
nation, offering them every chance to communicate. And it is through this 
jungle of potential discourse that the Joycean personality, the Joycean 
modern man, wanders that downward path from a semblance of communication 
to a lack of verbal contact with the world. The Joycean 'hero' wanders 
down a road, symbolized by Joyce's own literary method, that leads from 
dialogue and conversation, through argument and misunderstanding, to mono­
logue and finally to soliloquy.
In the early works, Dubliners and A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man. Joyce's most vital element in .writing is his use of conversa­
tion,^ a rich Irish conversation that "mitigates the sordid realities"* 
of the world. But even in these books, the monologue, the one-sided con­
versation, is present: the stranger in "An Encounter" harangues the two 
young boys with his incomprehensible message and invitation, and Stephen 
Dedalus in A Portrait listens to the long and incoherent monologues of 
his father, the long sermons of the priests. Next the monologue goes in­
ward and becomes an interior kind of discourse, discourse with oneself, 
the monologue grown silent as Stuart Gilbert observes,that soliloquy
Q
Levin, op. cit.. p. 52.
*Ibid.. p. 33.
^^In Richard Ellmann, James Joyce (New York: Oxford University 
959). p. 368.Press, 1 ,
108
of unheard and unspoken speech that Joyce used so dramatically in A Portrait, 
Ulysses, and Finnegans Wake, with Ulysses and Finnegans Wake ending with 
famous recitatives of self to self.
Joyce also employs literary method to symbolize the downward com­
munication path of modern man by gradually shifting the level or style of 
his language from clarity to confusion. Just as in "The Oxen of the Sun" 
episode in Ulysses Joyce reviews the historical decline of English style 
"until it ends in a frightful jumble of Pidgin English, Nigger English, 
Cockney, Irish, Bowery slang and broken d o g g e r e l , s o  his own literary 
style moves from the clarity of Dubliners down to the deliberate obscurity
of Finnegans Wake, wherein the "ahnihilisation of the etym" betokens the
12collapse of the word and wherein, as Joyce himself admitted, "I have put 
the language to s l e e p . T h e  language abyss of Finnegans Wake— the "last 
word . . . the witless wandering of literature before its final extinc­
tion," as Stanislaus Joyce put it^*— represents the abyss that awaits 
modem man, who tries to communicate but who is victim of a degenerative 
process to which both individuals and culturesmust submit.
The individual communicator who travels the downward path starts 
his journey, of course, with the intention of ascension, not regression.
He is travelling to escape the ordinary world, the ordinary Dublin. His
Joyce in a letter to Frank Budgen, quoted in Ellmann, op cit..
p. 490.
l^Tindall, op. cit.. p. 92.
13Ellmann, op. cit.. p. 559.
^^ Ibid.. p. 589.
^^Tindall, op. cit.. p. 71.
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journey, which proves foolish, has its origins in his desire to retreat 
from the broken word as he recognizes it in the market place. Even though 
the individual himself comes at last to his own broken word, to his own 
witless wandering in language confusion, he begins his journey to escape 
the broken word of others, the broken word of the society from which he 
hopes to isolate himself. And Joyce is much concerned, in the scope of 
his work, to portray and denounce communication failure on the larger stage 
of society and city, the communication failure of the agora. Stanislaus 
Joyce wrote in his diary that James' "great passion is a fierce scorn of 
what he calls the 'rabblement'— a tiger-like, insatiable h a t r e d , a n d  
it is the communication of the "rabblement" that Joyce presents' as prole­
gomenon to all subsequent communication consideration.
Market-place communication, it would seem, is not communication 
at all, but merely a matter of noise. The very god of the Dublin-world 
thunders audibly, but not understandably; the voice of God speaks in 
Finnegans Wake in vast hundred-letter, polylingual thunderclaps that are 
sound without sense. And modem man, imprisoned in the market-place world, 
as H. C. Earwicker is, receives representative communication from fellow- 
man in the insults shouted through the keyhole by a visiting hog-caller 
from America. Even when some semblance of understandable communication 
does occur, its significance is nil or perverse; in this Dublin-market- 
place world, "Things are so topsy-turvy that the preachers of God's word 
lead the prostitutes into sin."^^
^^Ellmann, op. cit.. p. 142.
Joseph Campbell and Henry Morton Robinson, A Skeleton Key to 
Finnegans Wake (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), p. 35.
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The market place is peopled with such men as Corley and Lenehan 
of "Two Gallants"— Corley who talks earnestly, but speaks without listen­
ing to the speech of his companions and whose conversation is mainly about
himself; Lenehan, a leech, whose "eloquence had always prevented his
18friends from forming any general policy against him." A certain ver­
bosity and eloquence prevail, but it is suspect, shady, underhanded, cheap.
Talk, but only talk, as Lily explains to Gabriel in "The Dead:" "The men
19that is now is only all palaver . . . The market-place men tire
themselves out "talking all afternoon in a public-house,but their talk 
is innerdirected; they are magnetised by their own speech. And even at 
the communication center of the city, the newspaper office, conversations 
are a conglomeration of disdain, timidily, brashness, twisted words, and 
semantic sport.
Communication among such people is frequently scurrilous, as is 
the mysterious card received by Hr. Breen in Ulysses, and as is the rumour 
instigated by the Cad about Mr. Earwicker in Finnegans Wake. Or the com­
munication is ludicrous, as is the letter Mr. Deasy has written on foot 
and mouth disease for the newspaper: "1 want that to be printed and
read."21 Nearly always the communication is confused or meaningless.
In Mr. Earwicker's tavern, drunks tell their drunken tales against a 
background of radio broadcasts constantly interrupted by static, key 
clickings, "vaticum cleaners," and the like. At the Ormond restaurant.
p. 59.
1 O
James Joyce, Dubliners (New York: The Modern Library, 1954),
l*Ibid.. p. 227.
on
"Gallants," Dubliners, p. 59.
^1James Joyce, Ulysses (New York; Random Hots e, 1934), p. 34.
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in Ulysses, a regular phantasmagoria of communication takes place with
Miss Kennedy and Miss Douce giggling hysterically at each other, Richie
Coulding telling whopping lies, Simon Dedalus singing the wrong words to
the song, George Lidwell hearing in the seashell the roar of the sea that
isn't there. And at Holies St. Hospital a drunken communication prevails
in the waiting room, with "words . . . difficultly understood and not
22often nice . . . outrageous mots . . . "  that only late in the evening
23"blend and fuse in clouded silence." Public communication emerges 
scarcely more than animal-like; the vicious dog Garryowen articulates as 
well as anyone. Public communication is as senseless as a chamber pot: 
"Empty vessels make most noise.
The Joycean 'hero,' born and bred into this poorly communicating 
world, finds himself surrounded by a debilitating experience. Stephen 
Dedalus, in A Portrait, becomes acutely sensitive to his mother's mutter- 
ings, the screech of an unseen maniac, offending voices, common noises, 
tongues that babble. And all the noise finally becomes, to the sensitive 
man of the Joycean world, a kind of hell where, as the Jesuit portrays 
the afterlife, "The damned howl and scream at one another . . . full of 
blasphemies against God and of hatred for their fellow sufferers . . .
All the noise finally concentrates us in a nighttown where "A deafmute 
idiot with goggle eyes, his shapeless mouth dribbling" tries to communicate.
^h h i d ., p. 400. 
^^Ibid.. p. 407. 
Z^Ibid.. p. 278.
^^A Portrait, p. 140.
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26
"Grhahute!" and where "a woman screams; a child walls; oaths of a man
roar, mutter, cease . . .
In spite of the hellish noise, however, men do try to communicate.
28Little Chandler has "an infant hope" that he might somehow communicate 
with "a little circle of kindred m i n d s . M a r t h a  Clifford types out her 
pathetic messages to Henry Flower, whom she has never met or seen: "Please
write me a long letter . . . And in Finnegans Wake, we hear the plea:
". . .so please kindly communicake with the original sinse we are only
31yearning as yet how to burgeon." And we are told: "All the world's in
want is writing a letters. A letters from a person to a place about a
thing. And all the world's on wish to be carrying a letters . . . .  Is
then any lettersday from many peoples, Dagnasanavitch? Empire, your outer-
32most. A posy cord. Piece." But the wish and the desire must contend
with the inevitable obstacles. Do we have the energy to persist? Lenehan 
"knew that he would have to speak a great deal, to invent and to amuse, 
and his brain and throat were too dry for such a task."^^ Do we have the 
courage to speak up? Little Chandler has trouble catching the barman's
^^Ulysses. p. 422.
2^Ibid.. p. 423.
^®"A Little Cloud," Dubliners, p. 89,
2*Ibid..
^^Plysses. p. 77.
^^James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (New York: The Viking Press, 1962),
p. 239.
S^Ibid.. p. 278.
^^"Two Gallants," Dubliners, p. 68.
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eye and ordering another drink. Do we dare risk our gob? Farrington, in 
"Counterparts," would like "to execrate aloud, to bring his fist down on 
something v i o l e n t l y , b u t  he's afraid of the boss. We are like Jimmy, 
in "After the Race," riding in the back seat of the car, trying to com­
municate with the Frenchmen up front:
The Frenchmen flung their laughter and light words over their 
shoulders and often Jimmy had to strain forward to catch the 
quick phrase. This was not altogether pleasant for him, as 
he had nearly always to make a deft guess at the meaning and 
shout back a suitable answer in the face of a high wind. Be­
sides Villona's humming would confuse anybody; the noise of 
the car, too.35
For the average man, unfortunately, the quest cannot overcome the obsta­
cles and ends up in a rejection of communication. Like Eveline, watching
her lover rush beyond the train barrier, listening to him calling her to
come, we can only stare back "passive, like a helpless a n i m a l . E v e l i n e  
knew "that he was speaking to her, saying something about the passage 
over and over again . . . .  She answered nothing."3? The average man, 
unfortunately, settles into adamant noncommunication, as does Joe, in 
"Clay," fdio refuses to speak ever again to his brother Alphy. Or the 
average man, inhibited by customs and traditions and mores, refuses to 
let himself speak out; Gerty MacDowell, in Ulysses, "was about to retort 
but something checked the words on her tongue. Inclination prompted her
to speak out: dignity Cold her to be silent.
^^Dubliners. p. 111.
S^Ibid.. p. 51.
3®«Eveline," Dubliners, p. 48.
S^Ibid.. HP. 47-48.
^^Ulysses. p. 343.
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For the more specialized, more sensitive Joycean personality, 
however, the reaction to communication difficulty midst the hellish noise 
of the market place amounts to something besides simple rejection of com­
munication. k rejection is made, of course, but the result is not simply 
noncommunication, but a kind of fertile silence out of which he believes 
can grow some new communication possibility. Joyce himself seemed to 
prefer a kind of "sensitive inarticulateness" to the "usual bombast" of 
society,39 for out of the fertile and sensitive silence one can begin to 
make the distinction between public, market-place language and another 
language, call it literary or what you will, wherein words have, as 
Stephen Dedalus observes, "the wider s e n s e , a  greater dimension more 
likely to facilitate communication. In fact, the sensitive inarticulate­
ness serves merely as a temporary and on-the-spot reaction to the agora; 
a hope prevails, definitely a Joycean hope, that somehow, somewhere there 
is an extra-public language that will permit man to transcend the agora 
and become truly coomnunicative. And it is the search for this greater, 
more adequate language that pervades a great deal of Joyce's semantic 
awareness.
When Stanislaus Joyce notes that James makes his confessions "in 
a foreign language--an easier confession than in the vulgar tongue, 
he is describing James' rejection of the ordinary for the extraordinary. 
Joyce's rejection of Gaelic is likewise a rejection of the Dublin language, 
the common, the ordinary, the "native tongue," and even his beloved
39Ellmann, op. cit.. p. 96.
^^A Portrait, p. 250.
^^llmann, op. cit.. p. 153.
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English, which in a Sinn Finn sense is a foreign tongue, proves inadequate. 
He said once that though there were enough words in English, they weren't
Am
the right ones/*^ Joyce went on, of course, in his own life to leam a 
number of languages— French, Italian, German— in a kind of continual quest 
to find his better language. And certainly Joyce's abundant use of for­
eign languages in his writings becomes symbolic of a perpetual reaching 
out for more than the one tongue. Like Little Chandler, impressed with 
the German- and French-speaking waiters in Corless's, Joycean 'heroes' 
desire more than the native tongue, more than the public language, and 
they weigh frequently the merits of language candidates: Simon Dedalus
calls Italian "the only l a n g u a g e ; B u c k  Mulligan plugs for Greek, as 
does Professor MacHugh; Granly, in A Portrait, demonstrates a preference 
for Latin; Bloom dabbles in Hebrew. What they are all looking for actually 
is the perfect language, the composite language. Polylingualism becomes, 
in the Joycean world, a kind of patchwork symbol of a language that does 
not exist, but is envisioned; one that will let the inarticulate and non- 
communicative rise into a better world of happier understanding. The quest 
is well expressed by Joyce himself; "I'd like a language which is above 
all languages, a language to which all will do service. I cannot express 
myself in English without enclosing myself in a tradition."^4
2.
With visions of perfect language dancing in his head, the Joycean
42ibid.. p. 410.
^^Ulvsses. p. 274.
^Ellmann, op. cit.. p. 410.
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'hero' would seem to be on the verge of some sort of positive gesture to 
escape the silent inarticulateness. He seems on the threshold of a jour­
ney out of the market place. But unfortunately, or at least ironically, 
the questing journey that the poor man takes becomes a nightmarish kind 
of running to nowhere, like that of the Red Queen and Alice. Is it be­
cause the perfect language does not really exist and any quest for it is 
a kind of madness? Or is it that modern man is mad to start with and sim­
ply corrupts a quest that theoretically could have been made? Or is it 
that the Joycean 'hero' who has the sensitiveness and desire to escape 
the market place becomes, because of that very sensitiveness and desire, 
too vulnerable to life's ravages upon human sanity? Regardless the an­
swer, the language quest taken by the Joycean man becomes a downward path 
leading him away from the noise of the world perhaps, but not at all in 
the direction of clarity or communication. And if the 'hero' envisions 
that he is getting somewhere, his vision is illusion.
A part of the problem lies in the fact that the sensitive Joycean 
'hero' slips into the trap of considering language almost thoroughly con­
notative. In reaction against the denotative babel of the public commu­
nication,^^ the Joycean 'hero' casts aside the generally agreed upon or 
the traditionally accepted definitions for words and concentrates upon a 
personal, subjective response to word symbols. Though even the men of 
the Dublin market place supposedly appreciated the connotative capacity 
of words at the very time they were making denotative use of words, the 
more sensitive Joycean personality allows his whole relationship with 
language to be based upon his personal response and association with words.
^^Levin, op. cit.. p. 197.
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Some words, for instance, he simply cannot stand; Joyce himself did not 
like the word love: "When I hear the word 'love' I feel like puking,"
he once said. Stephen Dedalus cannot stand the words generous and just, 
for they are "those big words . . . which make us so unhappy." And if 
we cannot stand a word, because of our emotional responses to it, we can 
refuse to use the word, eliminate it from the language. When confronted 
by Granly's question, "Do you love your mother?" Stephen can be relieved 
of answering: "Stephen shook his head slowly.— I don't know what your
words mean— he said s i m p l y . T o  the contrary, if one's response to a 
word is acceptable, then one can use it, and use it far beyond any deno­
tative limitations. Stephen reads the word foetus cut on an old school 
desk where his father had once attended class; seeing the word, Stephen 
envisions a whole way of life that the students must have lived; a vision 
"which his father's words had been powerless to evoke, sprang up before 
him out of the word cut in the desk."^^ The Joycean 'hero' concentrates, 
in other words, on complete obliteration of word denotations, building 
instead a connotative definition ^  his response to a word is at all 
meaningful to him; if his response is not pleasant or meaningful, the word 
is eliminated completely, neither denotative nor connotative definitions 
being given. One plays with a word, carefully, slowly, arousing one's 
emotions to it, as does the boy in "The Sisters," toying with the word 
paralysis.
^^Ellmann, o p . cit.. p. 644.
Portrait, p. 283. 
^^Ibid.. p. 100.
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Every night as 1 gazed up at the window I said softly to my­
self the word paralysis. It had always sounded strangely in 
my ears, like the word gnomon in the Euclid and the word simony 
in the Catechism. But now it sounded to me like the name of 
maleficent and sinful being. It filled me with fear, and yet 
I longed to be nearer to it and to look upon its deadly work.^9
One toys with the word until one has defined it emotionally, subjectively, 
privately, and if one finds oneself in a situation where one's private 
definition does not coincide with reality, then reality is in error, damn­
able, malicious. The young boy in "Araby" suffers in this way: "The syl­
lables of the word Araby were called to me through the silence in which 
my soul luxuriated and cast an Eastern enchantment over me,”^^ but the boy 
is undeceived when he discovers that the word stands for a "prosaic church 
bazaar,"51 and he is reduced to "anguish and anger,"5% Such an attitude 
toward language serves as a basis for the deterioration of communications 
in the Joycean world.
A more serious reason for failure, however, is that the quest for 
the perfect language becomes a matter of building a new language, of tak­
ing what was originally a market-place language and transforming it into 
a new medium. Based upon the fallacy that if one pares a watermelon from 
a round shape into a square and paints the rind blue rather than green 
one will have a new kind of fruit (when all one actually has is a distorted 
watermelon), the new, perfect language that the Joycean 'hero' creates for 
himself is no more than self-induced mirage, a mud pie passing for cherry
^^Dubliners. p. 7. 
^°Ibid.. p. 37.
^^Levin, OP. cit.. p. 34.
52
Dubliners, p. 41.
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cobbler, a windmill posing as giant before quixotic minds. This deceptive 
new language appears in the Joycean world in two major guises--that of 
non-language and that of anti-language. Non-language embraces those as­
pects of language which are sensory or physical; anti-language embraces 
those aspects of language having to do with meaning and sense.
First of all, in the area of non-language, the Joycean 'hero' es­
tablishes a language wherein the word has become matter. He establishes 
a vocabulary of words as physical things, shapes, and forms, without any 
consideration of the denotative capacity of language and with an increas­
ing disconcem with even its connotative capacity. We are in a world where
53words have become things, where to reach things we must go through words.
In the new perfect language one ignores the distinction "between the things 
he is describing and the words he is using to describe them,"^^ and words 
become movable blocks, objects to arrange, for the word the thing; old 
referents have been absorbed into the symbol; love is no longer an expe­
rience, it is a four-letter word-object that one can play with as a child 
might play with a colored block of wood in the nursery. We are where "the 
word now shone on his brain, clearer and brighter than any ivory sawn from 
the mottled tusks of elephants. Ivory, ivoire, avorio. ebur."^^ We are 
where words can sink "slowly out of hearing like a stone."^6 We are where 
one can pronounce "a soft o" protruding one's "full carnal lips" as if one
50
"'Ellmann, op. cit.. p. 2. 
^^Levin, op. cit.. p. 87.
Portrait, p. 208. 
5*Ibid.. p. 228.
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"kissed the vowel.
With the word become matter, it degenerates easily into becoming 
experience and reality. "Joyce . . . came to equate language and expe-
CO
rience," and he uses his literary method to symbolize the same state of 
mind for the modern man of his myth: the exact verbal equivalent of in­
fantile experience presented at the opening of A Portrait is not exact at 
all, of course, but in the Joycean mind it becomes the same as the expe­
rience, for the mind operates on the premise "that any given physical 
effect can be exactly duplicated by means of l a n g u a g e , w i t h  the further 
conclusion that language ^  experience, and hence, language i^ reality. 
Emotion, feeling, life are not described by words but are buried into 
words, the words become necessary in order to have the vital realities 
of existence. Emotions are not real, feelings are not real until they 
are phrasable, until all is integrated by words.
Like the little boy in "The Sisters" who cannot comprehend the 
priest's death until reading the card on the crape "persuaded me that he 
was dead,"^^ the Joycean 'hero' has stepped into a world in which words 
replace people, objects, and sensations. Stephen Dedalus tries to remem­
ber the past, tries to call forth some of its vivid moments, but all that 
comes to his mind are names: "Dante, Parnell, Clane, Clongowes."^^ There
^^Ibid.. p. 294.
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Levin, op. cit.. p. 97.
^^Ibid.. p. 98.
*°Ibid.. p. 50.
^^Dubliners, pp. 10-11.
Portrait, p. 104.
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are not even any pictures. Only words. So he desperately tries to add 
to his store of words, since they are all that count: "Words which he
did not understand he said over and over to himself till he had learnt 
them by heart: and through them he had glimpses of the real world about
him."^^ His fascination with words, his explorations in Skeat's 
Etymological Dictionary to find them, rests on his belief in their phys­
ical reality.
Although Stephen agrees that words are receptacles for thought,
they acquire for him another value. Becoming intercessors,
they stand between himself and reality. Through their agency 
alone he has 'glimpses of the real world about him.' Words do 
more than reveal that reality. They create it, and, as if God's 
compasses, draw significant f o r m . ^4
All things become verbal, even guilt, sorrow, self-reproach,^^ as reality
passes away into the physicality of words.
Obviously if words are reality, then the manipulation of words is 
the manipulation of that reality, and the Joycean 'hero' adds the dimen­
sion of verbal magic to the new, perfect language he is creating. Stephen
has "a consciousness of the power of words to confer an order and life of
their own,"^^ and when he ponders the question, "If a layman in giving 
baptism pour the water before saying the words is the child baptised?"^^ 
he is making of a sacrament an act of magic, for in asking about the order 
of words in the rite he is not asking if the baptism will be legal by 
canonical law, but is asking will the baptism be "real" in a physical and
*3lbid.. pp. 67-68. 
^^Tindall, op. cit.. p. 95. 
^^Levin, op. cit.. p. 95.
*6lbid.. p. 58.
^^A Portrait, p. 120.
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sensory universe. Stephen has
the state of mind that confers upon language a magical potency.
It exalts the habit of verbal association Into a principle for 
the arrangement of experience. You gain power over a thing by 
naming It; you become master of a situation by putting It Into 
words. It Is psychological need, and not hyperfastldlous taste 
that goads the writer on to search for the mot juste, to loot
the thesauraus.68
Stephen's own life, for Instance, seems governed and shaped by the nature 
of his name; "his strange name seemed to him a prophecy"^* and when he 
listens to his own name he seems "to hear the noise of dim waves and to 
see a winged form flying above the waves and slowly climbing the alr."^®
The Joycean 'hero,' manipulator of words. Indulges In name-magic and In 
a vast variety of cabalism and Incantation throughout the Dublin-world as 
he sinks deeper and deeper Into the quagmire of his Illusory language quest.
Finally, In the area of non-language and the consideration of the 
sensory aspect of words, the Joycean quester converts the word Into music. 
Joyce once wrote In a schoolboy composition, "There Is nothing so decep­
tive and for all that so alluring as a good s u r f a c e , b u t  Joycean 
'heroes,' In their attempt to escape the market place, forget the danger 
of the deception and respond only to the liveliness of surfaces without 
depth. The sound of words, the figure a word can cut upon the page become 
Increasingly attractive to the Joycean quester, and the rejection of the 
market-place language becomes more and more a rejection of surface ugli­
ness rather than the rejection of communication failure. Stephen can be
^®Levln, op. cit.. pp. 50-51.
Portrait, p. 196.
70lbld.. p. 196.
^^Ellman, op. cit.. p. 36.
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saddened by speech of genteel accent "marred by e r r o r s , a n d  can be
critical of a friend's speech because it has "neither rare phrases nor
73
Elizabethan English nor quaintly turned versions of Irish idioms."
Words are increasingly judged by the way they sound, not for what they 
mean: "Suck was a queer word . . . the sound was ugly."^^ And though
Professor MacHugh, in Ulysses, tells his library companions, when the ex­
pression Imperium romanum is defended as soundipg nobler than British or 
Brixton, "We mustn't be led away by words, by sounds of w o r d s , t h e  
Joycean 'hero' finally is led away by just that. He is more interested 
in the onomatopoetic potential in Verlaine's famous rain poem than in its 
message,76 and he becomes intensely delighted with words like seesoo. hrss. 
rsseeiss. oos^? (describing ocean waves) because he feels they are onoma- 
topoetically valid.
The rhythm of words becomes important: Buck Mulligan is concerned
that his name has "two dactyls."78 And Stephen bathes in the luxurious 
flow of language:
A soft liquid joy flowed through the words where the soft 
long vowels hurtled noiselessly and fell away, lapping and 
flowing back and ever shaking the white bells of their waves 
in mute chime and mute peal and soft low swooning cry . . .  .7^
7^A Portrait, p. 268.
7% i d .. p. 228.
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'^ ïbid.. p. 6.
76piysses. p. 129.
76Eiimann, op. cit.. p. 444.
77uiy8ses. p. 50.
78ibid.. p. 6.
7^A Portrait, p. 265.
124
Joyce himself sometimes shocked his friends by "caring more for sounds
80and rhythm than sense" in his writing, and his 'heroes' grow gravely
concerned with "the structural rhythm" possible in language, with the
"poise and balance of the period," until communication, which must embrace
more than the sensory symbols of language, goes the way of Stephen's prayer:
"His prayer . . . ended in a trail of foolish words which he made to fit
81
the insistent rhythm of the train . . .
Language has become music. Joyce's literary method, which symbol­
izes the course of the communication quest in the Dublin-world, came to
82music in Finnegans Wake, as Joyce himself acknowledged. But music is 
not communication. Music, as far as communication is concerned, is a 
dead-end road, just as magic is a dead-end road, or any exclusively sen­
sory use of language is. Given this kind of matter-magic-music language, 
one can talk of nothing and still seem momentarily entertaining, one can
OO
talk of nothing and even seem a genius, but always there is the nothing­
ness,®^ truly a tale signifying naught.
In the other area of the new language, that area concerned with 
the meaningful aspect of words, the Joycean 'hero' manages to create for 
himself a veritable ^ti-language, with all the outward signs of a commu­
nicative possibility but so functioning as to deny any fulfillment of that 
possibility. Whether or not it is true that the new "synthetic language
on
Ellmann, op. cit., p. 646. 
®^A Portrait, p. 98. 
®^llmann, op. cit., p. 393. 
®®Ibid.. p. 533.
®4lbid.. p. 533.
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OC
had to distort, if not disown, the tongue of Shakespeare and Swift . . . 
we certainly find a language in which the "native tongue" has been smelted 
"back to protean plasma . . . Purportedly modeled upon dream lan­
guage, this anti-language is a "fermented"®^ or soured version of all that
QO
we mean by normal discourse. Humpty-Dumptyism prevails in this fright­
ening world where "calculated slips of the tongue"®^ abound, where pig- 
Latin is the household dialect,^0 where the malapropistic language of the 
outlaw is defended, and where rhetoric succumbs to a perpetual trickery: 
adverbs become verbs ("I am almosting it," Stephen says);^^ sentences are 
chopped in half (the opening of Finnegans Wake); and a myriad other prank­
ster constructions occur.
One of the principal devices of the anti-language is the compres­
sion of several words into one, sometimes in so simple a construction as 
that called by Lewis Carroll the portmanteau word, but at other times more 
elaborate than any single suitcase could contain. For instance, consider 
the word "mathmaster" as explained by Joseph Campbell and Henry Morton 
Robinson: "Math is Anglo-Saxon for 'mow' or 'cut down,' and Sanskrit for
'annihilate.' It is also Hindustanti for 'hut' and 'monastery.' The word
OC
Levin, op. cit.. p. 173.
®®Campbell and Robinson, op. cit.. p. 4.
G^Ibid.. p. 128.
®®Especially hilarious is the fact that the Anna Livia Plurabelle 
passage of Finnegans Wake was not only written in Joycean anti-language 
but was also translated by C. K. Ogden into Basic English, anti-language 
at the other end of the spectrum. See Ellmann, op. cit.. p. 627.
89Levin, op. cit.. pp. 185-86.
*°Ibid.. p. 47.
^^Ulysses, p. 47.
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says: 'to overpower by cutting down men and annihilating their homes and
92
monasteries. " Delightful. Or consider the explication given by Tindall
of the following passage from Finnegans Wake: "This is big Willingdom
mormorial tallowscoop. Wounderworker obscides on the flanks of the jinnies.
Sexcaliber hrosspower."*^
This passage is to be taken according to Freud. The mormorial 
tallow-scoop, the marble-memorial-telescope-obelisk in the Park, 
is phallic and deathly too. The wounderworker combines wound 
with Mr. Bloom's wonderworker for curing flatulency. Sexcaliber 
hrosspower combines several symbols, all of them sexual: Excalibur
or sword, caliber or gun, horse mixed with roos (the German for 
nag), and six-cylinder or car. As for t&e jinnies, they are girls.
Such squashed language provides a firm basis for the anti-language, for 
it creates the general effect of carefully controlled ambiguity, a double- 
talk, a tripletalk, a saying one thing one time, another another time, all 
depending how one holds the words up to the light. Squashed language be­
comes the double-talk that Orwell warns about in 1984. a talk that points 
both north and south at once. Joycean 'heroes' delight "in saying two 
opposite things in the same w o r d s , w i t h  the result that we abide in a 
directionless world of deified antitheses and paradoxes.
Another principal device in the anti-language is agnomination.
Puns have had a frolicking and legitimate place in the history of man's 
communications; Joyce was keenly aware of the pun that serves as bedrock 
for the Church of Rome. But paronomasia becomes anti-language when it be­
comes so perpetual an event as it does in the Joycean world. From the
92Campbell and Robinson, op. cit.. p. 33.
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Finnegans Wake, p. 8.
9*Tindall, op. cit.. p. 54.
^^Campbell and Robinson, op. cit.. p. 34.
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notorious double-entendre of Chamber Music to such piddling ones as the 
"A.E.I.O.U." in Ulysses, the pun discolors any conceivable communication, 
simply by distraction if nothing else. A third principal device of the 
anti-language is the backward word. As Tindall points out, *"Jabberwocky' 
is written not only in dream language but in looking-glass language as 
we l l ."96 The voice of the damned sing God's praise backwards in Ulysses—  
"Htengier Tnetopinmo Dog Drol eht rof, Alulella!"^^— and we are told by 
Levin that, in Finnegans Wake. "The motif of thé rainbow, appearing to 
Noah in the aftermath of the flood, is complementary to the thunderbolt;
98we can dimly descry it, if we read the girls' names on page 227 backwards."
The noncommunicativeness of such a device is obvious. A fourth principal
device of anti-language is abbreviation. In this world why should one
write out "four things," when all one need do, with medieval blessings we
are told, is write "f.t." Why should one write out "please to lick one
and turn over," when one can say, "P.t.l.o.a.t.o." Why use words when
initials will do?
Scuse us, chorley guy! You tollerday donsk? N. You tolkatiff 
scowegian? Nn. You spigotty anglease? Nnn. You phonio saxo?
Nnnn. Clear all sol99
Anti-language uses all these devices and more to create a squashed,
distorted, unique vocabulary that filters out any and all communication.
The strangulated words of the Croppy Boy, in Ulysses. "Horhot ho hray ho
9^Tindall, op. cit.. p. 56. 
9^Ulysses, p. 584.
gg
Levin, op. cit.. p. 157. 
99Finnegans Wake, p. 16.
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rhother's hest*’^ ®® (which is supposed to be, "and forgot to pray for my 
mother's rest") is all that we get in these lost and lonely areas of lan­
guage gone awry.
The journey taken by the Joycean 'hero' in quest of the perfect 
language proves to be, primarily, an elaborate neurotic development within 
his own mind. Denied communication within the market place, accepting the 
silent inarticulateness, the Joycean man begins to develop a kind of mania 
for language, a mania which he thinks is his quest, but which is really 
a destructive gesture. His neurosis amounts to something like this: If
language is the container which communication must use, if language is 
the "form" and meaning is the "content," and if the problem is to find a 
better, more perfect language, one's attention and energies should be 
spent on container and form, rather than upon substance and content. And 
the Joycean personality does just that. His quest for the perfect lan­
guage degenerates into an excessive worship of the idea of language at the 
expense of meaning. Communication, the original goal, is lost in an over- 
wheming passion for medium. The areas at the journey's end remind one 
of those poor Southern dwellings in the United States where isolated, 
lonely souls have gathered up gourd fruit, have removed the succulent 
fmity pulp and thrown it away to rot, have dried and decorated the gourd 
shells, stringing them about the tree limbs in a fantasy of garish rinds.
The Joycean 'hero' flounders into a worship of language medium to 
escape a language communication he dislikes. He lists into an aggressive 
or opulent language, connotatively known, to escape from the frightening 
silence. Words, which are now his own and not the rabble's, can raise
Ulysses, p. 578.
129
him up from d e a t h , c a n  permit him to indulge in experience otherwise
impossible: . .it was only amid softworded phrases . . . that he
102dared to conceive of the soul or body of a woman . . . But his
neurosis creates not a real language, not a better or more perfect lan­
guage, but only the non-language of matter, magic, and music, and the 
anti-language of distortion, truncation, and strangulation. The only com­
munication that remains is with oneself, a soliloquy in which one's voice 
speaks softly to one's lonely heart. The only communication that remains 
is the one described by Joyce himself: " . . .  that letter selfpenned to
one's other, that neverperfect everplanned."^®^
3.
With society and market place as the enemy, the Joycean 'heroj' 
equipped with a language of folly, pits himself against the ordered rabble 
and traditional noise in a contest that achieves the comic proportions of 
Don Quixote's battles for the fair Oulcinea. If Don Quixote went to bat­
tle riding on a sagging nag and wearing a cardboard visor, the Joycean 
'hero' plunges into frantic battle boasting a theory of communications 
just as ridiculously inadequate. Don Quixote, that man turned inward, 
pits illusion against reality; the Joycean 'hero,' also turned inward, 
pits an illusory language against the inescapable facts of human need for 
communication. And just as there is a mingling of laughter and tears over 
the pilgrimage of the Spaniard, so in the searchings and seekings of the
lOlihe word "whisky," uttered at the wake, raises Finnegan from 
the dead.
Portrait, p. 180.
^^^Levin, op. cit.. p. 171.
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Irishman laughter and weeping find a common source. Should we laugh or 
cry over the man who attempts to speak to others by talking to himself 
and who seeks to improve language by destroying it? Jpyce creates a 
comedy, laced with agony, by acknowledging the paradoxes in the communi­
cation struggle.
Such a man as Gabriel Conroy, in "The Dead," represents one phase 
of Joycean paradox. Gabriel is a teacher of languages; also he is a man 
who can feel the pangs of an incurable isolation which no language can 
penetrate or assuage. He is the public communicator, maker of speeches; 
at the same time he is haunted by a sense of communication failure. When 
he reviews the speech he is to give at the dancing party, he becomes 
acutely aware of all the problems of communication, of all the subtleties 
and delicacies of allusion and reference and tone, and he convinces him­
self that the "whole speech was a mistake from first to last, an utter 
f a i l u r e . Y e t  he makes the speech and everyone applauds. Have they 
understood? Or does it matter whether they have understood or not? Do 
they really care? Certainly one would think, on the surface of things, 
that Gabriel is involved with a highly communicative world: the talk is
lavish, professional newspaper people are present, the question of the 
native Irish tongue is discussed, young ladies cry goodnight in German as 
they depart. Yet Gabriel is sensitive to the fact that names are slightly 
mispronounced, words are not understood, allusions misfire, voices catch 
and stutter. Gabriel is aware of the discrepancy between the surface and 
the depth, and as an educated man, sensitive and alert, he tries to make 
his accommodation to the world by being ever on his communication toes;
^°^Dubliners. p. 229.
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though he may not solve the problems, he at least is aware that he had 
taken the wrong tone with Lily in the pantry, that he should not risk a 
grandiose phrase with Miss Ivors, that he should question Miss Ivor's 
sincerity, and that he should grab hold of Aunt Julia's hand and shake it 
when no other communication will suffice. Gabriel is the paradoxical hero, 
frightened and inconfident, fighting the battle, aware of the pitfalls but 
making his attempt, unusually aware of communication difficulties but mak­
ing his living by teaching a communication medium. He is more involved 
than adept; more courageous than skilled; more informed of a situation 
than in command of it.
Gabriel's communication experience comes to a climax in his attempt 
to speak to his wife. Aware that for a brief moment she heard from beyond 
the world's noise some enigmatic communication, Gabriel wishes to cast 
aside the artificial, superficial articulation that passes for communica­
tion and to reach truly into his wife's heart and soul. He longed "to 
run after her.noiselessly, catch her by the shoulders and say something 
foolish and affectionate into her ear."^®^ But in this wish he comes to 
the greatest paradox of all: the harder one wants to communicate the more
difficult it is; the more we have to say, the less language we can seize 
upon. He longs to be alone with his wife, so that he can call softly to 
her and have her turn and listen, yet in the carriage driving away from 
the party, he is glad of the rattling carriage noise that saves him from 
having to converse with her. And later in the silence of the hotel room, 
he is delayed by the look upon her face— its seriousness and weariness
lO^Ibid.. p. 274.
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keep words from passing his lips. "No, it was not the moment yet."^®^
And the moment never comes. When he learns of her distant lover, winter
dead, he is inhibited further. "He longed to cry to her from his soul"^®^
lOR
but "He did not know how he could begin." Gabriel Conroy, master of 
languages, master of ceremonies, falters and fails and shivers into win­
ter silence. As he comes closer and closer in his own mind to the message 
to give his wife, he more and more lioose's the facility to talk. Paradox.
And irony.
Likewise the dilemma of Mr. Duffy in "A Painful Case." Here is 
the antisocial hero, whose "refinement" had made him withdraw from the 
rabble. "He lived his spiritual life without any communication with 
othe r s ,"109 until he meets one evening Mrs. Sinico and accepts her invi­
tation to talk. He is truly eager to talk with someone who speaks, as it 
were, his language, and he begins a long discourse, opening his nature to 
the full. His "message" proves so interesting that Mrs. Sinico asks him 
why he does not write out all this thoughts, but he rejects the idea with 
scorn. Why should he? "To compete with phrasemongers, incapable of think­
ing consecutively for sixty seconds? To submit himself to the criticism 
of an obtuse middle class which entrusted its morality to policemen and 
its fine arts to impressarios?"H^ Mr. Duffy wants to communicate, but 
only on his terms; he is sensitive to communication failures in the market
l°*Ibid.. p. 278. 
lO^Ibid.. p. 279. 
l°*Ibid.
l°*Ibid.. p. 135. 
ll°Ibid.. p. 138.
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place and therefore prefers to limit communication to a dialogue with 
himself or someone close to him. Mrs. Sinico seems to understand his 
words, and little by little they broaden their discussion to include not 
only the remote, but the near; and in the clarity of their isolation to­
gether, in their discovered silence away from the market place, Mr. Duffy
is able to communicate more clearly than ever before his one great mes­
sage about life: We cannot communicate. His own articulate voice insists
on the soul's incurable loneliness. Mrs. Sinico misunderstands, thinking 
Mr. Duffy's observation is actually an invitation for a more intimate com­
munication, and she proposes the final gesture of communication in the act 
of love. Mr. Duffy is disillusioned, and they agree to break off their 
intercourse.
Whereas Gabriel Conroy lost communication the more he sincerely 
wanted it, Mr. Duffy rejects communication the more it becomes available. 
Mr. Duffy actually relishes the impasse of man's wanting to communicate 
but never being able to do so. Even more clandestinely, perhaps, he rel­
ishes the communication that is within himself, the interior monologue, 
more than he does any social or outward communication. He wants to talk 
but doesn't want to talk. He is disgustingly frustrating as a communi­
cator. And even when he hears of Mrs. Sinico's death, he is not shocked 
from his stupidity. The only emotion that crosses his soul is a nausea:
". . .it revolted him to think that he had ever spoken to her of what he
111
held sacred." And "the threadbare phrases, the inane expressions of 
sympathy, the cautious words of a reporter won over to conceal the details
^^4 b i d .. p. 144.
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of a commonplace vulgar death attacked his s t o m a c h . S o  critical of 
and precious about the language of others, so insensitive to the communi­
cation needs of others, Mr. Duffy refuses to play the game; if "they" 
aren't going to stay within the limitations he prescribes then he will 
not communicate at all with them. All of which goes to prove the point 
he's held all along: We cannot truly communicate. Mr. Duffy arranges
his life so that "He could not feel her near him in the darkness nor her 
voice touch his ear. He waited for some minutes listening. He could hear 
nothing: the night was perfectly silent. He listenend again: perfectly
silent."113 And then, we may assume, he piously damns the universe for 
its awful stillness and his undeserved loneliness.
Mixed with our tears over the Conroys and the Duffys is an inevi­
table touch of laughter. We can sympathize to a degree, but beyond sym­
pathy is a growing laughter such as Cervantes and Swift alike knew how to 
elicit. It is the laughter of scorn, of criticism. And the Joycean world, 
after a certain seriousness occupies the stage, turns to that kind of hu­
mor that is in the human comedy, calling forth that kind of laughter that 
Jonson evoked by showing the world its follies and by showing the idiocies 
and ironies of life, the impasses and paradoxes. Joyce in his early work 
is generally straightfaced and reasonably serious, but as his canon pro­
gressed he turned more and more to the joke as a literary form, to an 
hysterical kind of comic strip in which, by broad caricature and grotesque 
masks, he sets forth the battle and quest of the individual communicator. 
Don Quixote emerges full blown in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake.
ll^ ibid.
ll^Ibid.. p. 147.
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In Ulysses. Stephen, Leopold, and Molly are the three great studies 
in communication experience, each of them having something of Joyce's "own 
preoccupation with l a n g u a g e . E a c h  one demonstrates a different kind 
of articulateness and a different pattern of quest for communication. Also, 
each one comes at last to a different form of noncommunication, the three 
making up a Joycean triangle of the broken word. Stephen, of course, is 
studied earlier in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and in the even 
earlier Stephen Hero; and because of the attention given to him in Joyce's 
work he comes closest, no doubt, to being the most extensive contribution 
Joyce made to the study of modern man.
Even as a boy, we are told, Stephen Dedalus was concerned with
words, concerned with their meaning and their use. Like the boy in "Araby"
fascinated by a term, like the boy in "The Sisters" fascinated by a word,
Stephen ponders various problems of definition, attempting to equate in
some way words with reality:
What did that mean, to kiss? You put your face up like that 
to say goodnight and then his mother put her face down. That 
was to kiss. His mother put her lips to his cheek; her lips 
were soft and they wetted his cheek; and they made a tiny little 
noise: kiss.^^^
That sort of semantically-sound definition would seem a good place to be­
gin in developing an understanding of communications. And certainly 
Stephen's concern with words continues. He worries about the meaning of 
the word "smugging," though he is hesitant to ask anybody about it; the 
meaning of the word "surd" is considered. As a schoolboy, he meets the 
matter of definition on a larger philosophical plane when Father Amell
114
Levin, op. cit.. p. 126.
^^^A Portrait, pp. 10-11.
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ponders the meaning of the word "retreat" and the word "eternity." "0,
116dread and dire word. Eternity! What mind of man can understand it?"
And perhaps it is out of the perplexing definitional problems of the Church
that Stephen begins, as his boyhood develops, to reveal a certain cynicism
toward traditional or classical definitions of words, definitions that
really do not enlighten one about the use of a word in everyday affairs.
There is a hint of scorn when he observes the heads of his classmates
"meekly bent as they wrote in their notebooks the points they were bidden
to note, nominal definitions, essential definitions . . . as well
as a hint of scorn when later he observes a professor beginning "to jug-
118gle gravely with the terms pure science and applied science." Scorn 
gives way to smugness, however, as Stephen decides to take over the defi­
nitional work left unfinished by Aristotle; he will define "pity" and 
"terror" with ease, and he becomes increasingly pedantic in the task.
Asked to define "claritas," Stephen explains that the connotation of the 
word is rather vague, that Aquinas' use of the term seemed to be inexact, 
it has baffled him for some time, but at last he is willing to give a def­
inition. In fact, Stephen becomes very skillful at defining difficult, 
abstract words, words of theory. If he has any problem it is with the 
definition of more ordinary words like "alone"; his friend Cranly ques­
tions Stephen's knowing what that word means.
The concern with definition is significant only as a rather quick 
glimpse into the way Stephen's mind is developing. Words and reality are
ll*Ibid.. p. 151. 
ll^Ibid.. p. 206. 
llGlbid.. pp. 225-26.
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the problem, but growing weary with philosophical and theological defini­
tions he enters a period of scorn in which he outdoes the enemy by becom­
ing a very articulate definer of theoretical terms, though perhaps still 
bothered by the terms that should have everyday meaning in his life.
Early in boyhood, too, Stephen develops, in some sort of psycho­
logical reaction to the world of Jesuits and Irish schoolmates, to the 
market place in miniature which the boarding school represents, a care­
fully nurtured silence. Innately shy, he at times would stand among the 
boys "afraid to speak, listening"!^* and later developed an extended mood 
"of embittered s i l e n c e , a s  some sort of "incommunicable emotion"^^^ 
developed within him. He maintained a "silent watchful manner," and 
"he could respond to no earthly or human appeal, dumb and insensible to 
the call of summer and gladness and companionship, wearied and dejected 
by his father's v o i c e ."^^3 Unquestionably, Stephen's problem has sexual 
origins, but a major part of that problem's manifestation is in terms of 
noncommunication. Inhibited by the Church and by society in general from 
expressing an essential emotional experience within him, Stephen responds 
pathologically by rejecting all expression, by "getting even" with the 
culture that has prescribed the limits of his articulation. Stephen, of 
course, is making something of a mistake by assuming that restrictions 
upon experience are necessarily restrictions upon communication (though
ll*Ibid.. p. 42.
12°Ibid.. p. 73.
IZllbid.. p. 83.
122
'^ ^Ibid.. p. 75.
123lbid.. p. 104.
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heaven knows they frequently are); he is already flirting with the concept 
that experience and language are interchangeable.
Finally, of course, especially in a boy's world, the dam breaks.
The "inarticulate cries and the unspoken brutal words rushed forth from
his brain to force passage"^^^ and he begins an understandable career of
furtive communication by writing foul long letters "in the joy of guilty
confession" and by carrying them "secretly for days and days only to throw
them under the cover of night among the grass in the corner of a field or
beneath some hingeless door or in some niche in the hedges where a girl
125might come upon them as she walked by and read them secretly." Stephen's 
silence breaks out into pornography, a satisfying form of communication 
to him now because it both satisfies the immediate need to articulate and 
yet makes no peace with the society that he already sees, even as a boy, 
as the enemy.
Because of his early Jesuit and Catholic orientation, however, 
Stephen suffers a great sexual guilt following his experience with pros­
titutes; in a moment of new commitment to the Church's teachings, he makes 
ready his confession, but now he is confronted with a new sense of inartic- 
ulation--not the old embittered silence of rejection, but the dumbness of 
shame and fear. He needs to communicate now, but the capacity to do so 
is gone: "He had to confess, to speak out in words what he had done and
thought, sin after sin. How? How?"^^^ His tongue cleaves to his palate, 
and "Shame covered him wholly like fine glowing asked falling continually.
IZ^Ibid.. p. 112.
125
^^^Ibid.. p. 132. 
12*Ibid.. p. 144.
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To say it in words! His soul, stifling and helpless, would cease to be."^^? 
This inarticulation, though consciously not the bitter rejection of social 
communication, is, in fact, rooted in a subconscious rejection of all that 
the Church stands for. He is not really a changed man underneath. He 
makes his confession, however; moves toward a piety and even toward a vo­
cation— to accept the words of the Church and of social order. But again 
he tums--and again because of language of the social order. One might 
ask of Stephen: did he reject the Church because of its language, or did
he reject a certain kind of language in rejection of the Church? Stephen's 
whole concept of language and reality suggests the possibility that his 
rejection of Church and the language it represents is a chicken-or-egg 
situation.
Stephen's mind "wearied of its search for the essence of beauty 
amid the spectral words of Aristotle or A q u i n a s . S o m e h o w  the language 
of philosophy and religion did not supply him, here in late adolescence, 
with the beauty he needed, and he finds himself, wherever he goes in the 
established world, anywhere in the Church-market place, walking "on in a 
land among heaps of dead l a n g u a g e . S t e p h e n ' s  earlier problem of defi­
nition is no doubt involved here, but a new problem of aesthetics in lan­
guage is also appearing. Not only the question of what words mean, but 
also the question of what aesthtic experience they provide enters Stephen's 
considerations. He comes to a point where "every mean shop legend bound 
his mind like the words of a spell and his soul shrivelled up sighing with
IZ^Ibid.. p. 164. 
12*IbidI. p. 205. 
129lbid.. p. 208.
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age A growing hypersensitiveness to language develops, not
only to word meanings, but to word forms, shapes, and sounds.
Once more having rejected the Faith and its language, and now bur­
dened with an increasingly acute "consciousness of language," Stephen 
moves, not to the earlier silence of rejection or the silence of fear, but 
to a silence more neurotic than all previous ones, a silence based upon a 
new satisfaction with a growing self-communication, a silence growing out 
of an increasing nonverbalized dialogue with the world around him, a dia­
logue that no one hears save Stephen himself. Not bitter, not frightened, 
Stephen now in his silence can smile interestingly enough "in answer to
the smile which he could not see on the priest's shadowed face, its image
131or spectre only passing rapidly across his mind . . . ." Taking a smile 
as a slight kind of visual communication, it is interesting that Stephen 
can "answer" a message that reaches him only by some kind of mental telep­
athy. A hint of this growing kind of self-constructed communication occurs 
when Stephen, listening in "reverent silence" to his priest, hears through
the priest's words "even more distinctly a voice bidding him approach of-
132fering him secret knowledge and secret power." In other words, Stephen 
is beginning to read messages that he envisions rather than simply the mes­
sages that are being directly communicated. He reads hostility in his
133
mother's "listless silence," and the epiphanical communication with a 
young lady is, one suspects, rather one-sided: "Her image had passed into
13°Ibid., pp. 207-208. 
131
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his soul for ever and no word had broken the holy silence of his ecstasy.
Her eyes had called him and his soul had leaped at the call."^^^ Though
visual and other nonverbal forms of communication are valid, of course, 
one realizes that a great deal of the communication going on in Stephen's 
life is actually a form of ventriloquism in which Stephen throws out his 
own voice and hears back what he wants to hear. It is interesting, too, 
in the last example, that Stephen should be pleased that no word was spoken
and that the silence of noncommunication has now become holy.
By the end of A Portrait. Stephen has begun that downward path of 
rejection that leads, as demonstrated earlier, to no communication what­
soever but to linguistic dead ends. The story of Stephen's deceptive quest 
for a communication outside the market place, even though within the mar­
ket place, is told in Dlysses. Tindall suggests that "since Ulysses begins
with the beginning of the Mass, the entire book may be considered a sym-
135bolic celebration of Stephen's communion with man." More accurately,
it is a celebration of Stephen's search for communion and communication.
Because of the communication neurosis that had been developing throughout
his childhood, Stephen, on the threshold of adulthood, can "no longer com-
136
municate with anyone in Ireland but himself." He goes into exile to 
France, symbolic of retreating to noncommunication within the agora, but 
now he returns, at his mother's death, and begins the quest for communi­
cation in his own peculiar terms.
An emblem of Stephen's doomed communication quest appears in his
13*Ibid.. p. 200.
^^^Tindall, op. cit.. p. 29. 
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reaction to his mother's request to hear his prayers for her. She "wanted
to hear my music. Silent with awe and pity I went to her bedside. She
was crying in her wretched bed. For those words, Stephen: love's bitter
137mystery." His remaining silent and refusing his mother the words she
wanted to hear becomes a haunting remembrance to Stephen through the awful
day of Ulysses: His mother comes in a dream, "silently . . . with mute
138secret words ;" she comes to him "Silently, in a dream . . . mute, re-
10Û
proachful." Her silence and muteness are a reenactment of his own wil­
ful noncommunication; and when at last he hears from her ashen breath the 
very prayer he refused to say, his response prophetically reveals the anti­
language and noncommunication that awaits him at the end of his supposed 
quest for contact with the world:
His response is entirely in character: first an obscene mono­
syllable, then a phrase of expatriate French, next the echo of 
Lucifer's refusal. Non serviam. and finally a direct Wagnerian 
leitmotif, the cry of Siegfried as he wields his sword, NothungÎ
The verbal chaos, the neurotic muttering of Stephen's private language 
reveals itself when challenged by the most significant communication fail­
ure in his life.
Stephen begins his communication quest that June 16, 1904, walk­
ing on through Dublin-world "waiting to be spoken to,"^^^ but finding that 
since he "spoke to non-one; none to me."^^^ He engages, of course, in
137
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142lbid.. p. 46.
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superficial forms of market-place communication as teacher at Hr. Deasy's
school and as messenger for Mr. Deasy, carrying the foot-and-mouth disease
letter to the newspaper; but in the "public" situations, Stephen finds in
both himself and others only "talk" and not understanding. As he obsewes
one of his students at work, he thinks : "Secrets, silent, stony sit in
the dark places of both our hearts: secrets weary of their tyranny.
The essence of the message not spoken remains in spite of articulation
with others. Leaving Mr. Deasy's, Stephen wanders along the beach at
Sandymount where he reads the language of things: "Signature of all things
I am here to read, seaspawn and seawrach . . . but since this is a
form of self-communication, he more honestly cries to the world, "0 touch
me soon, now. What is that word known to all men? I am quiet here alone.
Sad too. Touch, touch me."^^^ And he writes his message to the world
that never wrote to him:
Turning his back to the sun he bent over far to a table of 
rock and scribbled words . . . .  Who ever anywhere will read 
these written words? Signs on a white field . . .
As the day moves on, Stephen finds himself more and more involved
with the market place, even though he rejects it. At the newspaper office 
and in the library, he is surrounded by talkative, noisy people and, as 
he had done in his adolescence, he boisterously joins in this rabble com­
munication, outdoing them at their own game. "Stephen outdoes them . . . 
with . . . ingenious misquotations,"1*7 and in questionable definitions:
143lbid.. p. 29.
144ibid.. p. 38.
145ibid.. p. 49.
146lbid.. p. 49.
^4^Levin, op. cit.. p. 117.
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"Unsheathe your dagger definitions. Horseness is the whatness of all­
h o r s e . H e  engages in all the communication stupidities of the 
Shakespeare discussion. But underneath, in his secret mind, he is in 
rebellion against the rabblement as always. He knows he is surrounded 
by "Coffined thoughts . . .  in mummycases, embalmed in spice of words, 
surrounded by a world of "brainsick w o r d s , a n d  even while he plays the 
game of market-place communication, he ranges through a host of foreign 
languages as well as various forms of the English language: modern, 
Elizabethan, and the like, in what we have already described as the sym­
bolic search for a better, more perfect language.
Earlier in the day. Buck Mulligan had observed about Stephen's 
taciturnity that "The sacred pint alone can unbind the tongue of De d a l u s ,"^^l 
and certainly Stephen's drunkenness that night at the hospital and at the 
brothel makes him exceedingly garrulous; but quite obviously, too, the 
drunkenness makes his talk increasingly noncommunicative. In the increas­
ing darkness of his quest, he moves, paradoxically, toward a certain cheap 
eloquence which impresses the Dublin streetwalkers; at the same time he 
sinks into a kind of morose talk with himself in monosyllables. One part 
of him is acutely aware of the rhetoric of the traditional language that 
he learned of old--". . . one man in armour will beat ten men in the shirts. 
Shirt is synecdoche. Part for the whole"^^^— but another part has already 
rejected the ordered language for that "more perfect language" which is
^^^Ulysses. p. 184.
149%bid.. p. 191.
ISOlbid.. p. 238.
ISlibid., p. 20.
IS^Ibid.. p. 573.
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the creation of the Joycean 'hero.' When Stephen mllitantly asks, on the
midnight streets of Dublin, "Why should 1 not speak to him or to any human
153being who walks upright upon this oblate orange?" the answer must be 
that he doesn't really want to;
Late in the darkness, Stephen tells Mr. Bloom the following anec­
dote:
Solitary hotel in mountain in pass. Autumn. Twilight. Fire 
lit. In dark comer young man seated. Young woman enters.
Restless. Solitary. She sits. She goes to window. She 
stands. She sits. Twilight. She thinks. On solitary hotel- 
paper she writes. She thinks. She writes. She sighs. Wheels 
and hoofs. She hurries out. He comes from his dark comer.
He seizes solitary paper. He holds it towards fire. Twilight.
He reads. S o l i t a r y . 154
This is Stephen's story of communication. Solitary communicants. Indirect 
messages. Dim light. Solitary result. And it is to this point that 
Stephen must come himself. He has, through the day, thrown himself into 
the talk of the world, but he has communicated with no one. He has per­
haps left a few messages scattered along his way. But even if they are 
found and read, he will never know. His disbelief in the talk of the mar­
ket place and the inherent inadequacy of his own private methods for ser­
ious communication lead him to a lonely walk home in solitary silence as 
the long quest comes to an end.
Stephen's most likely chance to communicate during his questing 
day came in his association with Leopold Bloom, who joined him at the hos­
pital for the subsequent trip to nighttown. Bloom, like other Joycean 
characters, is a communication quester. "Bloom, is seeking and never
I S ^ i b i d .. p .  5 7 4 .
154ibid.. p. 668.
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finding, human i n t e r c o u r s e . the advertising business, a form of 
"public" communication, Leopold Bloom actively tries to improve his com­
munication skills by refining his vocabulary— he is thoughtfully concerned 
with the meaning and use of such words as "parallax," "teco," the 
"I.N.R.I." on the Roman Catholic crucifix (he ingenuously deciphers it to 
mean "Iron nails ran in"), and various other "what you may call."^^^
And he is concerned, as most Joycean characters are, with polylingualism, 
in which he puts much trust most of the time. He himself dabbles in 
Hebrew, reverts to pidgin Chinese, tries a bit of Spanish, and, in a fan­
tasy of daydreaming, envisions himself as parent of eight children, each 
of whom speaks five modem languages fluently. (Admittedly though, by 
day's end. Bloom is not so sure about the helpfulness of polylingualism—  
at one time he observes that there are more languages to start with than 
necessary.) Bloom also tries to lend a helping hand to the communication 
affairs of the world. In addition to his anxious concern with the adver­
tisement for Hr. Keyes, he alone sends a kind message to the mother and 
child at the hospital, he alone tries to bring order to the "strife of 
tongues"^^^ at the hospital, and it is he who, in another fantasy of day­
dreaming, envisions himself as king of Ireland performing the rites of 
public articulation and communication: the spokesman for the people.
Indeed, Bloom has something of a reputation as a talker.
^^^Levin, op. cit.. p. 114. 
^^^Ulvsses. p. 80.
IS^ibid.. p. 70.
IS^ibid.. p. 403.
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1 declare to my antimacassar If you took up a straw from the 
bloody floor and you said to Bloom: Look at, Bloom. Do you 
see that straw? That's a straw. Declare to my aunt he'd 
talk about it for an hour so he would and talk steady.
But the sad part is that Bloom's talk never really becomes communication.
He tries so hard, but it is nearly all just a sincere kind of verbosity
in a world that is not really listening anyhow. When Bloom has something
really to say, something to communicate, he is most usually thwarted.
Martin Cunningham thwarted his speech rudely several times at Dignam's
funeral: "Mr. Bloom, about to speak, closed his lips a g a i n . At the
newspaper office, he tries to communicate, but has a hard time of it,
"Slipping his words deftly into the pauses of the clanking" machine.
When he calls the newspaper editor, the response is "To tell him to go 
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to hell . . . ." When people do listen, they don't understand. "You 
don't grasp ny point, says Bloom. What I mean is . . . and in a
conversation with Joe Hynes, he mixes up his words, "Then he starts all 
confused . . . A major misunderstanding comes with the Citizen:
the news is reported that Throwaway has won the Gold Cup horse race, and 
because Bloom had offered Bantam Lyons a sporting paper that he was "just 
going to throw . . . away,"^^^ his words are misinterpreted and misunder­
stood as a tip, and the Citizen grows violently angry at this knowledge
IS^Ibid. p. 311.
IGOlbid. p. 95.
l*llbid. p. 119.
IG^Ibid. p. 135.
l^^Ibid. p. 301.
l**Tbid. p. 307.
IG^Ibid. p. 84.
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on Bloom's part. Bloom that he Is "often considerably misunderstood, 
and he sinks frequently ihtawiitelligibility. In the mocktrial in night­
town, Bloom is charged to make a "bogus s t a t e m e n t , a n d  he begins a 
"long unintelligible speech . . . .  He mumbles incoherently. Reporters 
claim that they cannot hear . . .  he talks i n a u d i b l y A n d  Bloom can 
envision himself as a "dummymummy who utters an unintelligible and inco­
herent w o r d .
Thus, behind Bloom's verbose and language-concerned manner is the
potential of unintelligibility. And why not, he might ask himself.
Doesn't the world one minute say to us: "Puke it out. Be candid for
170
once," and the next minute say to us: "Hold your tongue! Speak when
you're spoken to?"^^^ Bloom grows naturally shy at times about communi­
cation, especially communication of any permanence. He has a reputation 
of never putting anything down in black and white, he has fears that some­
one will read out the letter he has written to Martha Clifford, he argues 
himself out of speaking, verbally, to Gerty HacDowell, and he frequently, 
as he does in the hospital episode, gives dissembling, evasive, compro­
mised answers to questions.
Nevertheless, shy and afraid, frequently shut out of communication 
or misunderstood. Bloom has an almost pathetic hunger for conmunication
l G & I b i d . p .  6 4 1 .
1 6 7 l b i d . p .  4 5 3 .
p .  4 5 4 .
l * * I b i d . p .  5 3 7 .
1 7 ° I b i d . p .  5 2 6 .
l ^ ^ I b i d . p .  5 2 6 .
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with someone. Almost shut entirely out of his wife's considerations, he 
clings to eveiry possibility of communication. He reads the letter he re­
ceives from his daughter Milly over three times and saves it carefully.
He carries on a furtive, clandestine correspondence with Martha Clifford—  
he hides the letter, tears it open secretly in his pocket, reads it in 
secret places; his answer is written in a tavern, midst difficult circum­
stances, having to be hidden from prying eyes. In fact. Bloom has a long 
history of secret, furtive, ultimately unsatisfactory correspondences—  
indirect, partial communication— to which he confesses in the nighttown 
episode; he tells also that he prepared "unspeakable messages" and tele­
phoned them mentally to various women. These furtive, illegitimate at­
tempts at communication are almost comic, as Bloom tries anything at all 
possible to make his contact with the world. Though he concentrates on 
sexual correspondence with women, it is not difficult to see in his quests 
the deeper need for understanding conversation with his fellowman. He 
smiles at unidentified women on the streets, he has even once tried to 
communicate with a nun in church, and when he talks with Mrs. Breen he 
almost begs her to communicate: "Let her speak. Look straight in her
eyes. I believe you. Trust me."^^^ All his attempts, of course, are 
failures or near failures. When he helps the blind boy along the street. 
Bloom tries to converse with him, but to no avail. All he gets is "No
answer."173
Can there be any direct communication for him? He can remember 
a conversation he had once with a barber, but the conversation went
17^Ibid.. p. 155.
173ibid.. p. 178.
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indirectly, by way of the mirror. They talked to each other in the mirror, 
in a kind of oblique and intercepted way. Is that the way all his commu­
nication must be? When he goes to the beach and sees Gerty MacDowell he 
is tempted to talk to her, but doesn't. He tries rather to talk with his 
eyes.
Yes, it was her he was looking at and there was meaning in 
his look. His eyes burned into her as though they would search 
her through and through, read her very soul.^^^
The communication with Gerty is at a distance, removed, indirect, nebulous,
nonverbal. And the climax of their uncertain conversation is the symbol
of the standard Joycean terminal in communications: the self-communication
that is masturbation. Bloom brings the uncertain dialogue to an end by
talking to himself with his hand; the implications of this gesture in the
field of communications is self-evident.
What is left for Bloom to do? He tries to write a message in the 
sand, but knowing the impermanence of that, he "effaced the letters with 
his slow b o o t . A n d  when he goes that night to the bordello and finds 
his subconscious released into its long sequence of fantasies, the most 
pathetic moment comes when he tries to talk to the spectre of his dead 
son Rudy. Rudy does not answer. Only a stage-direction is given. The 
awful loneliness sinks in upon Bloom. Our messages are effaced. Even our 
ghosts do not speak. And Bloom's day ends, after Stephen has left him, 
with his going through his possessions--including his old communications, 
old letters, old advertisements, old words. Alone. In the dark house.
And when at last he lies down in bed with Holly and they talk together.
l^^Ibid.. p. 351. 
If^Ibld.. p. 375.
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he knows their talk is just that. Talk. There is no understanding. He 
accepts in the final instance the " . . .  mute immutable mature animality"^^^ 
of human life.
The bringing of Hr. Bloom and Stephen Dedalus together is, of 
course, the great climax of communication discussion in Ulysses. "The pri­
mary object of Ulysses is to bring these two inglorious heroes together 
. . . and to see whether they have anything to say to each other.
And one might think that two Joycean 'heroes,' both seeking communication, 
would find in their confrontation some sort of satisfactory, even if eccen­
tric or socially incomprehensible, communication. At first, such seems 
to be the case. Meeting at the hospital for the first time that day.
Bloom feels an attraction for Stephen and senses the possibility of a 
communicative rapport between them. He stays with Stephen through the 
chaos of the bordello and nighttown experiences, playing his paternal 
role; then in the journey that leads to Bloom's house, the communication 
attempts are made. Once it seems that communication is a very real pos­
sibility; when they "exchanged meaning glances in a religious silence of 
the strictly entre nous variety . . . ,'*^ 78 their great quantity of 
talk soon runs into communication troubles: Stephen begins "staring and
rambling on to himself or some unknown listener, somewhere . . . 
and when Bloom tries to explain that economic reform in Ireland will lead
17*Ibid.. p. 719.
^^^Levin, op. cit.. p. 66.
^^^Ulvsaes. p. 613.
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'ibid.. p. 621.
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to better "intercourse between man and man," Stephen doesn't really get 
the message:
He could hear, of course, all kinds of words changing colour 
like those crabs about Ringsend in the morning, burrowing 
quickly into all colours of different sorts of the same sand 
where they had a home somewhere beneath or seemed to. Then 
he looked up and saw the eyes that said or didn't say the words 
the voice he heard said . . .
When Stephen says something in the conversation, Mr. Bloom "fancying he 
was perhaps under some misapprehension," bends over and asks, "Unfortun­
ately I didn't catch the latter portion. What was it you?" And Stephen, 
"patently c r o s s t e m p e r e d , h a s  to repeat what he said. In fact, Mr.
Bloom gets in quite a "quandry as he couldn't tell exactly what construe-
182tion to put on belongs to which sounded rather a far cry," and he is 
not at all certain he catches the right allusions in Stephen's talk. But 
then Mr. Bloom, worried about actually how to "word it," finally asks 
Stephen to come home with him and try the communication there: " . . .  you
just come home with me and talk things over."^^^ But even on the way 
home. Bloom's mind wanders often enough while their conversation lags, 
and in the Bloom house, the two men drink their cocoa in what amounts to 
a "jocoserious s i l e n c e . what is there really to say? How can they 
say it? Isn't it too much work really? Talking is great fun. But is 
communicating? In a rather symbolic gesture. Bloom and Stephen recite
180
Ibid.. p. 628.
IBllbid.. p. 629.
IB^Ibid.. p. 629.
183lbid.. p. 642.
IG^Ibid.. p.661.
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languages to each other, Bloom Hebrew, Stephen Gaelic. They try to teach 
each other their "native languages," both try to provide each other with 
some means to make the contact they wish. But the evening is late, and 
neither one really knows his "native language" very well; their vocabu­
laries are very deficient. Stephen will not stay the night. The two men 
part.
The question is, of course, "What . . . can Stephen and Bloom have 
to say to each other? . . . With every futile question and perfunctory 
reply, they become more aware of the barriers that separate them--name 
and age, race and c r e e d . "^^5 failure of Stephen and Bloom to achieve
a working communication underlies the Joycean fact that "the barrier be­
tween man and man breaks down only occasionally and usually only a little, 
and the barrier quickly reforms . . . ." But is it the barrier that 
causes the communication failure? Or is it the communication failure that 
erects the barrier? Whatever the answer, Mr. Bloom, as his role in the 
day's drama comes to an end, curls himself up into the womb of the great 
bed, next to the warmth of the great mother, returning, down the path of 
sleep, to that noncommunicative kingdom, which— save for the kingdom of 
the grave— is man's most isolated fortress from the words and the symbols 
of the life he is forced to live.
Ulysses ends with Molly Bloom's famous soliloquy, the long extended 
conversation with self that all Joycean characters come to at last. If 
Stephen Dedalus represents the youthful, sensitive, well-educated, aesthet­
ically-oriented communication quester and if Bloom represents the practical,
^®^Levin, op. cit.. pp. 120-21.
1S6
Ellmann, op. cit.. p. 383.
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conscientious, thoughtful but not especially well-informed, socially- 
oriented quester, Molly Bloom represents that kind of uneducated, igno­
rant, sensually-oriented soul who does not even sense the need to take a 
communications quest, who lolls in the deep satisfaction of her own visit 
with herself, and who, symbolically, brings Joyce's communication story 
to a close.
Molly's long talk with herself is devoid of the normal language 
controls— syntax and punctuation and ordered thought— and even in those 
rare moments in life when she attempts some communication with others, 
she rarely rises to an acceptable level of language: From her warm bed,
she gives her orders abstractly to Bloom "in a sleepy, almost wordless
187manner." And "unintelligent and unalert, most of her remarks to others
IRRtake the form of animal-like noises of satisfaction or dissatisfaction."
Her greatest communication medium happens not to be language at all, but 
the tactile communication of sex, a form of communication that has a cer­
tain place in man's conversations with the world but which has value only 
as a very subordinate support or affirmation of communication that occurs 
verbally. As far as words themselves go, Molly is linguistically ignorant. 
Her English is pedestrian and vulgar, she scarcely remembers any of the 
Spanish she once spoke. She has a suspicious attitude towards words in 
general, especially polysyllabic words; she can't comprehend big words 
for ordinary things. She can only comprehend polysyllabic words by break­
ing them down into monosyllables: "metempsychosis" becomes "Met him pike
hoses" to her, and when Bloom explains that the word means, "the
187
Karl and Magalaner, op. cit.. p. 237.
IGSibid.. p. 228.
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transmigration of souls,” she vulgarly replies, ”0 rocks! . . . Tell us 
in plain w o r d s . ghe's scornful of the doctor who asked her if she 
had "frequent emissions.” She questions, "where do those old fellows get
all the words they have emissions . iil90 And in general, she's sat­
isfied to call the things of the world "whatyou callit.”^^^ Words don't
really matter, mainly because they are so vexing. She dislikes having to
spell "newphew," because it has ”2 double yeus,”^^^ and she is constantly
193
plagued by words she can't make out, "jawbreakers" she calls them that
a body can't understand. The main words in Molly's vocabulary are those
elementary monosyllables, which, alas, she has to pretend, for form's
sake, she doesn't know but which she supposes any fool would know. The
only real interest Molly shows in language is in her passing concern with
1 9 4people's names. She doesn't like books "with a Molly in them," she 
would drown herself if she had "the name of Mrs. Opisse,"^^^ she finds 
names with "bottom"^^^ in them ludicrous, but in general, even in the 
world of names, she is content to be rather vague, referring to people 
as "Miss This Miss That Miss Theother . . .
^ ^ ^ U l v s s e s .  p .  6 4 .
190lbid., p .  7 5 5 .
IS^Ibid., p .  7 4 6 .
I S ^ I b i d . , p .  7 4 3 .
^ ^ ^ I b i d . , p .  7 3 8 .
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Toward the communication of others, Molly takes a rather sneer­
ing tone. She sees no point In Mrs. Rlordan's "gabby talk," she's dls-
198
pleased with Miss Stack's "old maid's voice," and she wonders what
Stephen and Bloom "find to gabber about all n i g h t . M o s t  people are
Ignorant In Molly's eyes, "never understanding what you say even youd
want to print It up on a big poster for them . . . .*'200
Nevertheless, Molly likes to receive communications, unprepared
as she herself Is to communicate with others. Receiving love letters Is
her greatest delight, some of which she Is Inclined to answer but "short
just a few words,"201 and she has been known to Instruct other ladles In
the art of ambiguous love-talk, "a few simple words he could twist how he 
202liked." She tells us that "long ago I wished somebody would write me 
203a loveletter," and at times In her life when she received "not a letter 
from a living soul" she would mall letters to herself "with bits of paper 
In them so bored sometimes . . . .*'2^ Obviously, though, she Is less 
concerned with the contents of the love letters, more with simply receiv­
ing them. She Is like a child who enjoys playing the game of letter- 
writing and communication without being the least prepared for any serious 
endeavor.
p. 723.
^^^Ibid. p. 749.
20°Ibid. p. 742.
ZOllbid. p. 743.
2°2ibtd. p. 743.
^°^Ibld. p. 743.
2°^Ibld. p. 765.
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Joycean comedy reaches a height when Molly declares, toward the
end of her long soliloquy, that "I'd love to have a long talk with an
205intelligent, educated person . . . One Is reminded of Marilyn
Monroe's oft-expressed wish for a serious conversation with the world or 
nightclub singer Eartha Kltt's Insistence upon a serious visit with Albert 
Einstein. For what Molly really wants to do, as far as communication Is 
concerned. Is simply go through a minimum number of rituals, without com­
mitting herself to anything at all. And as Holly ponders the possibility 
that master-of-languages Stephen Dedalus may return to give her Italian 
lessons (the Implications of which. In the light of Stephen's own commu­
nication failures, are Ironic), she also ponders the language that she 
will teach him: the language in re os and other sexual pleasantries that
she. In her benightedness, sees as equal to all the verbalizations In the 
word. Her appalling disdain of all that Stephen and Bloom made an unsuc­
cessful effort to achieve brings Ulysses to a humorous and pathetic end.
4.
Finnegans Wake, en masse, serves as symbol of the broken word, 
but. In addition, through the chinks In the ruin, we see depicted a ghostly 
and bizarre still life In which the basic communication symbols of the 
Joycean world appear In their last stance. Nothing new Is added to the 
situation described In Ulysses and the earlier works. Finnegans Wake 
merely becomes the summation of the semantic awareness that has prevailed 
throughout Joyce's canon. Here Is the Great Letter, an archetypal symbol 
of communication, jumbled, confused, undecipherable, only partly understood.
ZOSlbld.. p. 765.
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Dug up from the garbage dump. It seems to be a letter from Boston, telling 
of various family matters, but since it is written in runes and in "sia- 
mixed twostalk," it is difficult to read. This is the Joycean concept of 
communications: trivial in the first place, floating in the dunghill of
the market-place world, written in the "strife of tongues." Anna Livia 
Flurabelle, one of the symbols of mankind, must acknowledge about the 
communication-letter: "Bvery letter is a hard but yours sure is the hard­
est crux ever."206
Here, too, in Finnegans Wake, is the archetypal communicative 
man: H. C. Earwicker, the stutterer, who in his "anxiety to justify him-
207self riddles his every utterance with incriminating slips of the tongue,"
setting off the false communication of rumour that pervades the book. As
Levin says, "We distinguish Earwicker by his intermittent stutter and
catastrophic hiccup. He is usually submerged in a welter of dialects and
documents--pidgin English, American slang, vulgar Latin, liturgical re-
208sponses, legal forms, advertisements, riddles." He is the talkative, 
noncommunicative man, floundering in polylinguialism in a search for under­
standing. When he says, "In the buginning is the woid,"^®^ he symbolically 
expresses the communication paradox of our lives: the Word, the archetypal
idea of communication in the human experience, is recognized by man, its 
possibility and its having been are recognized, but even as we express 
the truth of it, we distort, twist, and parody.
26^Finnegans Wake, p. 623.
207campbell and Robinson, op. cit.. p. 7.
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Earwicker's sons, Shem and Shaun, are also a composite portrait
of communicative man, a portrait based upon real-life Irish characters
210"famous for their incomprehensible speech." Going under various names,
the sons appear on occasion as Jute and Mutt, the one a stutterer, the
211other a half-intelligible person, who together perform a deafmute dia- 
212
logue. As Penman and Post, they appear as the writer and bearer of a
message. Their concern is definitely with communications and though they
appear as opposed characters, they are, taken together, mankind in general.
Shem is the stuttering boy whose business it is "to find and utter the 
213
Word." Shem, typically, is at war with society, and deteriorates,
following the downward path from the market place, to an irresponsible 
muttering of "family secrets, taking notes of private conversations, and 
publishing f i l t h . C o n v i n c e d  that nobody really wants to hear what he 
has to say, Shem writes a language that nobody can understand— "with in­
creasing lack of interest in his semantics . . ."—  and sickens into
the perverse communication gesture of using his own excrement for ink as 
he writes his incomprehensible message to the world. Lost in the downward 
maze that leads to the deceptive pseudo-communication areas, Shem lifts 
his foolish wand and thinks he has made the dumb speak, but all one hears
is articulation, not communication; noise, not sense: "quoiquoiquoiquoi-
216
quo iquo iquo iql"
^^^Ellmann, op. cit.. p. 562.
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Shaun, more the parallel of Mr. Bloom, more the citizen communi­
cator, less disturbed by the market place, is the bearer of messages, the 
great transmitter. Unfortunately when he brings the word to the world, 
he "misreads it, fundamentally rejects it," and concerns himself with 
deliberately restricting communication on the grounds of propriety. Con­
cerned more with surfaces of communications, not with the real messages 
underneath, Shaun is quite confident that "I am, thing Sing Larynx, letter 
potent to play the sem backwards like Oscan wild or in shunt Fersse trans- 
luding from the Otherman or off the Toptic or anything off the typés of
my finklers in the draught or with buttles, with my eyes thinkshut and 
218all," yet when he is confronted with the symbolic letter and is unable 
to understand it, he grows enraged and denounces the communication as bogus 
and improper.
Earwicker, Shem, and Shaun sumnarize the various aspects of Joyce's 
theory of communications, a theory that trails through all his work. They 
are the positions that different men take. All the positions are futile.
We all fail to communicate, even if in different ways. And the question 
that Anna Livia Flurabelle asks, toward the very end of the book, "Is 
there one who understands me?"^^^ is Joyce's recognition of the pathos of 
communications that pervades the twentieth century. To that question,
Joyce gives the thundering no, though there is every indication even while 
he is giving the no he is trying to work out, to explore the possibility 
of finding a yes. Like his character Richard, in the play Exiles, "He
217Campbell and Robinson, op. cit.. p. 13.
^^^Finnegans Wake, p. 419.
219
^Ibid.. p. 627.
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admits his own failure to penetrate the lives of others, yet he goes on
expecting them to penetrate his. He questions the very bases of human
220
intercourse, yet his constant effort is to communicate." Joyce, in­
deed, seemed confident that he might find the "yes" to replace the "no." 
"His study of archaic language and his notes on living language in street
or pub had made him master of all verbal effects from the divine speech
221
of thunder to 'lowquacity,'" and with such a range of language at his
command, with such an insight into words, with such an appreciation of
their beauty and their shapes and their forms, Joyce boasted, "I can do
222
anything with language." But the more he tried to write the "yes," 
the more it kept coming apart. It is like the five men in Ulysses adver­
tising HELYS, each man carrying one letter of the word; as they walk along 
the Dublin street the word begins to spread apart, becomes disjointed, 
and the letter "Y" is out of place, "lagging b e h i n d . T h e  word is 
broken. Joyce's "yes" is "written in smoke and blurred by mist and signed 
of s o l i t u d e . I t  cannot drown out the overwhelming "no" that his work 
reveals.
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CHAPTER VII 
T. S. ELIOT AND THE REFORMED WORD
. . . men cannot communicate by means of sound over either wire 
or air. They have got to communicate through love. Communica­
tion that is not also communion is incomplete. We use communi­
cation; we participate in communion.^
In his poems and plays, more than in his prose criticism, T. S. Eliot has
given himself to a depiction and analysis of general twentieth-century
malaise— to the terrors and torments of our time. More than many of his
literary compatriots, Eliot has emphasized the integral relation of his
work "to the society of which he is a part, to the climate of thought and
feeling which give rise to his expression."^ And perhaps inevitably,
therefore, Eliot has included in his analytical social descriptions an
elaborate consideration of the pathos of communications, the breakdown of
the word that haunts the modem consciousness. Eliot depicts, of course,
a world grown spiritually sterile, but that sterility becomes demonstrable
and is given effective witness in the more precise area of communication
failure.
Sir Claude Mulhammer say^ early in the first act of The Confidential
^Allen Tate, Collected Essays (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1959), p. 385.
^F. 0. Matthiessen, The Achievement of T. S. Eliot (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 19.
162
163
Clerk, that "My rule is to remember that I understand nobody,"3 a state­
ment that echose through all Eliot's work and serves as a kind of defini­
tive aphorism for modern culture (just as, perhaps, the aphorism "Nothing 
too much" served for the Greeks). We "understand nobody" because we never 
receive their messages ("t sent you a message, which never reached you," 
Mrs. Guzzard tells Sir Claude)^ or if luckily a message does arrive we 
find it undecipherable, as Sir Claude finds undecipherable the postcards 
that Lady Elizabeth sends him from Zurich. We try to get the message, we 
try to read the writing, we try to understand, but most of the time we have 
to say with Celia Coplestone, in The Cocktail Party. "I simply don't know 
what you are talking a b o u t . O f  if we deceive ourselves into thinking 
we do understand, we at last are told (in two of the most pathetic lines 
in modern literature), "That is not what I meant at all./ That is not it 
at all."^ It is as though there were "flood and drouth/ Over the eyes 
and in the mouth"^ of modern man, a flood and drouth that not only sepa­
rates man from man but deprivates the individual until he must agree with 
Lord Claverton, in The Elder Statesman, "Now I've no more to say, and no
Q
one to say it to." Frustrated by communication failure, modern man sinks
^T. S. Eliot, The Confidential Clerk (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Company, 1954), p. 19.
^Ibid.. p. 150.
^The Cocktail Party in The Complete Poems and Plays (New York: 
Harcourt Brace & World, Inc., 1962), p. 324.
^"The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," in The Complete Poems and 
Plays. p. 6.
^"Little Gidding," Four Quartets in The Complete Poems and Plays.
p. 140.
®T. S. Eliot, The Elder Statesman (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Cudahy, 1959), p. 23.
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into noncommunication itself, to the tragic acceptance of a verbal isola? 
tion analogous with, a metaphor for, a corollary to, the vaster spiritual 
hermitage of the twentieth-century personality.
Eliot explores this whole problem in great detail throughout his 
canon. Not seeing communication failure simply as a matter of fate and 
destiny, as Eugene O'Neill does, Eliot looks for the human error in our 
misunderstandings. He dissects the problem, asks questions about language 
and man's use of it, tries to locate the breakdown of communication in the 
context of the total human predicament, and finally proposes, if not a 
solution, at least a direction by which man may make his way toward a 
better, if not perfect, communication experience.
2 .
A central premise in Eliot's semantic awareness is that the major 
portion of man's problem in communication is the result of human inade­
quacy. Almost with deliberation, man weaves the web of inarticulateness 
and noncommunication around himself. As Agatha says, in The Family Reunion.
Thus with most careful devotion 
Thus with precise attention 
To detail . . .
Men tighten the knot of confusion 
Into perfect misunderstanding . . . .
We "tighten the knot" and fail to communicate because of all sorts of
psychological problems that we carry around within ourselves. We meet
somebody different or streinge, and we cannot communicate; Peter Quilpe,
in The Cocktail Party, could not talk to Celia because "She was different
Q
The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 230.
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from any girl I'd ever known/ And not easy to talk to . . . Or we
misjudge the people around us; Sir Claude had never bared his soul to
Lady Elizabeth because "I didn't think/ That you would be interested.
Or we are simply afraid, as J. Alfred Prufrock is. Sometimes we are the
victims of ignorance and confusion, as Colby Simpkins is when his "rather
12forced misapprehension about incest" upsets his communication with ' 
Lucasta Angel, in The Confidential Clerk. Sometimes we are simply the 
victims of the social setting: we can't communicate at a party, at tea
(Charles Remington says, in The Elder Statesman. "Very well, then I still
13stop to tea,/ But you know I won't get a chance to talk to you"), on
14
a shopping expedition ("But how can one talk on a shopping expédition.") 
or over luncheon. Sometimes we are even victims of our own sensitivity 
to decorum: Charles Piper says, in The Family Reunion. "Do you think I
ought to mention it now? It seems to me too late,"^^ and Ivy, in the same 
play, observes that "These things are much better not inquired into."^^
Dr, Warburton also delicately explains, "I don't like to say this."^^ We 
are greatly inhibited in our talking by a goodly number of psychological
^^The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 314.
^^The Confidential Clerk, p . 106.
^^C. L. Barber, "The Power of Development . . . in a Different 
World," in Matthiessen, op. cit.. p. 226.
13The Elder Statesman, p. 14.
l^ Ibid.. p. 13.
15
The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 229.
^^Ibid.. p. 230.
^^Ibid.. p. 262.
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and social restrictions, all human in origin, all humanly cultivated.
Even when we are able to make some statement, however, or utter
some word, we are confronted by receptors who doubt us (Charles Hemington
to Monica Claverton-Ferry: "I'm sorry, I couldn't help wondering/ How
18much your words mean"), who don't listen to us (Alex Gibbs, in The 
Cocktail Party, to Julia Shuttlethwaite, "You've missed the point com­
pletely . . . .  It's perfectly hopeless. -You haven't been listening"),
who simply cannot hear us (Harry Monchensey, in The Family Reunion, to
20Mary: "I can only speak/ And you cannot hear me"). Or even worse, we
find our receptors responding only to the externals of our talk, as does
21the audience of Mr. Apollinax; they hear our words, but do not know our 
meaning. Sometimes, too, we are confronted with receptors who overinter­
pret our message (as Dr. Warburton charges Harry Monchensey) or "take 
things" in the wrong way (Edward Chamberlayne says to his wife Lavinia,
in The Cocktail Party. "It's just that way of taking things that makes
22
you so exasperating" and Lord Claverton asks, "How open one's heart/
When one is sure of the wrong r e s p o n s e ? " ) A n d  we are always confronted, 
of course, with the simple inevitable differences in age, wisdom, maturity, 
and the like. Sir Claude explains his failure to communicate with his 
father:
18
The Elder Statesman, pp. 99-100.
19
The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 297.
2°Ibid.. p. 280.
^^Elizabeth Drew, T. S. Eliot: The Design of His Poetry (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 26.
22
The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 238.
^^The Elder Statesman, p. 105.
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I never understood him.
I was too young. And when I was mature enough 
To understand him, he was not there.
Because we are human— emotional, sensitive, imaginative, individ­
ualized— we complicate our communications. But Eliot, in his semantic 
awareness, faces up to the problem that man is also handicapped in the 
medium of communication, the language itself; though even in dealing with
language, Eliot suggests a part of the problem abides in human misuse.
25
"I've gotta use words when I talk to you," the suffering Sweeney says
(Sweeney Agonistes). but using them, "It is impossible," as Prufrock points
out, "to say just what I mean!"^^ This language problem may be simply
the result of ignorance; Harry Monchensey admits that "I do not know the
27words in which to explain it . . . ." Or the problem may be the lack
of vocabulary within the language; Harry, again, argues that "I talk in
28general terms/ Because the particular has no language," and Agatha says
there is "more than there are words for."^^ Likewise, Monica Claverton-
Ferry points out that "there's no vocabulary/ For love within a family.
In addition to man's failure with language, language itself is a limited
31
instrument; Charles Hemington speaks of the "limits of speech," and
^^The Confidential Clerk, p. 48.
^^The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 83.
28
Ibid., p. 6.
^^Ibid.. p. 280.
2*Ibid.. p. 235.
2^Ibid.. p. 246.
^^The Elder Statesman, p. 88.
S^Ibid.. p. 131.
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observes that "It's strange that words are so inadequate.Eliot admits 
that we are confronted with a weak medium when he says, in Four Quartets, 
"Burnt Norton,"
Words strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden.
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place.
Will not stay still,
though obviously with the word "imprecision" Eliot asks man to share the
guilt of language inadequacy.
Eliot, it seems, is critical of a number of flaws in the whole
area of language--flaws that make up the weakness and the inadequacy. He
is critical of "dark generality" (Archbishop Thomas Becket chides the
Tempter, in Murder in the Cathedral, for wrapping his meaning "in as dark
generality/ As any c o u r t i e r " ) o f  discourse that is "Full of high sen-
QC
tence, but a bit obtuse" (The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock); to ab­
stractions: Harry Monchensey asks, "Do you think that I believe what I
said just now? . . .  I was talking in abstractions: and you answered in
abstractions."36 Eliot is also critical of cliches and the "formulated
37phrase" of Prufrock, and implies a language weakness when Lavinia 
Chamberlayne says, "Oh, Edward, I'm so sorry," then adds the apology,
^^ Ibid.
33The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 121.
3*Ibid.. p. 188.
35ibid.. p. 7.
3*ibid.. p. 268.
S^Ibid.. p. 5.
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"what a feeble thing to say!" or when Sir Henry Harcourt-Reilly, in 
The Cocktail Party, admits
And when I say to one like her,
"Work out your salvation with diligence," I do not 
understand 
What I myself am saying. ^
More significantly, Eliot seems critical of what might be summed 
up as deliberately noncommunicative language. He seems to imply, for in­
stance, in Mr. Eliot's Sunday Morning Service, an opposition to "the appal­
ling polysyllables and learned terms with which the poem is loaded,"40 
and in The Waste Land he also seems to attack, by implication, overtly 
noncommunicative words: the "demotic French"^! of Mr. Eugenides, and the
various other languages that the poem itself employs. As Elizabeth Drew 
puts the matter well in her remarks about the Sanskrit words "Datta," 
"Dayadhvam," "Damyata":^^ The protagonist is "attempting to shore up the 
ruins by repeating words of comfort and strengthening of the spirit which 
may help him. But they are in foreign tongues, not translated into his 
own inner experience and so become a part of himself. Give. Sympathize. 
Control. Peace. remain abstract ideas . . . The same opposition on
the part of Eliot prevails, it would seem, in Choruses from "The Rock" (VII) 
when he sees a denial of this world in "rites with forgotten meanings."44
^^Ibid.. p. 381.
^^Ibid.. p. 368.
AO
Drew, op. cit.. pp. 38-39.
4^ he Complete Poems and Plays, p. 43.
42lbid.. p. 50.
43
Drew, OP. cit.. p. 90.
/lA
The Complete Poems and Plays, p . 107.
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Although the popular undergraduate opinion assumes that Eliot's use of 
Greek and Latin epigraphs, German and French quotations, Sanskrit words 
and the like is indicative of a precious and learned sophistication, an 
equally enlightened reading of Eliot's non-English lines may well he that 
they are a depiction of a modern Babel, a depiction— and indictment— of 
noncommunication, or at least delayed communication, sophisticated or 
otherwise.
All language problems come to climax, of course, in the matter of 
definition and meaning, and so it is that Eliot, in his perusal of the 
medium, touches upon the ambiguity of word meanings, upon the subtleties 
of word choices and terminologies, and especially upon the precariousness 
of nomenclature, since all these matters involve the denotative-connotative 
capacity of words as well as private evaluations (definitions in the broad­
est sense) of word symbols.
First, it is difficult to know what words do mean. Mrs. Guzzard
brings up the matter,
I feared there might be a confusion in your mind 
Between the meaning of confusion and imposture.
And "What does the word mean?" Agatha asks, when Harry Monchensey has
suggested she is not u n h a p p y . I n  The Cocktail Party, psychiatrist Reilly
explores the matter of definitions. "'Nervous breakdown' is a term I
never use:/ It can mean almost anything," he explains,and he tells
AQ
Celia, "Tell me what you mean by a sense of sin," making also the point
*^ The Confidential Clerk, p. 144.
*^The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 276.
47lbid.. p. 346.
4Glbid.. p. 361.
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that "We have yet to find what would be normal/ For you, before we use
the term ' a b n o r m a l . To Lavlnia, Reilly points out that "You have come
SO
where the word 'insult' has no meaning." The meaning of words, Eliot
observes, depends upon varying conditions. Dr. Warbuton says, "Health is 
51a relative term." "What do the words mean now— 2  and you?" Charles
52Remington asks Monica, and Doris explains, in the Prologue to Sweeney 
Agonistes, in her reading of the cards, which are easily metaphors for 
words, "You can't be sure. It just depends on what comes next."^^ Doris 
goes on to explain that, in trying to determine whether the King of Clubs 
"means" Pereira or Sweeney, "You've got to think when you read the cards,/ 
It's not a thing that anyone can do. Eliot is aware of the chameleon­
like nature of words and is aware, too, of the care that man must take in 
determing word meanings.
Second, it is difficult and problematical to know what words to 
select in order to communicate. Even when words are essentially synony­
mous, there is the matter of taste, connotation, tradition, and decorum.
B. Kaghan says, in The Confidential Clerk. "I really don't know what emo­
tion to register," but Lucasta scorns the phrase "emotion to register:" 
"You don't need to talk that language any longer:/ Just say you're
**Ibid.,
SOlbid.. p. 353.
^^Ibid.. p. 255.
52The Elder Statesman, p. 16.
^^The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 76.
S^Tbid.
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embarrassed."^^ And when Colby refers to his father as "an unsuccessful
organist," Mrs. Guzzard suggests he say instead, "not very successful.
Eliot's point is not that one phrase, in either case, is better, but that
people do not agree, that we each live in little worlds of preferences that
create obstacles along the communication road. Nor can anyone make our
choices for us. When Lady Elizabeth says, "But you know, I actually liked
to believe/ That I was a foundling— or do I mean 'changeling'?" Colby
57
answers, "1 don't know which you mean." The communicator must make his 
own selection and suffer the consequences, knowing full well that many 
people respond rather heatedly to certain terms. Michael Claverton-Ferry, 
in The Elder Statesman, is offended by being called a gambler just because
CO
he gambles, and when Lucasta refers to herself as a "guttersnipe," Colby 
cries out, "You mustn't use such words! You don't know how it's hurting, 
as does Edward, when Lavinia informs him, "I think you're on the edge of 
a nervous breakdown." Edward reacts against the term by crying out, "Don't 
say that I
People are most sensitive, no doubt, about names. Though Eliot 
considers names absurd, as C. L. Barber s uggests,he sees that absurdity
^^The Confidential Clerk, p. 141.
^4 b i d .. p. 152.
^^Ibid.. p. 86.
^^The Elder Statesman, p. 81.
^^The Confidential Clerk, p. 72.
^^ h e  Complete Poems and Plays, p. 342.
61
Barber, "The Power of Development . . . ," in Matthiessen, 
op. cit.. p. 222. .
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as a part of man's language problem, and there is much semantic implica­
tion in our human delight and concern with what we are called and what we 
call others. To call a person the wrong thing is to interrupt communica­
tions, but to find the right name is not always easy.  ^Mrs. Carghill, in 
The Elder Statesman, wants Lord Claverton to call her not Mrs. Carghill,
not Maisie Batterson, but her stage name Maisie Montjoy: "It would give
62me such a thrill . . . ," she says. Monica does not wish to be called
CO
Miss Claverton, but Miss Claverton-Ferry, or even better, just Miss Ferry. 
Mrs. Piggott does not want to be addressed as Matron or N u r s e . A n d  
Lucasta is greatly distrubed if she is called Miss Angel; in fact she con­
siders herself to be cursed "with a name like Angel./ I'm thinking of 
changing it."^^ Some people do changé names, of course: Dick Ferry be­
comes Lord Claverton^^ and Fred Culverwell becomes Mr. G o m e z . A n d  some
souls, like Lady Elizabeth, change the names of others; Mr. Simpkins be-
68
comes Mr. Colby because she prefers it. But taste in names is hard to 
ascertain. Mrs. Guzzard considers Kaghan an odd name, but has to agree 
with Lady Elizabeth that her own name is "an unusual name." Taste is 
especially confusing in regard to given names and surnames: "You call
62
The Elder Statesman, p. 63.
*3lbid.. p. 57.
^Ibid.. p. 56.
^^The Confidential Clerk, p. 23.
The Elder Statesman, p. 29.
*?Ibid.
^^The Confidential Clerk, p. 37.
**Ibid.. p. 88.
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her Lucasta?" Lady Elizabeth asks. "Young people nowadays/ Seem to have
dropped the use of surnames altogether."^® Eggerson is horrified, in The
Confidential Clerk, that Kaghan should call Mrs. Eggerson by her first
name, Muriel, though apparently Muriel likes it.^^ And Colby is equally
disturbed that Lucasta should address Sir Mulhammer as Claude "to his face,"
and call Lady Elizabeth "Lizzie" behind her back, though Sir Claude is 
72amused by it all.
Eliot reveals in all this discussion of human inadequacy and lan­
guage weakness something like a survey of venial sins in the area of com­
munication. Our sensitivities, our doubts, our fears, our foolish responses, 
our imprécisions, our shifting definitions constitute our communication 
follies, less than malicious, more laughable and stupid, symptomatic some­
how of our untransfigured humanity. Undesirable, but to be expected. Far 
more serious are those communication sins partaking of the nature of de­
ceptive cant, sins that occur as the venial sins strengthen and deepen in 
the human experience, festering into falseness. When we begin to overlook 
our faults and flaws and begin to think we have no problems, no sins, begin 
to think we are communicating adequately and seriously, then we are in 
deep danger.
The women who "come and go/ Talking of Michelangelo"^^ are as in 
grave danger of stupidity-grown-proud as is Mr. Apollinax with his "dry
^^Ibid.. p. 81.
^^Ibid.. p. 21.
^^Ibid.. pp. 27-28.
73
The Complete Poems and Plays. p. 4.
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and passionate talk" devouring the a f t e r n o o n . A n d  the lass, in The
Waste Land, who explains, "I didn't mince my words, I said to her myself,
is, with Amy Monchensey who says, "1 do not mince matters in front of the 
76
family," guilty of a kind of smug confidence that she, if no one else, 
is getting through to others. Pretentiousness and over-confidence lead 
us to vain attempts "To communicate with Mars, converse with spirits"^^ 
(Four Quartets) and such people as Madame Sosostris, the famous clairvoy­
ante of The Waste Land, begin to appear, she who has a bad cold, a voice 
muffled and unclear, and an unclear message for the world.^^ People with 
the "unclear message" become almost villainous, almost death dealing, as 
Harry Monchensey explains, in recounting a time in his childhood:
I remember the silence, and the hushed excitement 
And the low conversation of triumphant aunts.
It is the conversation not overheard.
Not intended to be heard, with the sidewise looks.
That brings death into the heart of a child.
Pretentious and over-confident cotmnunication is on the same level with
SOthe shadowy, suspect communication of Harry's aunts or the communication
of Mrs. Carghill and Mr. Gomez who "whisper" their "miserable stories" in
81The Elder Statesman. or the guests who whisper their gossip behind Mr.
7*Tbid.. p. 18.
^^Ibid.. p. 41. .
^^Ibid.. p. 229.
^^"The Dry Salvages," Four Quartets in The Complete Poems and 
Plays, p. 135.
78Drew, op. cit.. p. 71.
^^ The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 260.
®°Ibid.
81
The Elder Statesman, p. 109.
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Frufrock's back. Flawed communication degenerates into false and corrupted 
communication that is all "voice" and "noise," void of meaning, superficial 
and ersatz communication, decadent and destructive.
Archbishop Thomas Becket speaks of the "undesirable/ Voices under
82 09
sleep" that keep the mind from being "whole in the present." These 
are the same undesirable voices that Prufrock recognizes--"the voices dy­
ing with a dying fall"®^— and that wake us into our death. They are the
85same voices, "sea and aerial," the endless repetition of which is re­
jected in Four Quartets. "The Dry Salvages," the same "lying voices"®^
that Harry Monchensey recognizes, and the "voices shaken from the yew
87tree," in Ash Wednesday, which, until they drift away, drown out the 
more legitimate voice of prayer. We give ourselves, as we are told in 
Choruses from "The Rock", to "endless palaver"®® and "friendly sentiments"®^ 
and "write innumerable b o o k s , b u t  it is all "noise without speech, 
in a universe, as described in Lines to a Yorkshire Terrior. where "Natural
^^The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 185.
®®Ibid.
®^Ibid.. p. 5.
®^Drew, op. cit., pp. 184-85.
88
The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 251.
®^Ibid., p. 66.
®®Ibid.. p. 102.
®9lbid.
9°Ibid.. p. 105.
*llbid.. p. 99.
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forces shriek'd aloud,/ Screamed, rattled, muttered endlessly."^2 Celia 
Coplestone damns the false communicators, the "voices," and the "noise" 
when she says, "They make noises, and think they are talking to each other;/ 
They make faces, and think they understand each o t h e r . A n d  Celia goes 
on to describe what happens to our communicative capacity when we let it 
sink into the corruption not only of venial error but of the lie, the eva­
sion, and the slander:
I listened to your voice, that had always thrilled me.
And it became another voice--no, not a voice:
What I heard was only the noise of an insect.
Dry, endless, meaningless, inhuman.
Inevitably, as communication difficulties degenerate into communi­
cation chaos and superficiality, a certain skepticism about the communica­
tion process begins to develop in anyone who has a grain of sense. Sir
Claude expresses a general skepticism when he asks about the conversation
95his wife is having with the cabman, "What can they be talking about?"
In Four Quartets. "Burnt Norton," the narrator ponders, "My words echo/
Thus, in your mind. But to what purpose . . . and Prufrock, contem­
plating the mermaids, despairs: "I do not think that they will sing to
97
me." Dusty asks, in Sweeney Agonistes. "What'll I say!" and the cynical
go
response of Doris is, "Say what you like . . . ," for she knows with
^^Ibid.. p. 91.
*^ibid.. p. 360.
9*T b i d .. p. 236.
^^The Confidential Clerk, p. 33.
^^The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 117. 
p. 7.
®®Ibid., p. 75.
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Sweeney himself, ", . . if you understand or if you don't/ That's noth-
99ing to me and nothing to you." Harry Monchensey confirms this skep­
ticism when he observes, "Whether I know what 1 am saying, or why I say 
it,/ That does not matter.
Skeptical, we grow silent. We refuse even to make a communica­
tion attempt. Harry turns against the world's talk; " . . .  that's not 
the language/ That I choose to be talking. I will not talk yours.
"It is no longer worthwhile to speak to anyone!" Celia says. We turn
on the gramophone to escape "From talking . . . when we had to be alone"
103
(The Cocktail Party). And we descend into the hell of The Hollow Men, 
groping together to "avoid s p e e c h . W e  become the modem, twentieth- 
century isolated and alienated man— "Poor Father! All your life! And 
no one to share it with," Monica s a y s ; " H e l l  is oneself," Edward 
Chamberlayne says. "One is always a l o n e . A n d  we are left in that 
stark and sterile world that Eliot has delineated so forcefully for our 
times, a world in which our mayor, as in Coriolan. rides mutely forth,
". . .no interrogation in his eyes/ Or in the hands . . . and our
**Ibid.. p. 84. 
lOOlbid.. p. 252.
lO^Ibid.. p. 266.
102
^^‘ibld.. p .  3 6 0 .
p. 341.
lO^Ibid.. p. 58.
^^^The Elder Statesman, p. 108.
^^^The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 342. 
lO^Ibid.. p. 86.
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representative man, Sweeney, may meditate upon birth, copulation, and 
death, but "cannot communicate his feelings;"^®® can only stand, with his 
companions, suggestive of many of the fragments into which the wholeness
of our culture has b r o k e n , " t h e  silent vertebrate in brown"^^® and
111
"the silent man in mocha brown," blocking the homed gate, no messages
coming through. And they grow old, until, with the aged one in Gerbntion,
modern man says: "I have lost my sight, smell, hearing, taste and touch:/
112How should I use them for your closer contact?"
3.
Eliot's semantic awareness does not end on this pessimistic note,
however. Eliot recognizes something in human nature, some calling, that
will not let us rest easy in our failures. "We can't sit here in si- 
113lence," Edward Chamberlayne says, for we have a passionate need to es­
cape our isolation and loneliness. Even in our semantic wilderness, our 
waste land, we begin a crying out, "Speak to me. Why do you never speak. 
Speak" (The Waste Land).^^^ Like Lord Claverton, terrified of being alone, 
we all need "Someone to make a remark now and then."^^^ We "want to talk
^®®Matthiessen, op. cit., p. 159. 
l°*Ibid.. p. 105.
110"sweeney Among the Nightingales," in The Complete Poems and 
Plays. p. 35.
llllbid.
ll^Ibid.. p. 23. 
ll^Ibid.. p. 331. 
ll^Ibid.. p. 40.
H ®The Elder Statesman, p. 19.
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to somebody" (The Cocktail Party); "I had to talk to someone" (The
Cocktail Party); "I believe that all he needs is someone to talk to"
1 IS(The Family Reunion). We begin to make our subtle and less-than-subtle
requests for communication, as happens in Portrait of a Lady;
The voice returns like the insistent out-of-tune 
Of a broken violin on an August afternoon:
"1 am always sure that you understand 
My feelings, always sure that you feel.
Sure that across the gulf you reach your hand."
Recognizing a communication failure, the lady is making her pathetic plea.
"Perhaps you can write to me," she says. "You will write at any rate."^^®
Human beings possess that great desire to come up out of silence,
like Lazarus from the dead, "Come back to tell you all, I shall tell you
all" (The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock). We know "We must try to
penetrate the other private worlds/ Of make-believe and fear"^^^ (The
Family Reunion) and "We've got to try to understand our children"^^^ (The
Confidential Clerk) and we must let others know that we are willing to
cooperate, to make an effort. Celia says: "I want to understand you. 1
could u n d e r s t a n d . L a d y  Elizabeth says:
^^^The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 304.
l^^Ibid.. p. 316.
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Ibid.. p. 237. 
l^*Ibid.. p. 9.
12°Ibid.. p. 11.
121%bid.. p. 6 .
IZ^Ibid.. p. 268.
^^^The Confidential Clerk, p. 158.
124jhe Complete Poems and Plays, p. 236.
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1 wish you would talk 
Sometimes to me as if I did understand.
And perhaps I might come to understand better.^25
Yet we must realize that communication is not necessarily our privilege
but a right to be won by struggle. Weak as we are, inadequate as language
is, we must be willing, as Charles Remington puts it, to "struggle for 
126
words," and we must accept the lesson described in Four Quartets. "East
Coker": "You must go by a way wherein there is no e c s t a s y " a n d  accept
"the intolerable wrestle/ With words and m e a n i n g s . A n d  Eliot, in this
poem, is talking not alone about the specialized,matter of poetry but of
communication in general when he says.
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt 
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure 
Because one has only leamt to get the better of words 
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which 
One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each venture 
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate . . . .
We must wrestle and struggle and raid the inarticulate. We must listen
to Agatha, in The Family Reunion:
. . . best tell us as you can:
Talk in your own language, without stopping to debate 
Whether it may be too far beyond our understanding.
Eliot envisions our struggle to be actually toward the achieve­
ment of a new language, or perhaps more properly a new level of language.
The Confidential Clerk, p. 106.
126
The Elder Statesman, p. 131.
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The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 127.
12*Ibid.. p. 125.
12*Ibid.. p. 128.
13°Ibid.. pp. 234-35.
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Ultimately the struggle must involve more than medium; it must involve 
our psychological and intellectual attitudes and processes. But fundamen­
tal to any improvement in conmunications is the verbal accommodation, and 
though Eliot is not over explicit about the nature of the new language,
he argues that it is possible. Harry Monchensey contends "there must be
131another way of talking/ That would get us somewhere," and Eliot, in 
this situation a disciple of Arthur Symons and the Symbolists,seeks 
communication relief by exchanging an old language for a new: " . . .  last
year's words belong to last year's language/ And next year's words await
133
another voice" (Four Quartets. "Little Gidding"). What we need do is
"purify the dialect of the t r i b e , t o  "find words" we "never thought
135to speak." What we need do is lift ourselves up into a new language
situation and a new communication possibility, an elevation that Eliot
describes in Choruses from "The Rock" (IX):
Out of the sliny mud of words, out of the sleet and 
hail of verbal imprécisions.
Approximate thoughts and feelings, words that have 
taken the place of thoughts and feelings,
There spring the perfect order of speech . . . .
Where the word is now unspoken, "We will build with new speech" (I),^^7 
^^4 b i d .. p. 269.
^^^Matthiessen, op. cit.. p. 27 n., quotes Eliot's saying, "I 
myself owe Mr. Symons a great debt."
^^% h e  Complete Poems and Plays, p. 141.
IS^Ibid.
^^^Ibid.
13*Ibid.. p. 111.
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and with our new speech we will achieve a new power, an achievement com­
parable to the learning of a foreign language so fluently " . . .  that you
1 OQ
can think in it," and henceforth "feel yourself to be/ Rather a dif-
ion
ferent person when you're talking it" (The Confidential Clerk).
But how are we to achieve our new speech? How are we to lift our­
selves out of our silences and come into the perfect order of speech?
Eliot's answer comes through a peculiar analysis of the communication sit­
uation, an analysis that provides less a universal and ubiquitous panacea 
for communication problems, more a methodology and perspective for the 
individual who wishes to say his prayers, express his loves, attend to 
his affairs even while those around him are victims of cant and confusion. 
The new speech, as Eliot envisions it, may not come to one and all but 
only to a limited few who, through proper effort, can make for themselves 
an establishment upon green islands of articulation, "between two waves," 
"between the storms."
4.
Eliot divides communication into two parts: the public and the
private. Or, to use other terms, the vulgar and the extraordinary. This 
partitioning is kin to the division that he makes in a more specific way 
in poetics between "the common word" and "the formal word," though in this 
latter division he would seem to be seeking "the right e q u i l i b r i u m " ^ * 0  
between the parts in order to effect "The complete consort dancing together"
^^^The Confidential Clerk, p. 45.
13*Ibid.
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(Four Quartets. "Little Gidding"), while in the division of communica­
tions he is seeking the disappearing of the one part and the triumph of
the other.
Public communication comprises all the flaws and failures which
Eliot has carefully observed in human communication experience. It is the
communication of those citizens who, in describing their ordinary lives
in Murder in the Cathedral, tell how they
Talked at the corner of the fire
Talked at the corner of streets,
• ♦ • 1AO
Living and partly living.
It is the ordinary, pedestrian, inadequate, "partly living" communication
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that slips so easily "Among velleities" (Portrait of a Lady). It is 
the communication of those women in The Waste Land whose cockney voices 
are "vulgar, insensitive voices which speak of marriage, unfaithfulness, 
fertility and abortion at exactly the same level and in exactly the same 
tone as of a new set of teeth or a Sunday d i n n e r . I t  is what Eliot 
calls in Poetry and Drama "Ordinary s p e e c h , t h a t  ordinary speech "with 
its fumbling for words, its constant recourse to approximation, its dis­
order and its unfinished s e n t e n c e s I t  is the communication that a 
civilization "founded on money values and secular rationalism, with no
^^^The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 144.
142lbid.. p. 180.
^^^Ibid.. p. 8. 
l^^rew, op. cit.. p. 78.
l^^T. S. Eliot, Poetry and Drama (Cambridge; Harvard University 
Press, 1951), p. 12.
14*Ibid.. p. 11.
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religious communion or human sense of community"possesses as the re­
sult of a perversion of some better communication in times past. The 
word once clear "has lost all its resonance and is only a confusion of 
' w h i s p e r s . P u b l i c  communie at ion--or mass communication, social com­
munication, what have yop— is that which we finally accept as members of 
the group, accept as do people described by Reilly:
Two people who know they do not understand each other.
Breeding children whom they do not understand 
And who will never understand them.
Set against this public coomunication is private communication- 
private in a specialized sense that it is "out of the stream" of public 
communication or elevated above it. And one must note here Eliot's gen­
eral distinction, regarding communications and other behavior, between the 
group, the mass, the mob, the public on the one hand and the club, the 
community, the city (in Charles Williams' sense of the word), the insti­
tution on the other. Eliot's distinction between public and private is 
not a matter of numbers, but a matter of order. Within the private, or­
dered community (be it the Establishment, Church, or Atheneum Club) a 
specialized communication, often involving a specialized language, may 
develop that functions far better than the inadequate "talk" of the pub­
lic. It is interesting that Eliot does not condemn Sweeney and his fel­
lows because they are communicating effectively in some argot, dialect, 
slang, or specialized language; he condemns them because they are scarcely
^^^Drew, op. cit.. p. 48. Miss Drew is describing the world as 
portrayed in Gerontion.
148ibid.. p. 52.
1 4 9
The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 364.
186
speaking at all, are not understanding themselves in their own world, and 
are sinking into inarticulation.
A good illustration of these different worlds--and the fact that 
they are congruous and concurrent though separate— is to be found in the 
first act of The Elder Statesman. Charles and Monica, who have gone 
through their struggle to communicate and who have achieved an articula­
tion of their love for each other, suddenly find, simultaneously with the 
articulation, that they have stepped into what Monica calls "our private 
world."
. . . now we have our private world—
The meanings are different. Look! We're back in the room 
That we entered only a few minutes ago.
Here's an armchair, there's the table;
There's the door . .
In this private world, things have changed, been transfigured and trans­
formed. In this private world, we are articulate, communicating creatures 
who find ourselves in a near-paradise of understanding. But when Monica 
and Charles are confronted with having tea--with father as guest and with 
butler to serve--Monica has to say, "Now we're in the public world.
The struggle of man becomes, then, in terms of these worlds and 
in terms of the quest for communication, to gain the one and leave the 
other. A tension develops within the individual and within the society.
In Four Quartets. "The Dry Salvages," for instance, Eliot puts in juxta­
position "the communication which is prayer and intercession . . . and 
the kinds of 'conversing with spirits' which deaden the sound of the
^^^The Elder Statesman, p. 16.
ISllbld.. p. 17.
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*voice descanting.'*' In the same poem Eliot proposes the idea of "an 
inner voice" singing "in counterpart to the 'faded song' of . . . delu­
sion . ... .'*^ 53 in The Waste Land, he reveals the "invoilable voice"^^^
of Philomel— the communication of the private and better world— crying 
"Jug, Jug" to the dirty ears of the public w o r l d . I n  Act II of The 
Cocktail Party, a scene is enacted that reveals the two different king­
doms of communication: Reilly, Alex, and Julia— apparently citizens of a
private kingdom-- make libations in prayer for Edward, Lavinia, Celia, and 
Peter— who are, apparently, unhappy members of the public kingdom, but who 
yearn to escape from it and who, to differing degrees, are making their 
way from the public kingdom to the private. When Alex says, "The words 
for the building of the hearth" and "The words for those who are upon a 
j o u r n e y , w e  infer that somehow Edward, Lavinia, and Celia have moved 
into a position to accept the "words," that the words are now a meaningful 
gesture on their behalf, that words now have a living quality for them.
But Julia, in the elevated private kingdom of communication, looking down 
into the public kingdom, watching Celia in particular climb up the road 
from publicness to privateness, asks that Celia be protected "from the 
Voices," and that God protect her "in the s i l e n c e . W e  must, appar­
ently, climb up through the voices of the public kingdom, the voices and
152
Drew, op. cit.. p. 185.
IS^Ibid.. pp. 183-84.
^^^ h e  Complete Poems and Plays, p. 40.
^^^Ibid.. pp. 368-69.
15?Ibid.. p. 369.
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the noise both, march through the forests of some kind of silence, before 
we can enter the higher kingdom of true communication and true understand­
ing. Edward,Lavinia, and Celia, it seems, have come far enough along in 
this development that "words" are truly "for" them. But Peter Quilpe, 
who has said a number of times in the play that he cannot understand any­
one, is not in sight of the new speech. "There is one," Reilly explains,
138"for whom the words cannot be spoken."
Alex: They cannot be spoken yet.
Julia: You mean Peter Quilpe.
Reilly: He has not yet come to where the words are valid.
Coming to where the words are valid— coming from the public king­
dom into the private— involves, of course, some sort of change of mind, 
some sort of intellectual and spiritual insight that, confronting the 
same faces and same problems and same language even, transforms all, makes 
clear what was obscure, makes understandable what was confused. We must 
acquire, to make our shift from world to world, some kind of fire, some 
kind of burning intensity within us. As an example, one form of communi­
cation, prayer, as we are told in Four Quartets. "Little Gidding,"
. . .  is more
Than an order of words, the conscious occupation 
Of the praying mind, or the sound of the voice praying.
And what the dead had no speech for, when living.
They can tell you, being dead: the communication
Of the dead is tongued with fire beyond the language 
of the living.160
To be tongued with fire is not, however, so much a matter of special elo­
quence. Whatever eloquence inheres in our new speech would seem to be
15*Ibid.
IS^Ibid.
IGOlbid.. p. 139.
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more of a product than cause; the cause of the new speech, the cause of
development from public to private, would seem to be a moral event on our
part. "The individual locked in his solitary identity can escape from this
obsession only by self-surrender and by sympathy with o t h e r s . S o m e h o w
our attitude toward others must morally improve if we are to escape our
Sweeney-like isolation in the public world and come to the new words and
new speech of the private. "There is only one way for you to understand/
And that is by seeing . . . ," Harry Monchensey says, but this seeing
is essentially a matter of moral insight. Lady Elizabeth's complaint that
163
Sir Claude "always made me feel that I wasn't worth talking to" is at
heart a moral criticism, just as is Lavinia's complaint against her husband:
Edward, what are you talking about?
Talking to yourself. Could you bear, for a moment.
To think about me?
Can we overcome our egotism, our selfishness, our self-concern in order to
communicate with others? Can we turn our vision into the lives of others
and come to say with Colby:
. . .  I understand you better 
In learning to understand the conditions 
Which life has imposed upon you . . . .1&5
Eliot recounts a great deal of his thesis of the translation from
the vulgar to the extraordinary kingdom of communications--a translation
involving the moral event--in terms of the Christian tradition. One is
^^Hiatthiessen, op. cit.. p. 138.
^^^ h e  Complete Poems and Plays, p. 250.
^^^The Confidential Clerk, p. 108.
^^^The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 342.
^^^The Confidential Clerk, p. 50.
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tempted to say that Eliot recounts his communications theory in a religious 
metaphor, yet one must as honestly say that Eliot recounts a religious 
doctrine in a metaphor of communications. What one finally acknowledges 
is that, in Eliot, religious experience and communication experience are 
parallel if not congruent; and though certainly our religious experience 
is more comprehensive than communications, Eliot sees a great affinity be­
tween the two.
Developing the religious parallel, Eliot tells of a foundational 
silence in the universe, a deadly silence, an almost diabolical silence, 
the silence of that darkness which awaits us if we fail in our spiritual 
commitments and out of which man has struggled to rise over the millenia. 
Eliot most frequently calls it the "empty silence"^^^ as he does in Four 
Quartets. It is empty because "there is no 'sense* or meaning or mes­
sage."1^7 It is the silence of the funeral (Four Quartets. "East
C o k e r " ) .168 it is the silence we recognize in our daily lives when in the
. . . dark dark dark . . .
. . .  an underground train, in the tube, stops too long 
between stations 
And the conversation rises and slowly fades into silence 
And you see behind every face the mental emptiness . . . .
In "The Dry Salvages," Eliot speaks of the "silent fog"l^® and that "sound­
less w a i l i n g ,"171 "voiceless wailing"17^ (oxymorons comparable no doubt
168ihe Complete Poems and Plays, p. 123.
l^^Drew, op. cit.. p. 170.
168ihe Complete Poems and Plays, p. 126.
169 l b i d . 170 l b i d .. p. 131.
171lbid. 172lbid.. p. 132.
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with Milton's '.Markness visible") and "the silent withering of autumn 
f l o w e r s . I n  The Waste Land, the jungle is crouched and "humped in 
s i l e n c e , "174 ^nd in Coriolan. we hear of the "silent croaking night."175
In opposition to this deadly, empty silence is the Word. "In the 
beginning was the Word"17^ is that scriptural verse fundamental to Mr. 
Eliot's Sunday Morning Service. The Word is, of course, applicable to 
both sides of the religion-communication parallel, for the Christian logos 
means the initial, life-giving revelation of God among matter, but logos. 
ambiguous term that it is, must, along with all other potential meanings, 
still denote "word" and "speech." Elizabeth Drew makes the point well;
"the ultimate revelation is the image of communication by speech . . . ,"^77 
and though Eliot refers in the term Word to the Christ, he almost means, 
inevitably, the spirit of communication, the spirit of life that is our 
knowing and our reaching out for what is beyond us. We can only proceed 
from "light to light, in the light of the Word" (Choruses from "The Rock" 
VII).178
The spirit of communication, incorporating a moral sense, comes 
into the empty silence of the human predicament not as the perfect artic­
ulation of which we dream, however. The spirit of communication, the Word, 
comes, as we learn in Gerontion. as
173lbld.. p. 132.
174ibid.. p. 49.
175lbid.. p. 88.
17* I b i d .. p. 33.
177Drew, op. cit.. p. 203.
17^The Complete Poems and Plays, p. 108.
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The word within a word,, 
unable to speak a word,,
Swaddled in darkness.
The Word must evolve within us (Christ must re-enact our humanity), expe­
riencing the difficulties of misunderstanding and confusion, until it can 
effect for us the necessary transfiguration into the new speech. B o m  
into the empty silence, the Word experiences also the agony of the "voices'* 
and the "noise":
The Word in the desert
Is most attacked by voices of temptation.
The crying shadow in the funeral dance.
The loud lament of the disconsolate chimera.
(Four Quartets, "Burnt Norton")
Certainly the
Shrieking voices,
Scolding, mocking, or merely chattering, 
always assail . . . ."181
and "Against the Word the unstilled world still whirled . . . ." (Ash 
Wednesdav^.182
Yet the Word's birth and agony are not in vain, for though the 
Word has gone through the empty silence and gone through the rabble, it 
has left in its wake that moral enlightenment that permits the protagonist 
of The Waste Land to awake from his blindness: ". . . to the *!' of the
poem the ancient 'word* is no longer completely dumb and dark . . . .  He 
is agonizingly aware, in the imprisonment of his personal waste land, that
17*Ibid., p. 21. 
IGOjbid.. p. 122. 
IGllbid., pp. 121-22, 
182ibid.. p. 65.
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the possibilities of rebirth cannot be dismissed . , . Rebirth is,
of course, in the communication side of Eliot's religion-communication 
parallel, that translation from the vulgar to the extraordinary, that sud­
den moral firing of the human heart and mind, which permits us to say, as 
Monica says to her father, “It is time to break the silence I
Breaking the empty silence, accepting the Word, disavowing the
counterfeit “voices" and “noises," all these lead us, however, to a para­
doxical moment in human experience. As we step over from the public king­
dom into the private kingdom of communication, we find that we must enter 
a new silence, a silence that is a genre of stillness necessary for our 
accepting the Word. "The silent listening"^®^ (Four Quartets. “The Dry 
Salvages") Eliot calls it, where one can “hear your voice as in the si­
lence/ Between two storms . . (The Family Reunion). This is neces­
sary; otherwise we shall find ourselves in the situation depicted in Ash 
Wednesday; “Where shall the word be found, tdiere shall the word/ Resound?
Not here, there is not enough silence . . . We need the silence
that, in religious terms, Mariana and Our Lady (in Ash Wednesday) provide 
us, “The silent sister"^®® who "spoke no word,"^®^ that “lady of silences.“^9®
l®®Drew, op. cit.. p. 63.
^®^The Elder Statesman, p. 105. 
l®^The Complete Poems and Plays, p . 132. 
l®*Ibid.. p. 251.
IG^Ibid.. p. 65.
!®®Ibid.. p. 64. 
l®*Ibid.
19®Ibid.. p. 62.
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What we must accept now is . .to be blessed with the gift of silence" 
(Choruses from "The Rock" the living silence, the spiritual still­
ness, that borderline of moral consciousness that we must cross over in 
order that we may come into paradise.
And there is a paradise. "Children's voices in the orchard"
192(Landscapes. "New Hampshire"). That lovely place
. . .  of the hidden waterfall 
And the children in the apple-tree 
Not known, because not looked for 
But heard . . .  in the stillness . . .
(Four Quartets. "Little Gidding")
There is a communication paradise (and a religious paradise) where
. . . every phrase
And sentence . . .  is right (lAere every word is at home,)
Taking its place to support the others . . .
The Word progresses through deadly, primeval silence, through the 
suffering of "noise and darkness and terror and d i v i s i o n , t h r o u g h  the 
new and transforming silence ("the center of the silent Word"^^^), into 
the paradise of perfect understanding. Man, instructed by that meta­
physical and religious example, progresses, if he will, from utter inartic­
ulation, through cant and broken words and all that is contained in "pub­
lic communication," through the transforming moral realization that true 
communication must begin in our private hearts before it can abide in our
l^^Ibid.. p. 105.
l^^Ibid.. p. 93.
193lbid.. p. 145.
l**Ibid.. p. 144.
195Drew, op. cit.. p. 113.
19*Ibid.
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mouths and our messages. Then man can come into that paradise that Eliot
describes in the dedication to The Elder Statesman, a dedication "To My
Wife": We may become lovers
Who think the same thoughts without need of speech
And babble the same speech without need of meaning . . . .
The words mean what they say, but some have further meaning
For you and me only.^*?
5.
Those who do achieve true communication in their private ways must
then become, in Eliot's thinking, the teachers of communication to the
world and, thereby, the saviors of the culture: " . . .  unless we have
those few men who combine an exceptional sensibility with an exceptional
power over words, our own ability, not merely to express, but even to feel
198any but the crudest emotions, will degenerate." Indeed, true communi­
cation becomes the manifestation of the metaphysical Logos here in our 
world, a counterpart of Logos that becomes emblematic of it. And those 
practitioners of the new speech perform, as priests, a kind of sacramental 
action beneficial to the rest of mankind, extending into the world the 
Word and propagating, out of the private kingdom into the public, that 
perspective or consciousness "which emphasizes the need to move as best 
we can towards 'definite meaning expressed in the properest words, 
toward the envisioned semantic paradise.
Eliot sees for most men today something less than paradise, of
Elder Statesman, p. 5.
1 QQ
Barber, "The Power of Development . . . ," in Matthiessen, 
op. cit.. pp. 200-201.
l**Ibid.. p. 202.
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course. But Eliot's chief contribution to modern semantic awareness is 
a kind of hope based upon an astute criticism. His belief that "the in­
communicable . . . may often mean merely 'the vague and unformed 
suggests to us the need for an intellectual effort, an intellectual re­
finement. His belief that our flawed history (including our total com­
munication effort) is human experience "lived without the framework of a 
Logos," suggests the need for a religious and spiritual quest. Man's 
struggle in mind and heart, in language and in attitude, in the machinery 
and in the conception— this is what shall bring us to a better world 
wherein the word is made whole.
Eliot leaves us on a threshold. He leaves us at a moment of ex­
pectation. He leaves us at a moment of moral decision. "I'm not sure, 
Edward," Celia says, "that I understand you;/ And yet I understand as I 
never did before."^0% And Charles Piper says.
It's very odd,/
But I am beginning to feel, just beginning to feel/
That there is something I could understand, if I were told it.
And Harry Monchensey says, "I think I see what you mean,/ Dimly . . . .”204
Dimly we see through the glass. Something is beyond. Eliot brings us to
the threshold, brings us to peer over into the possibility of resolving
the pathos of communication, of picking up the broken word, of mending
our broken lips.
^^^Matthiessen, op. cit.. p. 64.
201Drew, op. cit.. p. 54.
^^^ h e  Complete Poems and Plays, p. 326.
ZO^Ibid.. p. 288.
ZO^Ibid.. p. 237.
CHAPTER VIII
EPILOGUE: THE POSSIBILITIES OF RESTORATION
There Is nothing that forges and creates a people more, and 
nothing that preserves their humanity more than words, more 
than speech . . . .
In the absence, for many people nowadays, of any absolute 
sanction to give us the Word, it becomes necessary to create 
our own (lower case) words. to make our own definitions as 
best we can. The resulting responsiblity for each individual 
person can be enormous; in Jean-Paul Sartre's famous phrase, 
we are "condemned to freedom.
O'Neill, Joyce, and Eliot vigorously developed the theme of the 
broken word in their literature; they stand as representative spokesmen 
for the twentieth-century pathos of communications. Their various explo­
rations of man's inability to communicate with man became an integral part 
of their myths and world-views and philosophies. Their great articulation 
of communication breakdown— an articulation effected also by other greats 
of the interbellum period: Hemingway, Faulkner, Fitzgerald, Huxley,
Lawrence, Woolf— has been carried on into the age of anxiety, cold war, 
and the bomb by Samuel Beckett, George Orwell, Tennessee Williams, J. D.
Salinger, to name only a few.
Within this articulation there appears a complex of motifs that,
^h e  Rev. William F. Lynch, S. J., "In Word and In Song," Art and
the People. Television Show No. 4 (New York: The Catholic Hour-TV, January 
27, 1963), p. 1.
2
Gibson, op. cit., pp. x-xi.
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woven together, constitutes a major portion of the theme of communication 
failure. This complex comprises at least five major motifs in modern lit­
erature having close connections with the pathos of communications. These 
motifs do not necessarily have their matrix in the pathos, but they have 
received aid and succor from the pathos so that their prevalence in modern 
literature has been strengthened and given a significance they might not 
otherwise have had. No one author, of course, has necessarily developed 
all of these motifs, but they are to be found in nearly every area of mod­
ern literature and together they provide the chief characteristics of the 
theme of the broken word.
1. The Solo Conversation. This motif is one of literary technique 
and craftsmanship and has had a vogue in modern literature in various 
guises: monologue, soliloquy, and all forms of "stream of consciousness."
Though usually considered a technique growing out of the desire for greater 
realism in literature, the "solo conversation" motif can also easily be 
seen as a facet of the communication failure theme. Though indeed the mod­
ern devices of monologue, soliloquy, and stream of consciousness may be 
"realistic," they are also quite evidently forms of self-communication, 
forms of a one-sided conversation. Actually a literary technique long 
before modern literature— see the Una Ellis-Fermor discussion, for in- 
stance, in The Jacobean Drama— the use to which the solo coversation has 
been put in modern letters has a special association with .the pathos of com­
munications. The technique or motif can be re-examined, with the pathos 
of communications in mind, wherever it occurs--not only in Joyce, Eliot,
H. Ellis-Fermor, The Jacobean Drama (London: Metheuen & Co., 
Ltd., 1936), pp. 49 ff.
199
aud 0'NeiIl-4>ut in Faulkner, Woolf, or who have you, including the Beatniks 
and the Angry Young Men of the fifties.
2. The Facade. With its more recent roots in Baudelaire's homo 
duplex, the idea of dual-natured man (not the duality of body and soul, 
but the duality of the true and the false) has been a major motif in mod­
ern literature. Most apparent in O'Neill's mask experimentations, the 
theme of preparing our faces to meet the faces that we meet echoes through­
out modern literature from the Richard Corys: to the J. Alfred Prufrock's;, 
into the whole concern of Edith Sitwell's Facades in general, of Jean 
Genet's The Blacks in particular, and on into the search for the genuine 
beneath the phony in all the literature of the J. D. Salinger tradition.
The facade motif is connected with the pathos of communications, for in 
the context of communications the human mask is significant both as a bar­
rier and as a distorting filter. Man's facade hides what he has to say 
and distorts that which is said by others. The facade motif has been in­
corporated into the theme of the broken word, and the broken word has 
helped give the facade motif its popularity in the modern arts.
3. The Experimental Language. All the attempts in modern litera­
ture to manipulate the language in unorthodox ways (Joyce, Gertrude Stein, 
even William Burroughs with his folded pages), to incorporate foreign ton­
gues into literature (Joyce, Eliot, Ezra Pound), to work with as many spec­
ialized areas within the language as possible, i.e. argot, slang, idiom, 
(O'Neill, Joyce, Salinger)--all come into focus in the light of the pathos 
of communications. Language experimentation is seen, of course, in modern 
literature as attempts to extend the facility of language to verbalize 
reality and, in some cases, as a rather snobbish attempt to speak to one
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audience (some vaguely identified academic and polylingual audience) at 
the exclusion of all others. In addition, however, all the language ex­
perimentation in modern literature--and such experimentation is admittedly 
one of the hallmarks of a great deal of twentieth-century serious litera­
ture— can be seen as a motif symbolic of the loss of communication, of 
deviation from orthodox, communicative language. Perhaps it is a two-way 
street: to a certain extent language experimentation fostered and popu­
larized the pathos of communication, but without the pathos in the back­
ground a great deal of language experimentation, especially as we see it 
in modern poetry, would not have been maintained at all.
4. The Communication Hero. One of the major characters in modern 
literature has been the artist, the creative person.^ The Joycean hero 
is the most obvious example, but the communieations-minded, the language- 
sensitive, the articulation-inclined man appears, too, as a major type in 
O'Neill's drama, and in a vast number of other literary works. Thomas 
Wolfe's Eugene Gant is but one of the many "sensitive young men" who, in 
their twentieth-century costume, are particularly concerned with the ex­
pression and communication of that which they feel. The novelist or jour­
nalist character in such works as Huxley's Point Counter Point and Gide's 
The Counterfeiters, such painters and artists as appear in To the Lighthouse
^"Perhaps this is again a sign of the interregnum /^ate nineteenth 
century and the early twentieth century/ in the thinking of modern man: 
that the artist should suddenly come to have exorbitant value as subject 
matter— should seem a hero or a traitor to his proper heroic role— and 
should seem so to the artist himself and not merely to his biographer. In 
this James is not alone; he is followed by Mann and Proust and Gide and 
Pirandello and Joyce, to all rhom the artist became the type of hero most 
precious . . . Richard P. Blackmur, "Henry James," Literary History 
of the United States, ed., Robert Spiller, et alia;. (3 vols.; New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1948), II, p. 1050.
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and in Joyce Cary's The Horse's Mouth are all part of a modern motif re­
lated to the pathos of communications. The struggle of these communica­
tion heroes both to develop into full-fledged articulators and expressors 
(all in the tradition of the Kunstlerroman) and to articulate and communi­
cate in spite of a hindering rabblement with its noise and meaningless 
talk— the struggle achieves its full significance only as a part of the 
larger theme of communication failure in modern poetiry, drama, and fic­
tion.
5. The Moral Event. A more nebulous motif than the others, this 
facet of the communication failure theme is seen in Joyce's epiphanies, 
in all the "moments of truth" or "moments of insight" that are discussed 
in modern literature. Again, this concept of the dynamic moment when man 
turns from one way of life to another is not peculiarly modern--consider 
Oedipus Tyrannus for instance. But much has been made in modern literature 
of these intense, usually transfiguring moments when a human being sud­
denly has the opportunity, even if for only a brief time, to find in what 
had been only emptiness and noise a far better world of harmonious silence 
and true communications. One need cite only the works of Charles Williams, 
Rainer Maria Rilke, Par Lagkeirvist, T. S. Eliot to find examples of the 
moment of moral event, that, in the context of the pathos of communica­
tions, becomes the hopeful ingredient in the otherwise somber-threaded 
theme of the broken word. Even though the transfiguring moral event occurs 
in modem literature not as an immediate concern with the pathos of commu­
nications, in nearly every case the event touches upon the pathos, and to 
the extent that communication is involved in larger moral issues, the moral 
event provides some sort of possibility of restoration for the broken word.
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Also, the prevalence of the pathos of communication has no doubt prompted 
a good deal of the quest for the moral event, as well as the quest for a 
number of other spiritual answers.
2 .
Out of the articulation of the pathos of communication, with its 
complex of motifs and with the particular emphasis given to the broken 
word by such major figures as O'Neill, Joyce, and Eliot, the popular, 
more-than-literary concern with communications has developed in the 
English-speaking world, until today "communication failure" has become 
the scapegoat-explanation for problems in nearly every area of human ex­
perience— from agriculture to politics, from child-rearing to team sports. 
C. P. Snow has carried the pathos of communications to a certain logical 
end in his concept of "two cultures," and a large percentage of the mili­
tant debates of our days— see for instance Richard Hofstadter's recent 
book, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (the eggheads versus the fat­
heads), and Daniel Boorstin's critical response in Saturday Review.^  as 
well as the continuing battle between the camps for and against Webster III 
and between the traditional stylists and the liberal linguists as described 
recently by Lincoln Barnett^--have at least a number of their roots in our 
almost neurotic semantic awareness.
Surely, though, the pathos of communications need not be a last­
ing cultural disease. Surely modern man must begin to envision some
^Richard Hbftstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New 
York: Knopf, 1963), reviewed by Daniel J. Boorstin, "The Split-Level 
Tower," Saturday Review. June 1, 1963, p. 19 ff.
^Lincoln Barnett, "Who Is Behind the Assault on English?" Horizon, 
(July, 1963), p. 33 ff.
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restoration of the broken word. The restoration will probably be a mat­
ter of seeing that the broken word is not quite as shattered as once 
thought and be a matter of revitalizing our faith in language and attend­
ing to it with greater care. The restoration will probably be a matter 
of improved attitude and craftsmanship combined. Also the restoration 
will probably be a matter of recognizing the deep affiliation communica­
tion has with man's moral and spiritual nature as well as with his intel­
lectual capacities. As Father William F. Lynch has written,
People love words and they love great speech, speech that flows 
out clearly in the air and challenges us to be as great, as 
clear-cut, as rhythmic as itself. It is exactly this we are 
being denied today by men who have a contempt for the people 
and are the new masters of our public arts. People love words
and speech. They carve them as great monuments so that they
shall not forget what has been good in the past.?
Perhaps the most powerful of the restorative movements to date 
has been that of Korzybakian General Semantics, but the trouble with 
General Semantics is that it raises as many problems as it solves. Quite 
properly and effectively. General Semantics has encouraged a greater con­
sideration of language, a more meticulous concern with language possibil­
ities and limitations, but at the same time it has had upon many people 
a tremendously inhibiting effect, frightening people into silence for fear 
they may "misuse" language. Also, at the same time General Semantics has
attacked varieties of language mystiques, it itself has floundered many
times into a kind of faith-healer role, promising better health and in­
creased prosperity simply through communication reform.^ Without wishing
?Lynch, op. cit.. p. 1.
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to engage in the exciting debate about General Semantics, one cannot help 
obseirve that a great deal of the support for General Semantics has come 
from engineers, scientists, mathematicians, and the like--men who perhaps 
envision language as a scientific Instrument, a mechanical structure, and 
who, in spite of protestations to the contrary, may be blind to the human-
9
ness of language experience. All in all. General Semantics, while urging 
reform of language and restoration of the broken word, has so overwhelm­
ingly condemned man's misuse of language and failure to communicate that 
the poor patient has less faith in the cure than in the reality of the 
illness.
A genuine restoration of the broken word must begin with a rejec­
tion of any sort of fatalistic attitude toward communication failure— a 
rejection of the sort of hopelessness that O'Neill acknowledged in his 
semantic awareness--and must also begin with a rejection of a number of 
fallacies that plague our understanding of language and communication.
A good many of these fallacies have themselves grown out of restorative 
movements (including General Semantics), but are entirely deceptive as 
programs for improving communication. Though no doubt hundreds of fal­
lacies could be listed, some of the more disturbing ones— and popular 
ones--are the fallacies of "the new improved language," "the good old
Û
See H. L. Mencken, The American Language Supplement (New York: 
Knopf, 1945), p. 102, for a similar opinion.
^^As a teacher, I had, several years ago, an interesting experi­
ence with a student in creative writing class: the young man had had
several courses in semantics and now found himself totally unable to put 
words down on paper, for he had become too acutely conscious of the un­
certainties of language; each time he put a word on paper, all the pos­
sible implications and meanings of the word leaped into his mind and he 
was forced to cancel the word out. I have known several other cases of 
what I call "semanticitis."
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language," "the simplified language," "euphemism and anti-euphemism," and 
"sophisticated inferences."
Within the fallacy of new language one must include all advoca­
tion of one universal language (Esperanto et alia), new improved alpha­
bets (that of George Bernard Shaw for example). new standardized, phonet- 
ically-accurate orthography (telefon, nite.-thru), and the myriad other 
reform schemes. Language, though having certain arbitrary aspects to it, 
cannot be concocted arbitrarily or wrenched overnight out of old molds 
into n e w . W h a t e v e r  changes take place in language can only be reflec­
tions of changes taking place in the human situation. Human change and 
growth are slow; language changes are slow. And any new language can only 
be a modification, a variation upon the existing language. One cannot 
arbitrarily cancel out a language and construct a new tongue. As Edmund 
Wilson says, "We may hope that there will yet be a medium by means of 
which all the peoples can communicate with one another, but we cannot 
forecast what such a language might be, we can hardly as yet even specu­
late as to which linguistic elements will predominate; still less can we 
concoct one synthetically." All the experimentations of the twentieth- 
century toward the development of a "new Language" actually are not gen­
uine restorative efforts to mend the broken word but are simply reflections
^^What Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York; The 
New American Library, 1949), p. 112, has to say about primitive peoples 
applies I think to our own age: "No savage society of unintellectual
hunters and squaws could ever build a language; they could only produce 
it by some such unconscious process as endless misunderstanding, modifi­
cation, reduplication for emphasis .. . . and 'filling in' by force of a 
formal feeling based on habits."
^^Edmund Wilson, "My Fifty Years with Dictionaries and Grammars," 
New Yorker. April 20, 1963, p. 208.
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and mirrorings of the broken word itself. Though some people have seen 
in the excessive linguistic experimentations of Joyce, in the more con­
trolled and limited experimentations of Eliot, an extension of language 
into new dimensions, the truth is that the experimentation is simply linked 
"with our contemporary sense of chaotic change and upheaval, of disequi­
librium and i n s e c u r i t y . "13 xhe restoration of the broken word will not 
come about simply by devising a new vocabulary, a new syntax, a new alpha­
bet, a new orthography. The communication problems faced by man would 
simply be transferred into new sounds and shapes.
Likewise we are confronted with a fallacy if we suppose that the 
broken word will be restored by our going back to some language situation 
of the past. It is easy to daydream about the good old days when language 
was purer and lovelier than it is now. But language is a stream that flows 
only in one direction, and any nostalgia for a language of the past is no 
more pertinent to a restoration of the broken word than is the utopian 
dream of a better language far ahead. Man has never had, and never will 
have, more to work with, as far as communication goes, than "the language 
of this day." To invest his hopes in something past or future is to avoid 
the contemporary issue. Though much is to be praised in Eliot's program 
for improved communication, he reveals an astonishing communication blind­
ness in his intense predilection for seventeenth-century English and in 
bis vigorous assurances— in many places, but typically in a recent review 
of The New English Bible— that deterioration and corruption are rampant 
in the language, that we are victims of an active "agent of decadence.
^^Matthiessen, op. cit.. pp. 134-35.
S. Eliot, "T. S. Eliot on the Changing Language of the 
Scriptures," The National Observer. December 24, 1962.
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Eliot, too, has a weakness for the etymological fallacy in that he be­
lieves that a word really means what it first meant, that somehow the 
Greek or Latin roots of a word give us the real, the genuine meaning of 
a word.^^ He hates to acknowledge that language changes, flows, moves, 
and that language can no more be kept what it once was than one can keep 
a human being or a flower what they once were. At the heart of Eliot's 
problem, and at the heart of the fallacy of the "good old language," is 
a burning desire for stability and a confusion of taste in language with 
communication in language. But the restored word does not necessarily 
mean a static word, nor does it necessarily mean, alas, a beautiful word.
The fallacy of simplified language appeals to those who feel that 
present-day communication problems are the result of complexity (rhetorical 
and syntactical elaborateness, one supposes) and size (large vocabularies). 
The point of this fallacy is to reduce language to bedrock; to avoid com­
plex communication problems by throwing out the window all the implements 
of those complex p r o b l e m s . ( B a b y  with the bath water, as it were.) Ab­
surd as it may sound, the simplifiers seem to argue that if we don't have 
a name for something the something goes away. Or that the primary colors 
are quite adequate to describe any color sensation. Ogden's Basic English 
is, undoubtedly, the prime example of language by reduction, an approach 
that by now has been proved hopelessly inadequate— neither satisfying our
Joyce tended toward the same etymological fallacy, though he 
went in a slightly different and bizarre direction by making up his own 
word origins. He insisted, for instance, upon a thirteenth-century ety­
mology for "Odysseus": Outls— "ndbodÿ'; Zeus— "God." As Richard Ellmann, 
op. cit., p. 372, says, "The etymology is merely fanciful . . . ."
^^See Saplr's contention, quoted in Langer, op. cit., p. 89, that 
infantile language has a limited communication aspect.
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communication needs nor our aesthetic needs. Herman Melville, a century 
ago, explored the possibilities of communication improvement by "going 
back" and "down to" an earlier, more simple language, but he discovered, 
and wisely admitted, that simplified language becomes simply kindergarten 
or infantile language, complicating our communication efforts rather than 
helping them.^^
Another fallacy is that concerning euphemisms and anti-euphemisms 
and word preferences in general. Some people feel that to use language 
properly and effectively and most communicatively, we should use it "real­
istically," whatever that means. Perhaps this sense of "realistic" Ian-
1ftguage is a reaction against Victorian circumlocutions, but whatever the 
cause, it is a fallacious position. The most common example used by ad­
vocates of "realistic" or "anti-euphemistic" language is in connection 
with death. We are told that the word dead is much "better" than the ex­
pression passed away. But to demonstrate the "betterness" is utterly im­
possible, unless one insists upon the equally fallacious criterion of syl­
labic economy: fewer syllables are better than more syllables. The old
anti-euphemistic argument that the expression passed away is unrealistic 
reveals an appalling ignorance not only of language but of people. Few 
bereaved survivors have ever made a mistake about the expression passed 
away; they know exactly what it "means." Jessica Hitford recently damned 
the funeral business for its calling a coffin a casket, an undertaker a
-^^Particularly in his first novel, Tvpee. Melville explores the 
primitive and infantile communication experience. He rejects the expe­
rience, however, for the more realistic one of Moby Dick.
^^Obviously euphemisms, when they become non-referential and lead 
us away from reality, can be harmful, but a great many criticisms of cir­
cumlocutions are really criticisms of metaphors and synonyms.
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mortician, a flower truck a flower car, and so f o r t h . B u t  surely her
preferences are legitimate only in the area of subjective taste, not in
the area of communication. Likewise, Eliot's dismay that the swine of the
King James Version has become pigs in The New English Bible is valid only
20in the area of likes and dislikes, not in the area of communication.
Â final fallacy to mention is that of sophisticated inference. 
Quite simply stated, this fallacy holds that whatever one says in language 
something else is implied, and that the implications constitute the "real 
message" being communicated. It is the fallacy that literal language is 
insignificant and ignorable; that direct communication is impossible.
Joyce seems especially addicted to this fallacy, or at least is intent 
upon depicting it. It is a fallacy especially appealing both to the 
highly-creative and overly-educated personality and to the guilt-ridden, 
criminal, or minority-group personality. Perhaps, most of all, it is 
appealing to the socially ambitious who have great fear of naivite or 
ingenuousness: one must not seem simple-minded by taking language lit­
erally; one must always wink and smile, having discovered the "real mes­
sage," the real implication, the unsaid. When this fallacy maintains, 
communication gets lost in cleverness and ingenuity.
More important than rejection of fallacies, however (and the fal­
lacies could be explored at great length), is a positive program of 
thoughtful language use in order to communicate. First of all, one should 
maintain as large a vocabulary as possible and should encourage the
Jessica Mitford, "The Undertaker's Racket," The Atlantic.CXI 
(June, 1963), p. 62.
^^Eliot, op. cit.
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general enlargement of the language in order to effect as discrete and 
distinct a nomination of things, events, and ideas as p o s s i b l e . O b v i ­
ously, one must avoid any sort of nomination mania or any sort of naming 
magic; but our common realization that rose and tulip are, many times, 
more precise and useful words than the general term flower, still holds 
true. And at times of extreme communication crisis or delicacy, the more 
refined and precise our words are the better off we are. Refinement and 
precision in words is vastly helped by word quantities, for to distinguish 
and discriminate, one must have material with which to work.
Secondly, one must maintain a constant cautiousness concerning 
abstract and generalized words. (General Semantics has made a useful con­
tribution here, constantly calling our attention to the danger of these 
words.) Words that have no immediate physical referents are not to be 
cast aside, but our use of them must be quite careful and we must be aware 
of the danger of ambiguity that surrounds them. Thirdly, and this grows 
out of the dangers of ambiguity, we must be willing to define our terms 
as often as necessary and in as precise and specific a way as possible. 
Though we may normally assume that certain words are commonly defined in 
our culture, we must always be willing, if the obvious necessity arise, 
to define our terms as best we can, knowing, of course, that there are 
certain limitations on definition-that we simply can't overcome.
Fourthly, in our positive program of language use, we must
21Admitting that many people cannot accept reality without having 
a name for the things within reality, I am inclined to agree with Langer, 
op. cit.. p. 102, that "to name things is a thrilling experience, a tre­
mendous satisfaction." .Having the names of things— names we have given . 
or the names our culture has given— is advantageous; where's the value 
in a limited vocabulary?
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constantly search for agreements within as large social and cultural groups 
as possible concerning the technical operation of language--its syntax, 
grammar, and rhetoric. Though we know perfectly well we will never achieve 
a one hundred per cent agreement on every language construction, on every 
syntactical propriety, and though we know perfectly well that the language 
agreements we do achieve today are going to be changed tomorrow, we must 
constantly search for at least temporary, fairly widely accepted under­
standings of what we are going to do within the province of sentence struc­
ture and the like.
Fifthly, though, at the same time we are looking for agreement, 
we must maintain.as flexible an attitude toward language as possible. We 
must be willing to bend in our use of language if the bending is necessary 
for communication. We must avoid any authoritarianism or dogmatism that 
values rules and regulations above communication. We must never let our­
selves be more concerned with being "right" than with being "understood." 
(Eliot, it seems, errs in this direction at times, counting too much upon 
validation within institutional or corporate language.) Our task is, some­
how, to avoid language anarchy, (with each person speaking his own private 
tongue), by coming together into community--yet without letting that com­
munity become dogmatic.
Sixthly, we must acknowledge the mutability of language, its con­
stant movement, rearrangement, change. We must leam to float with the 
current of language; we may build our little dams for the day in order to 
achieve a quiet pool of language, but we must be prepared for the dam's 
breaking tomorrow and the flood of language moving on.
Seventhly, we must understand the nature of the word itself. The
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word is actually a logos duplex; words have meaning, words have sound. 
Words are both symbols for referents and physical structures having sound 
and rhythm. Both aspects of the word are very valuable to us, but we must 
not confuse the two. We must never substitute the one for the other. 
Joyce, as we have demonstrated, made the mistake of substituting the phys­
ical word for the meaningful word, and many of us grow more concerned with 
the aesthetic aspect of language than with the communicative aspect.^2 We 
are more concerned with "sounding good" than "making sense." In fact, we 
must take great care always to distinguish between aesthetics and communi­
cation; to distinguish between language as a literary medium wherein per­
haps the aesthetics of language is of equal value with the communicative­
ness of language, and language as a communication medium wherein the aes­
thetics must take a secondary place. As Santayana warns us,
. . . sometimes sensation and language, instead of being passed 
over like the ticking of the telegraph, may become objects in 
themselves, in all their absolute musical insignificance; and 
then animals become idealists. The terms in which they describe 
things, unlike the things they meant to describe, are purely 
specious, arbitrary, and ideal; whether visual, tactile, auditory, 
or conceptual these terms are essentially words. They possess 
intrinsically in their own ontological plane, only logical or 
aesthetic being; and this contains no indication whatever of the 
material act of speaking, touching, or looking which causes them 
to appear. All possible terms in mental discourse are essences 
existing nowhere; visionary equally, whether the faculty that 
discovers them be sense or thought or the most fantastic fancy.2^
We must distinguish between communication as a literary problem and com­
munication as a problem in human intercourse; in the former we have the 
additional privilege of private investment of meaning; in the latter we
2^Locke, op. cit.. p. 149, attacks an over-concern with the sounds 
of words at the expense of word meaning.
90
^"'Santayana, op, cit.. p. viii.
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have the moral obligation to come as close as possible to the communi­
cator's intended meaning.
Finally, we must constantly keep in mind that language and commu­
nication are a social experience, and like all social experience, require 
courtesy, compassion, and wisdom. Susanne Langer says "it requires a cer­
tain amount of good-will and like-mindedness to understand the speaker of 
a one-word s e n t e n c e , b u t  the same need for good will and like-minded­
ness holds true for all communication efforts. We must have the desire 
to communicate, and we must give our communication efforts the loving at­
tention and concern that they deserve. Charles Williams makes much of 
"attention" and "concentration" as Christian virtues, and likewise they 
are virtues in our attempts to understand one another. Vast amounts of 
communication failure occur not because of any language difficulty what­
soever, but because of a failure of our wills and our desires. To a cer­
tain extent, Lionel Trilling is right when he says, "It is not words that
make our troubles, but our own wills. Words cannot control us unless we
25desire to be controlled by them." We must increase our desire to com­
municate, and then pay attention as we go about our communication business.
We must always consider the standard determinants of communica­
tion: to whom are we speaking, what is the occasion, what is the subject
of our message, what role do we play in this experience. Most important, 
of course, is in the paying attention to our receptors: if they do not
understand our rhetoric we must change it, if they have limited vocabu­
laries or other language limitations we must respect their weaknesses
24Langer, op. cit.. p. 111.
^^Lionel Trilling, op. cit.. p. 187.
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and accommodate ourselves to them. That is, if we truly want to communi­
cate. And we must be willing to communicate in as many ways as necessary 
and as many times as necessary. We must not be afraid to repeat ourselves, 
or to try various supporting media. Words certainly constitute our major 
communication medium, but we must be willing, if necessary and if possible, 
to use tactile and visual communication, the communication of action and 
deed, to back up our verbal attempts. Economy may be an aesthetic virtue, 
but it is not always a communication virtue.
A great deal of our communication breakdown in the twentieth cen­
tury must finally be attributed to a moral and spiritual breakdown. Eliot 
is perfectly right in suggesting that some sort of moral event is neces­
sary if we are to restore the broken word, if we are to return to communi­
cation. Allen Tate, too, has had much to say on the need for communion
among men as a requisite to communication. Though Edwin Arlington Robinson 
may have seen our modem world as a spiritual kindergarten where mankind 
is trying to spell 'God' with the wrong blocks, the opposite may be as 
equally true: we may have the right blocks and be trying to spell some­
thing less than the moral word. Our moral and spiritual apathy has led 
us to the deep silences that we blame on language rather than upon our­
selves. Many people cannot communicate because they do not want to com­
municate; they have nothing to say, not in intellectual lack, but in spir­
itual lack. They cannot say "I love you," because they have no emotional 
feeling. They are without rage or passion or insight or delight. They
^^John Stuart Mill in his essay "On Liberty" made a similar obser­
vation when he said tiiat "Very few facts are able to tell.their own story,
without comments to bring out their meaning." The simple statement, with­
out the necessary contextual communication, often fails.
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have nothing to say, they don't want to say anything, they apologize for 
their nothingness by claiming it is impossible to communicate. The break­
down of our time is in emotional sensitivity, in social concern, in spir­
itual commitments— not really in language or in communication. The broken 
word is often the mask behind which more grievous problems hide. The peo­
ple who are unable to tell us what they feel, often feel nothing. The 
people who are unable to explain their ideas, often have no ideas. The 
people who claim the prerogative of inarticulateness often are simply 
claiming the prerogative of irresponsibility and noninvolvement. Joyce 
is a good example of communication destruction by means of exile; Joyce 
failed to see the need for love as the ultimate basis for communication.
And though some may feel that "the harrowing tragedy of the O'Neill family 
was not the lack of love but failure in the communication of their love 
for each o t h e r , t h e r e  is every evidence that the love itself was sus­
pect, that the communication failed because there was so little love be­
hind it. In all our lives, a great deal of the failure to communicate 
can be attributed to linguistic stubbornness, pride, snobbery, and gen­
eral rigidity. One of the great restorative gestures our age must make
to set right the broken word is seek out a new sense of ethics, morals,
28and spiritual awareness.
In spite of all, of course, man will never conmunicate perfectly.
^^Bowen, op. cit.. p. xviii.
2Blt has been suggested that language communication is, in itself, 
a part of the ethical necessity for modem man: "Nonviolence means faith
in the Word, or simply Faith. Nonviolent action presupposes violent speech 
and covenants, openly arrived at. Silence and secrecy are the enemies. 
Where debate stops, there begins fight. Words heal, silence infects.
Silent inaction means apathy. It shows interest in nothing." Niccolo 
Tucci, "Offhand," Saturday Review. January 20, 1962, p. 12. .
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At least, man will always wonder if he has communicated perfectly. The 
truth is, he will never know. But communication difficulty or incomplete­
ness need not be exaggerated into utter communication failure, into the 
utter tragedy that O'Neill described. After all, man's very state is a 
qualified and compromised state. All our affairs, here in our human con­
dition, are inadequate. Just as we accept the mystery of life without 
having all the explanations we would like, so we must accept communication 
as we are able to manage without ever having that perfect accord and under­
standing that we would like to achieve. Life is a matter of faith. So 
is communication. All symbols are at last potentially ambivalent— even 
symbolic action is ambivalent--and it is only on faith that we accept a 
certain meaning for a symbol.
The broken word, after all, is not unuseable. It is less broken, 
more merely flawed. And man is accustomed to flawed instruments. Flawed 
as the word is, inadequate as language is, we must still recognize that 
"Language is, without a doubt, the most momentous and at the same time 
the most mysterious product of the human mind. Between the clearest ani­
mal call of love or warning or anger, and a man's least, trivial word,
there lies a whole day of Creation— or in modern phrase, a whole chapter 
29of evolution." Whether modem man establishes within himself the faith 
and will to lift himself from the pathos of communications is yet to be 
seen, of course. But surely he will. Surely he will not let that "whole 
day of Creation" have been in vain and slip back forever into the madden­
ing doubt that he is no more than the dumb animal. Modem man surely can, 
through thoughtfulness and compassion, make his way through all the
29Langer, op. cit.. p. 83.
217
communication obstacles and articulate, not just sounds without meaning, 
but the living words, neither magical nor miraculous but immensely human, 
that reach, though falteringly, flimsily, and flawed, somehow the other 
man, the other soul, the other consciousness hidden there behind that 
other garment of earthly being. "I am here, I am here I" we cry. "I am 
sending you my message. Help me to be heard. Help me to be understood." 
And in that very human cry we lift up the broken word, lift it high, lift 
it in the gesture that must be made. The broken word is better than no 
word. And we must rejoice in our partial victory, in the fact that we 
have a word at all, that we can elevate it at all— in human aspiration 
and in human dignity.
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